

# CASE STUDY



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The Scattered Beads



**THE EXECUTING AGENCY OF REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR ACEH AND NIAS  
(BRR NAD-NIAS)**

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**Head Office**

Jl. Ir. Muhammad Thaher No. 20  
Lueng Bata, Banda Aceh  
Indonesia, 23247  
Telp. +62-651-636666  
Fax. +62-651-637777

**Nias Representative Office**

Jl. Pelud Binaka KM. 6,6  
Ds. Fodo, Kec. Gunungsitoli  
Nias, Indonesia, 22815  
Telp. +62-639-22848  
Fax. +62-639-22035

**Jakarta Representative Office**

Jl. Galuh II No. 4, Kabayoran Baru  
Jakarta Selatan  
Indonesia, 12110  
Telp. +62-21-7254750  
Fax. +62-21-7221570

www.e-aceh-nias.org  
know.brr.go.id

---

Compiler : John Paterson  
Ratna Pawitra Trihadji  
Editor : Cendrawati Suhartono (Coordinator)  
Harumi Supit  
Linda Hollands  
Margaret Agusta (Chief)  
Melinda Hewitt  
Team from Tsunami Disaster Mitigation  
Research Center (TDMRC)  
Team from Faculty of Economics,  
Brawijaya University  
Team from Indonesian Institute of  
Sciences (LIPI)  
Copy Editor : Linda Hollands

Margaret Agusta  
Photography : Arif Ariadi  
Bodi Chandra  
Graphic Design : Amel Santoso  
Bobby Haryanto (Chief)  
Priscilla Astrini  
Wasito  
Final Reviewer : Aichida UI-Aflaha  
Ricky Sugiarto (Chief)

**Translation to Indonesian**

Editor : Gita Soerjoatmodjo  
Ratna Pawitra Trihadji  
Zuhaira Mahar  
Copy Editor : Ihsan Abdul Salam  
Suhardi Soedjono  
Translator : Bianca Timmerman  
Harry Bhaskara  
Prima Rusdi

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With this BRR Book Series, the Indonesian government, its people, and BRR wish to express their deep gratitude for the many kind helping hands extended from all over the world following the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and the March 28, 2005 earthquake in the islands of Nias.

Four years on, the once devastated landscapes are again vibrant with the sporadic rhythm of human life. This achievement is the result of a steadfast commitment of the local, national and international community, combined with the resilience of the people who lost so much.

The dynamics and challenges encountered during the massive undertaking of rebuilding homes, hospitals, schools and other infrastructure, while striving to empower those who survived to reshape their future and redevelop their way of life, provide an important understanding of the disaster-recovery process in Aceh and Nias.

In light of this, within the pages of this book, BRR would like to share those experiences and the lessons learned as a small contribution to return the favor to the world for the invaluable support it contributed to building Aceh and Nias back better and safer; as a history of the humanitarian journey of a united world.



*I am proud,  
that we can share the experiences, knowledge, and lessons  
with our fellow countries. It is hoped that what we have done  
can be a standard, a benchmark, for similar efforts  
at the national and international levels.*

Speech of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono  
at the Official Closing Ceremony of BRR at the State Palace, April 17, 2009  
about the BRR's trip to the Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Conference  
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, April 24, 2009



*In both emergency relief and reconstruction periods, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC) M-6 trucks played a very critical role on distributing logistics to remote and hardly accessible areas. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

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# Introduction

For a period of three days, beginning on December 27, 2004, the Indonesian flag was drawn to half mast, and a nation was in mourning. A national disaster was declared and the world watched in disbelief. An earthquake, followed by a series of tsunamis, struck the western-end of Indonesia, causing an unprecedented loss of life and the obliteration of whole communities. For those who survived, their homes, livelihoods, and prospects for the future were swept out to sea.

The earthquake, one of the largest in recent history measuring 9.1 on the Richter scale, was the result of a convergence between two tectonic plates beneath the ocean floor. Although dormant for over 1,000 years, with the buildup of pressure caused by one plate slowly sliding under the other at an estimated rate of 50 mm per year, on December 26, 2004, these two tectonic plates ruptured along a 1,600 km length of what is known as the Sunda mega-thrust.

The epicenter of this earthquake was located 250 km south-west of the Indonesian province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Its rupture - a slippage of up to 10 meters, resulted in the ocean floor being (permanently) lifted and dropped, pushing the entire water column up and down, and generating a series of powerful waves. Tsunamis swept violently up to 6 km inland over the shorelines of Aceh and surrounding islands, beginning less than half-an-hour after the earthquake. A total of 126,741 lives were lost and, in the wake of the disaster, an additional 93,285 people declared missing. Some 500,000 survivors lost their homes, while as many as 750,000 people lost their livelihoods.

In the private sector, which constituted 78 percent of the destruction wrought by the earthquake and tsunamis, up to 139,195 homes were destroyed or severely damaged, along with 73,869 ha of land with varying degrees of productivity. A total of 13,828 fishing boats vanished, up to 27,593 ha of brackish fish ponds disappeared, and 104,500 small-to-medium businesses ceased to exist. In the public sector, 669 government buildings, 517

health facilities, and hundreds of educational facilities were either destroyed or rendered non-functional. The loss to the environment included 16,775 ha of coastal forests and mangroves, and 29,175 ha of reefs.

The loss and damage of these regions did not end there and, on March 28, 2005, another major earthquake measuring 8.7 on the Richter scale struck the nearby islands of Nias in the Indonesian province of North Sumatera. This second natural disaster resulted in the death of 979 people and the displacement of 47,055 survivors. The proximity of this earthquake, a result also of two tectonic plates rupturing, slipping a length of 350 km, directly beneath the Simeulue and Nias islands, resulted in massive damage to the islands' infrastructure.

The eyes of the world once again watched in disbelief as the devastation of these regions unfolded, and helping hands began arriving from all corners of the globe to assist in the rescue and relief operations. Individuals of every race, religion, culture and political persuasion across each and every continent worldwide, along with governments, the private sector, non-government organizations and other national and international bodies, reacted in an unprecedented show of human concern and compassion.

From the scale of the devastation wrought by both disasters, it was clear that it would not be enough to simply replace the homes, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure. The rehabilitation and reconstruction program would need to embrace the rebuilding of the social structures that once thrived along the shores of Aceh and within the hinterlands of Nias. The trauma of losing friends, family and a means to support those who survived required that the recovery program focused not only on physical, but also non-physical, development, and on rebuilding an economy to a level that would ensure a firm foundation for future (re)development and growth.

On April 16, 2005, the Government of Indonesia, through the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2005, established the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, BRR) to coordinate and jointly implement a community-driven recovery program for Aceh and Nias. BRR's mandate was to design policies, strategies and action plans, within an atmosphere of transparency and accountability, and to implement them through effective leadership and coordination of the combined domestic and international effort to rebuild Aceh and Nias back better and safer.

The rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias have constituted a challenge not only for the people and Government of Indonesia but for the entire international community. That this challenge was overcome successfully is reflected in the conclusions drawn in evaluations concerning the recovery program. In the final months of the program, the World Bank among others concluded that the recovery was an unprecedented success story and a model for international ship - outcomes which were realized through effective government leadership.

The nation's management of the recovery program gained the confidence of donors, both institutions and individuals, and through BRR's anti-corruption policies and processes, the trust of the international community. And without the cooperation of the international community, the post-disaster situation in Aceh and Nias - the unparalleled devastation - could never have been reversed.

In recording this humanitarian achievement, BRR has produced the BRR Book Series containing 15 volumes that detail the processes, challenges, solutions, achievements and lessons learned during the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh and Nias. It is hoped that these books will function to capture and preserve the experience of the recovery, and to establish guidelines for future disaster-recovery programs across the world.

Even more on the Recovery field, many unique cases came to surface, for its potential use of lessons learned, awaiting to be studied and disseminated. Case by case, like beads of a necklace that are loosed. These beads need to be collected and are necessary to be reunited in a form that people may value, although not in the original form of the necklace. The anthology of these case studies, therefore, may be appreciated as an offer to collect and then arrange those beads.

Presenting 90 case studies (50 in this book and the remaining available in the cd of BRR Book Series), this book titled *The Scattered Beads* discovers specific and interesting phenomenon on the field during, and related to, the Aceh-Nias Recovery.



# 4-Year Achievement

## Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

<b>635,384</b> people displaced	
<b>127,720</b> people killed and 93,285 missing	
<b>104,500</b> small-medium enterprises (SME) destroyed	<b>155,182</b> laborers trained
	<b>195,726</b> SMEs received assistance
<b>139,195</b> houses destroyed	<b>140,304</b> permanent houses built
<b>73,869</b> hectares of agricultural lands destroyed	<b>69,979</b> hectares of agricultural land reclaimed
<b>1,927</b> teachers killed	<b>39,663</b> teachers trained
<b>13,828</b> fishing boats destroyed	<b>7,109</b> fishing boats built or provided
<b>1,089</b> religious facilities destroyed	<b>3,781</b> religious facilities built or repaired
<b>2,618</b> kilometers of road destroyed	<b>3,696</b> kilometers of road constructed
<b>3,415</b> schools destroyed	<b>1,759</b> schools built
<b>517</b> health facilities destroyed	<b>1,115</b> health facilities constructed
<b>669</b> government buildings destroyed	<b>996</b> government buildings constructed
<b>119</b> bridges destroyed	<b>363</b> bridges constructed
<b>22</b> ports destroyed	<b>23</b> ports constructed
<b>8</b> airports or airstrips destroyed	<b>13</b> airports or airstrips constructed

4<sup>th</sup> Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias

**ACEH-NIAS RISEN FROM ADVERSITY: HUMANITARIAN JOURNEY OF A UNITED WORLD**

13 February 2009



# Prologue

**DISASTER** is a tragedy, recovery is a triumph. The distance between the two can serve as a laboratory for understanding the physical and social factors that govern both. The December 2004 disaster in Aceh, and March 2005 earthquake in Nias, provided an opportunity for all government and non-government organizations to analyze the reasons behind the unimaginable human and physical loss wrought by these tragedies. In turn, and in many instances, the rehabilitation and reconstruction program that ensued resulted in a re-evaluation of established policies and practices in the implementation and delivery of humanitarian aid. It is these learning and re-evaluation processes and acquired knowledge that are recorded in the pages of this collection of case studies.

“Pick up a stone and throw it anywhere”, was Kuntoro Mangkusubroto’s remark when he first arrived in Aceh and asked about his recovery plan. “Where ever that stone lands, start there!” he explained when first examining the extent of the destruction. Such was the devastation caused by the tsunami that frankly, at that time, anything, anywhere that anyone could do, would be of assistance. It was in this setting that one of the largest ever humanitarian recovery programs began, and it was within this context that aid organizations from all over the world began to apply their knowledge and experience in a united effort to rebuild Aceh and Nias back better and safer.

Four years on, with more than \$7.2 billion spent by up to 1,000 organizations and thousands of national and international aid workers, life has returned to normal in Aceh

*President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono opens the Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias IV (CFAN-IV), Jakarta, February 13, 2009. The forum was the last joint event of BRR and all its Recovery Partners before BRR completed its four-year mandate. The President specifically emphasized the goal of CFAN-IV in consolidating the lessons learned of the recovery actors so that they could be disseminated all over the world for the sake of humanity. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

and Nias. The tragic memories remain, but the triumphant achievements have provided communities with hope and, concretely, a better understanding of disaster mitigation and community-based development. Similarly, it has provided implementing agencies with a better understanding of the complexities of rebuilding whole communities beginning with village planning through to the establishment of social and administrative support structures.

In an effort to record this journey between tragedy and triumph, this collection of case studies provides a glimpse of the experiences, the challenges and lessons, encountered by implementing agencies and their beneficiaries. These case studies were prepared by participating organizations in collaboration with BRR. While not all organizations had the opportunity to contribute, the collection represents a wide spectrum of those organizations who have participated in different ways, utilizing different skills, within the recovery program.

This compilation of case studies also covers a broad range of the different experiences, challenges and lessons organizations faced during this, one of the largest ever, humanitarian recovery programs. The aim of presenting this record of challenges and achievements in a case-study format is based on the understanding that stories from the field, prepared by implementing agencies on the ground, provide a basis for readers to either analyze, develop or simply absorb the different outputs and outcomes of the many and varied projects implemented to overcome an immense human tragedy. Moreover, it is an opportunity to study the lessons learned to ensure that in the advent of similar events, agencies and their beneficiaries will be even better prepared.

For convenience and ease of reading, this collection of case studies has been divided into 7 sectors even though, in some instances, individual case studies are cross sector. These sectors have been incorporated as chapter headings, in an effort to provide some structure to the 90 case studies included in this publication. With constraints on the number of pages available for this book, only 50 case studies appear in the printed pages, while the remaining 40 are contained on the CD attached to the inside back cover.

Reading through this maze of different case studies implemented by government and non-governmental organizations from all corners of the world, the complexities of humanitarian work on such a scale is clearly apparent. Moreover, as the needs of beneficiaries can vary significantly according to a range of environmental, social and cultural factors, notwithstanding the extent of the disaster's impact, this compilation of case studies provides a rare (unedited) insight into the implementation and delivery of humanitarian aid. ■





# Housing and Settlements

THE reconstruction of housing and settlements has been the hallmark of the recovery program. In addition to the achievements made within this sector, the building of homes and spatial planning for communities has been one of the most challenging aspects of the recovery for all implementing agencies. A total of 15 case studies are included in this book for this sector, with 9 appearing in the printed pages and the remaining 6 on CD. They provide an important perspective of the challenges and achievements associated with procurement, community-driven reconstruction and the issue of standardizing housing types.

*Housing in Alue Naga, Syiah Kuala Sub-district, Banda Aceh, was built in parallel with the fishing ponds rehabilitation, April 3, 2009. Out of the target of 139,195 houses in accordance to the Presidential Regulation 47/2008, 140,304 houses have been built. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

## Asian Development Bank (ADB)

# Nias Traditional Houses in Transition Process

**THE** Nias earthquake not only severely damaged public infrastructure but also cultural heritage in the form of traditional houses. Traditional houses are built in accordance with the traditional structure of society, knowledge of which has been passed down through the generations

With no other institution showing an interest in providing aid to restore traditional Nias houses, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) decided to extend aid to reconstruct and rehabilitate not only conventional houses but also traditional ones in South Nias.

Two projects were undertaken, namely Project Nias 1 in 2007 and Project Nias 2 in 2008. Reconstruction and rehabilitation for Project Nias 1 were done in four villages: Bawogosali, Hilimondregeraya, Hilinamoniha and Bawoganowo.

A total of 54 traditional houses were reconstructed in Bawogosali (14) and Hilimondregeraya (40), while 188 traditional houses were rehabilitated in Bawogosali (44), Hilimondregeraya (44), Hilinamoniha (20) and Bawoganowo (80).

After seeing the results of reconstruction and rehabilitation, primarily in Bawogosali and Hilimondregeraya, BRR asked ADB for more support to rehabilitate traditional houses in other villages. In 2008, Project Nias 2 commenced, in which 197 traditional houses were rehabilitated in seven villages: Hilisimaetano, Botohilitano, Hilimozaua, Lahusa Fau, Onohondro, Hilinawalo Mazingo and Hilizoroilawa.

ADB formed an observation team to study the architectural design of traditional Nias houses, covering library research, field observation and discussions with resource persons. Technical guidelines were drawn up to be used by facilitators, Community Development Groups (KSMPs) and beneficiaries.

The project was conducted under community-based contracts in which beneficiaries built their own houses. As they were able to make changes, including building a larger house than originally designed and contracted, beneficiaries agreed to cover the additional costs themselves. ADB and each community democratically formed a KSMP with a head, secretary and treasurer. Each KSMP consisted of six to 10 beneficiaries. The KSMPs played an important role in disseminating information, coordination and in managing and motivating members. Training for the head, secretary and treasurer included materials covering an introduction to community contracts, disbursement and cash flow management, progress monitoring and mechanisms. The objective of the training was to: (1) develop the capacity of KSMPs in coordinating and motivating their members to play an active role in the implementation process; (2) give them firsthand information on the Earthquake and Emergency Support Project housing program, particularly on the rehabilitation of traditional houses through community-based contracts; (3) introduce the roles and responsibilities of KSMP and encourage team building among beneficiaries; (4) introduce rehabilitation techniques and methods. Traditional House Specialist provided guidance for implementation and monitoring; (5) develop capacity in financial management.

First priority was given to the construction of the lower structural parts of houses, namely *batu ehomo*, *ehomo*, *ndriwa*, *siloto* and *lalihowo*. Second priority was given to flooring components of houses, namely *sikholi*, *folano*, *balo-balo* and *fafagahe bato*. Third priority was given to the middle-part, namely *lago-lago*, *ima laso* and *ama laso*. The last priority was given to roofing. Due to a shortage of palm leaves for traditional roofing after the earthquake, galvanized iron (GI) sheets were considered the easiest and cheapest alternative.

Each contract was valued at Rp 54 million, which BRR disbursed through the Central Treasury Office to each KSMP account in two installments. The first installment was for 55 percent of the contract value and the second for 45 percent. A KSMP withdrew the funds from its account with Bank Rakyat Indonesia. Application for the second disbursement was submitted to the officer for contract verification (Pejabat Pembuat Komitmen, PPK) with a progress report for every house and KSMP and photographs of the project. Initial installments were distributed to beneficiaries at the project implementation consultant's office in Teluk Dalam to ensure that distribution was acceptable and free from manipulation and corruption.

Heads of villages were invited to witness the process, and all activities were facilitated by a distribution team, which provided beneficiaries with details of the distribution procedure and mechanism, information on community contracts and the responsibilities

of beneficiaries as the main actors in the implementation of community contracts. In this process, the project implementation consultant (PIC) acted as a facilitator in guiding beneficiaries through the process of recording payments on budget and cash flow sheets and distributed all data to beneficiaries to ensure accountability.

## Development and Implementation

The measures taken by ADB to help reconstruct and rehabilitate traditional houses received a warm welcome, with many inhabitants building their own houses in traditional style. A few beneficiaries decided to build conventional instead of traditional houses. In the Project Nias 2 in seven villages, 274 traditional houses were originally slated to be rehabilitated, but after consultation with the head of BRR South Nias and ADB's housing advisor, it was decided that priority would be given to 197 selected houses. The decision to reduce the number was based on the view of BRR South Nias that only 200 houses could be completed before the closure of the DIPA 2008 budget allocation on Dec. 18, 2008.

The decision to rehabilitate only 197 traditional houses gave rise to complaints, voiced primarily by heads of villages and communities whose houses and villages had originally been verified by BRR and PIC for rehabilitation. However, it was beyond the means of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program to accommodate the 383 houses in eight villages affected by this issue.

In the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of traditional houses, it was decided to form a sub-team of Traditional House Specialists to prepare technical guidance for rehabilitation of traditional houses. However, one resident was dissatisfied with this decision, which resulted in an incident in Teluk Dalam, the capital of South Nias district. A consultant from an aid agency involved in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of traditional houses was assaulted by the village head and an accomplice who falsely accused the consultant of making mistakes that led to faulty construction.

The original contract between BRR and KSMP included roof work costing Rp 12 million. Upon the suggestion of an oversight consultant, changes were made to the design of the roof to maintain the character of the traditional Nias structure. Due to this, the volume of work increased markedly and the cost of roofing rose to Rp 16 million. Contract changes had to be made to cover the additional cost of roofing by eliminating some items scheduled after the roof work. Another contract amounting to Rp 6 million was then drawn up to cover the eliminated items. Thus, the total contracted amount for each house rose from Rp 54 million to Rp 60 million. However, some beneficiaries declined the additional payment for roofing in the false belief that the additional money would be granted to cover other items they needed for their houses.

To address this issue, PIC-45 conducted coordination meetings with the oversight consultant, PPK, KSMP, the Village Committee for Housing and Basic Infrastructure

Construction (KP4D) and village heads and communicated the result to beneficiaries. However, this issue persisted. Later, a community meeting was held in all four villages to discuss it directly with the beneficiaries, which resulted in the beneficiaries agreeing to cover the additional costs themselves.

## Lessons Learned

During the implementation process in the field, the main problems were a shortage of skilled carpenters, availability of good quality timber, lack of motivation on the part of some beneficiaries and perpetual rain in Nias.

During the course of rehabilitating traditional houses in Nias, the team noted that the use of community-based contracts was a good approach to implementation as it brought benefits to the community, such as (1) traditional houses would improve as the work was done by the owners; (2) the community learned how to organize themselves; (3) the community learned how to prepare a systematic work plan; (4) it increased the application of democratic ways to find solutions and compromise; (5) it improved the capacity of a community to undertake construction work; (6) it improved the capability of communities to manage funds in a responsible manner; (7) it increased community pride in traditional houses and villages.

Community-based contracts gave beneficiaries the opportunity to play a significant role during implementation. The above points could only be achieved through gradual empowerment.

ADB's training for KSMP and facilitators proved to be successful. The villagers were traditional low-income farmers who learned how to manage their affairs in implementing the program.

Similar programs should provide more time for empowerment before field work or rehabilitation or reconstruction is implemented.

Beneficiaries of traditional house rehabilitation in seven villages of Nias realized the benefits of the program and their enthusiasm and motivation increase accordingly.

The key to success of a program lies in the synergy between various stakeholders, but often the biggest challenge comes from the elites, including village heads and figures who misuse their power, positions and facilities to illegally collect money from people.

The distribution of funds directly to beneficiaries through community-based contracts minimized the opportunity for dishonest practices and encouraged people to play active roles. It also encouraged people to learn how to tackle problems in a guidable and systematic manner, which ultimately empowered the community to face future challenges.

Many beneficiaries complained that the funds were insufficient, claiming that their houses had suffered heavier damage that necessitated the replacement of more components, resulting in higher costs. It was explained that in the initial contracts, there were four main parts of traditional houses to which the priority of replacement was given, which complainants understood and eventually accepted.

In forming a KSMP, a PIC was able to assist KSMP and when possible organize them to provide material in bulk so that prices could be kept lower than market price. The team assisted them in finding good quality but cheap material in line with technical requirements.

However, many things needed evaluation. For example, traditional houses are built in accordance with the traditional structure of society, with the size and shape being determined by the owner's social status. Therefore facilitators, consultants, village heads and communities had to agree on the model of houses to be rehabilitated and reconstructed. This was aimed at preventing any misunderstanding between consultants and a community, which could have given rise to physical violence, such as that in Teluk Dalam, South Nias. Second, selection criteria for traditional houses funded for rehabilitation and reconstruction had to be appropriate and clear so as to avoid complaints and envy among inhabitants. Third, when construction was altered, either in the form of materials used or in the function of a section of a house, talks on the changes were held to determine the impact on the originality of the traditional houses and disbursement of funds. ■

# Rebuilding Society Through House Reconstruction

## Introduction

**THE** Grant Agreement between the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Republic of Indonesia for the Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project (ETESP), states that the overall goal of the project is to help rebuild the regions of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and North Sumatra province, including Nias Island following the December 26, 2004, tsunami and earthquake and to support their revival to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The housing component concerns the reconstruction of houses that were destroyed and the rehabilitation of damaged housing, as well as the provision of water and sanitation systems.

The scale of the devastation caused by the tsunami and earthquake in Aceh and Nias was so enormous that available knowledge and experience were of little use. Clearly the expertise needed to alleviate the problems was nonexistent. The most difficult problem faced was the loss of both tangible and intangible information, including the memory of the remaining inhabitants and landmarks.

To tackle this problem, ADB first dispatched a team of seasoned national and international experts, including those who had worked in the rebuilding of Calang, the capital of Aceh Jaya, to formulate the terms of reference (TOR) for consultants to be assigned to implement ADB assistance. The team was tasked with visiting as many potential sites for assistance as possible and to meet central government officials



from the Public Works Department and the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), as well as local government offices. Most sites that were proposed to the team were either already taken by other donors or “nonexistent”. Of those taken by other donor agencies, many were later abandoned. Amid this confusion, ADB decided to assist only two villages, namely **Gampong Pande** and **Lamdingin**, both in Banda Aceh. At a later stage other villages and relocated villages in Aceh were also assisted, while in Nias, traditional houses damaged by the massive March 2005 earthquake were rebuilt.

Gampong Pande, the ancient capital of Aceh, is located in Kutaraja district. The local community believes that the rulers of Aceh originate from this village, and their graveyard is still being looked after by the villagers. The long process of planning the rebuilding of the original village fostered a close relationship between ADB’s planning team and Gampong elders (see map), resulting in a decision to only accept assistance from ADB. The reconstruction involved 153 houses supported by roads and drains, a village office, community center (*meuligoe*) and women’s hall (*bale inong*). The latter was donated by Indonesian friends from France. The reconstruction of Gampong Pande was finished in about one year in accordance with all reconstruction principles.

## Development and Implementation

As the objective of the project was to re-establish basic housing for each household whose residence had been destroyed or damaged by the earthquake/tsunami and to ensure safe living conditions for the inhabitants, the house design and selection criteria for beneficiaries were carefully considered. A household was eligible for a grant for reconstruction or repair only if the claimant

had occupied the affected house at the time of the earthquake/tsunami. ADB also strove to ensure that community ties were reestablished. The number of houses built in each village was in accordance with the village plan made prior to construction.



Under the ETESP, women were fully entitled to rehabilitation provisions. Widows were the recipients of the grant for a house owned by their husbands. Orphans of a deceased couple would share, as co-recipients, the grant for the house owned by their parents. All efforts were made to ensure that widows and children inherited the land owned by their husbands or parents where legally possible. In case this was not possible, widows and children were entitled to receive rehabilitation premises on the basis of the policy for people who had been renting a house at the time of the tsunami.

In the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation, the following reconstruction principles need to be observed:

- Focus on the people as receivers of assistance and involve them in the reconstruction.
- Houses built would be able to withstand earthquakes of the intensity of the Aceh and Nias earthquakes, and construction would take into account existing national standards.
- Materials used, manner of construction and occupancy of the houses had to be environmentally friendly.
- Responsiveness to gender issues and the issue of incomplete families.
- Written collective agreement on land ownership, location and area size.
- Avoidance of disaster prone areas and adherence to the approved Spatial Plan.
- The use of local resources, both material and human.

*Rear part of the house is extended by using suspended temporary shelter.  
Photo: ADB Documentation*



*Traditional Nias house after rehabilitation.  
Photo: ADB Documentation*

- Involvement of the people in the planning and design, so they would be able to undertake future construction and repairs.
- Contractors built houses to be further developed by the residents themselves, supported as far as possible by the Project Implementation Consultant facilitator's supervision.

Houses were designed in the style of a traditional Acehese house with an open plan system and were not finished. The recipient of the house was therefore motivated to "complete" the house by modifying or developing it. This allowed the owners to meet individual needs, such as connecting two or more houses between siblings or parents and children and deciding how their house should look. In short almost all of the 153 houses reconstructed have a personal character; no two houses are alike. As all the initial houses have been fully rebuilt, the original village community was reestablished. In other villages, in Aceh as well as in Nias, ADB worked together with other donors such as UN Habitat.

The reconstruction of Gampong Pande required persistence and patience in order that the reconstruction came as close as possible to the original condition. The community was very active in providing information and discussing the outcome in the preparation stage although there were no

maps available or indication of what had been where before the disaster. Information was derived from satellite photos provided by the EU. With strong support from the community, the village plan was finished and sanctioned by village elders. The post reconstruction period saw not only further development of the reconstructed houses but also the planting of trees and flower beds. Three ancient graveyards, an important heritage site for Aceh, were restored.

The Nias experience was similar, the difference being that the community there was still intact. However, the village plan still needed to be prepared, a new house type designed and a manual for the rehabilitation of traditional houses jointly developed. Through the establishment of cordial working relations, some of the non-traditional houses destroyed in the earthquake have been reconstructed in the traditional model with minor modifications so the interiors can be used more effectively.

## Analysis

In the almost four years of implementing house reconstruction and rehabilitation in many parts of Aceh, including Sabang and Nias, the following valuable lessons can and should be learned.

1. Although not easy to achieve, it is extremely important that the people be involved as soon and as much as possible. The longer the time from the disaster, the more difficult it is to involve the people. Sincerity on the part of the people and consultants should be expressed as genuinely as possible to foster understanding.
2. The approach to reconstruction and rehabilitation should be based on serving the victims and rebuilding the community rather than meeting a target number of houses to be built. ADB ensured that ALL eligible members of the villages were served.
3. Planning and design should allow the possibility for the community to do more for themselves, resulting in an environment that is unique to the locality and one that best serves the needs and aspirations of the community.

One of the hindrances faced was the slow bureaucracy. This was further compounded by the poor quality work of most of the contractors who did not meet ADB prescribed standards. Lax management of the reconstruction work further reduced the quality of the end result that had been anticipated by ADB and the beneficiaries. The community contract model used in the Nias rehabilitation and reconstruction delivered better quality at more effective cost. This model was not feasible in Aceh as very few of the beneficiaries were at the locality after the disaster.

The reconstruction of destroyed houses has reached the final stage. Several international and local organizations and non-governmental organizations have assisted in whatever way they can and success has been achieved by incorporating local initiatives, such as in the reconstruction of Calang, which was totally destroyed and was able to function again in two months. ADB assistance is expected to hasten the development and rehabilitation of a larger area on a larger scale, as well as to help in the rebuilding of people's lives, homes and communities.

ADB built more than 6000 houses and rehabilitated more than 1000 in Aceh and Nias. Of these, 1300 houses are located in the southern part of Nias, with about one third of them being traditional house types. The ADB rebuilt the traditional houses in southern Nias because this heritage might have disappeared altogether if they were not restored. The reconstruction also included the unique public squares (*ewali*) that still feature megalithic elements. ■



*Main street of Gampong Pande.  
Photo: ADB Documentation*

Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

# Accelerating Aceh's Reconstruction and Rehabilitation through Community Land Mapping and Village Spatial Planning

**LAND** ownership recognition in parts of Aceh was turned on its head by the December 26, 2004, tsunami. The tsunami resulted in the loss of public land records, as well as people of good standing in the community who could testify to the traditional or statutory recognition of a person's land ownership. LOGICA's Community Land Mapping (CLM) and Village Spatial Planning (VSP) programs assisted communities to obtain essential data on land boundaries immediately after the tsunami, affording quick rebuilding of houses and essential public infrastructure. This case study shows how it is possible to work with survivor-communities to help them begin the process of rebuilding their lives from the ground up.

## Background of the Initiative

As well as causing the deaths of 126,741 people, the tsunami that hit Aceh on December 26, 2004, also destroyed vital infrastructure, such as homes, schools, government offices and other places providing public services.

Look at the picture below of the destruction wrought by the 2004 tsunami in Aceh – this image is from the city of Banda Aceh – and imagine what it would retake to build your home in an area like this, where it is unclear where land boundaries lay. How would you begin? The people who survived the tsunami in Aceh had to rebuild their lives in this devastated environment, while burdened with incredible mental and physical exhaustion, having lost family members, all their possessions, their homes and towns.



The CLM program was designed to provide basic initial data about the land boundaries in communities, and VSP provided the villagers and donors with basic infrastructure data in order to kick-start development.

*Banda Aceh, 4 months after tsunami,  
April 2, 2005.  
Photo: LOGICA Documentation*

## Significant Events

Based on community demand immediately following the tsunami, LOGICA facilitated community meetings with affected communities to identify the survivors' most urgent needs. Consequent to these meetings, land boundary identification and village spatial planning were selected as the two top priorities by communities. LOGICA chose to address both these concerns, beginning with CLMs.

LOGICA trained villagers in affected villages to map existing settlements and land boundaries, complete consensus-based ownership agreements and mark individual land plots. This was all done in accordance with government guidelines and the result of the work was accepted by communities. Community-based ownership agreements were required before the reconstruction of houses could begin. The consultative process resulted in CLM products, such as village maps, land ownership lists, and community boundary agreements.

From these CLM products, Village Spatial Plans (VSPs) were developed, assisting each village in planning community land use, infrastructure and other resource needs. VSPs

also assisted 'external' agencies – namely, district and sub-district levels of government, NGO's, donors and their consultants – by providing information of a standard format (produced through community consultation and representing community spatial planning concerns) to quickly and easily assess the spatial environment of each village.

All these mapping products were transferred to village, sub-district and district levels of government and made available to donor housing providers and related contractors for VSP and reconstruction purposes.

LOGICA worked with communities to complete CLMs in 400 villages across ten Acehese Districts, with 88,718 land parcels mapped and more than 200 VSPs produced. More than 3,200 villagers were involved in the CLM process and approximately 1,050 villagers participated in the VSP process. At least 30% of CLM volunteers were women. VSPs have been used by more than 270 government agencies (of various levels of government) and local and International NGOs that have been working toward Aceh's reconstruction and rehabilitation.

## Challenges

- **Starting from zero, with zero to start from.** At the beginning it was very difficult to organize community meetings while people were still struggling physically and mentally to restart their lives following the tsunami. In this environment it was not easy to convince communities that they should move on and rebuild their lives again. We learned that it was necessary to listen to communities and develop a program based on their essential needs, a process that has been both effective and has created a sense of ownership of the assistance program among the beneficiaries.
- **Lack of local knowledge and expertise.** Programs like CLM and VSP had never been conducted in Aceh before. Subsequently it proved extremely difficult to find well-trained community facilitators in these fields from within Aceh to train communities. We had to spend considerable resources to first train land-mappers and planners before they could start work with communities. LOGICA decided to recruit local Acehese graduates and senior lectures from the Architecture Dept at the local Syiah Kuala University, and train them in the appropriate techniques. This also had the positive consequence of building local Acehese capacity in this regard. Using local human resources also worked to solve many challenges in the field, particularly in regards to culturally sensitive issues.

## Lessons Learned

- **Build good relationships with community.** CLM and VSP programs involved communities through both community meetings and engaging community members to work in small teams to produce the maps and plans. Good community relations were also fostered through the LOGICA team living with the communities with whom they worked.
- **Gaining trust.** Community involvement in LOGICA's programs have been key factors in the effectiveness and efficiency of the CLM and VSP initiatives. Working closely with communities and their leaders and the local authorities has been essential for all people/stakeholders to gain a sense of ownership of the program.
- **Community involvement.** The sustainability of programs, their outputs and outcomes depends greatly on the level of community involvement and its sense of ownership.
- **Optimizing local and community knowledge as a resource.** In disaster situations, when logistics and infrastructure are drastically compromised and survivors are traumatized, using or optimizing community and broader local resources – namely, knowledge of local culture and land ownership history – can speed up the recovery process and is often more effective than bringing in resources from outside the affected area/province/country.
- **Learning by doing approach.** It is wise to not be too ambitious in starting programs. LOGICA started CLM in only twelve villages within a single sub-district and then – having proved successful – moved gradually to replicate the program in another almost 400 villages across ten districts in Aceh. This approach provided an opportunity for LOGICA staff and community leaders involved in the programs to learn by doing: testing the methodology and shaping it to suit the project. ■

## Yayasan Masyarakat Makmur Mitra Adil (Mamamia)

# Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Houses and Settlements in Aceh (RRHS-Aceh Program)

**THE** Mamamia foundation was established on January 4, 2003, in Banda Aceh to promote the interests of impoverished communities, particularly in rural areas, throughout NAD. Mamamia or Masyarakat Makmur Mitra Adil (People's Welfare through Equitable Partnerships) carried out its first activity in four villages in Montasik sub-district in Greater Aceh District in early 2003 in partnership with KUB (Klat Limbang). The Montasik project dealt with the production and marketing of chilies.

Mamamia was fortunate to have acquired a good understanding of Acehnese society during the years preceding the tsunami. That knowledge allowed it to take prompt and appropriate action when the tsunami struck on Dec. 26, 2004.

In May 2005, a high level representative of the German Development Bank KfW visited Mamamia's base camp in Seungko Mulat, Lhoong sub-district to gain insights into Mamamia's reconstruction implementation strategies in the PRR-L Program.

The bank representative was in Aceh to assess the situation with the aim of initiating and executing several interventions with German government funding through KfW. One of the identified interventions concerned reconstruction and rehabilitation of houses and settlements in Aceh for which an allocation of 41 million Euro was envisaged.

Mamamia was approached by German Consultancy Firm GITEC Consult GmbH in July 2005. GITEC proposed to subscribe to the KfW-RRHS Aceh Tender together with Mamamia with the understanding that GITEC would be the leading party, Mamamia would

implement the house reconstruction using its empowerment model, and GITEC would supervise Mamamia's activities both technically and financially. As the leading party, GITEC would take care of all dealings with KfW, BRR and related institutions, including reporting.

After the RRHS was commissioned to GITEC, an agreement was signed between GITEC and Mamamia on Oct. 1, 2005, with the concession that GITEC could also employ alternative reconstruction models to ensure targets were met in the event that the Mamamia model could not produce results fast enough. In accordance with the agreement, Mamamia would administer its own finances and would be financed in Euro directly from GITEC's head office in Germany. Mamamia agreed to report to the RRHS-Aceh general manager in Banda Aceh.

The budget for the Mamamia-RRHS activities would be based on detailed and approved Bills of Quantities (BoQ) that were expressed in quantities of building materials needed to build a house of a specific type or any other facility at agreed unit prices per kind of material. GITEC on its part would monitor market prices to make sure that the Mamamia's unit prices conformed to current market prices.

The price of a house or other facility would include the total price in the BoQ with an additional 15 percent to cover the delivery costs of services and supplies by Mamamia to the beneficiaries and the running of the facilities and services needed to that effect at both, Mamamia's headquarters and base camps. Services would include the cost of conducting elaborate identification- and assessment exercises in connection with each potential beneficiary and his/her village and sub-district/district environments.

## Relevant Features of the Mamamia Approach:

1. All programs are carried out by Acehnese people from rural areas.
2. Larger programs are coordinated and monitored from base camps in the area concerned. Smaller programs or portions of larger programs in remote areas are coordinated and monitored from a health post in that area.
3. Each program aims at assisting the village concerned to solve a specific problem, taking into account that the reconstruction of a village needs to be carried out in ways that promote the best possible conditions for a harmonious village community.
4. The community is the partner of Mamamia from the identification phase until the completion of a program in a specific village. This partnership is shaped in village meetings and through the execution of the forum's decisions in the implementation phase.
5. Each program is executed in a way that empowers each beneficiary to build or develop his/her facility such as a house, orchard or vegetable garden. This is formalized in a Grant Contract between Mamamia (on behalf of each specific

- program) and the beneficiary. Under this contract, the beneficiary becomes both, the principal and the builder/developer of his/her facility. The beneficiary can also be a collective such as a village for the building of a health center.
6. The Land Entitlement Certificate (SKT) that is established in accordance with Customary Law is sufficient legal proof of land ownership to allow the beneficiary to start building/working on that land.

## Implementation of the RRHS-Aceh Program

### Number of Houses

According to the agreement between GITEC and Mamamia, the number of houses to be rebuilt by Mamamia was provisionally slated to reach 5,000 units. After GITEC, KfW and GTZ identified the number of districts, sub-districts and villages for the RRHS-Aceh Program in July-August 2005, Mamamia was invited to cover the reconstruction needs of selected locations in Banda Aceh and Greater Aceh and Bireuen districts. Mamamia was invited to construct 3,463 houses in these areas. However adjustments were made. Ultimately, by the end of 2008, as many as 4,513 had been built by RRHS-Mamamia in 51 villages.

### Two Types of Houses

Under the RRHS Program, Mamamia built two types of houses: the *kalsi* plank house and the hollow block house. The *kalsi* plank houses were of the same dimensions and layout as the *kalsi* plank house in Lhoong (42 m<sup>2</sup>, including a bathroom of 6 m<sup>2</sup>). However, some features were changed and/or reinforced such as: a small terrace, thicker roof sheeting, and a steel anchor connection between the foundation and wooden vertical beams.

The hollow block house designed by GITEC at the end of 2005, was of the same dimensions as the *kalsi* plank house. The walls, however, were made of concrete blocks of 15 cm wide with two holes inside. Steel bars are put inside the holes at regular intervals and the holes filled with concrete after the blocks were placed one on top of the other, resulting in a strong construction. At the final count, *kalsi* plank houses numbered: 2,574 units; and hollow block houses: 1,939 units; a total of 4,513 units.

### Complementary Measures

#### Water:

GITEC carried out the larger water supply systems, while Mamamia took care of shallow wells. A total of 919 shallow wells were constructed. In some areas, shallow wells were not feasible due to brackish water or other reasons. In such cases, water harvest units were

made (at the request of the beneficiaries concerned) by attaching gutters to the roofs and channeling rain water into a 1,100-liter poly tank. The poly tank was placed on a stand beside the house. A total of 421 water harvest units were installed, 170 in Bireuen and 251 in Lamnoo area.

### Sanitation:

The RRHS houses all come with a bathroom. Mamamia also built 3,820 septic tanks close to the houses. GITEC built the remaining 592 units with contractors: in Baitussalam (367) and Lamnoo (225).

### Roads:

GITEC commissioned the building of roads and related works to contractors. Mamamia built 3.9 km of roads in and between villages in Bireuen. In Bener Meriah, Mamamia in association with the village people repaired about 7 km of access roads to building sites.

## A Brief Case Study: Bireuen Base Camp

The Mamamia Assessment Report on the proposed villages in the Bireuen District was finished on Sept. 28, 2005. The establishment of the Bireuen base camp in Jeunieb sub-district started in November 2005. The base camp team was accommodated in tents. Existing facilities on the rented compound offered office and storage facilities, so that the building of additional facilities was limited to a kitchen with dining space, a *balai* (small hall or gathering place) and some other small spaces. As a result, the base camp team was quick to become fully operational.

Regular meetings with the target villages were organized. Among these the most important was held at the end of November 2005. At that occasion, 550 people gathered in the base camp, including the village heads of all target villages. During the meeting, it was agreed that, in order to start immediately, the houses that would be built in Bireuen, would be *kalsi* plank houses, that these houses would have a terrace at the front and that the building cost would be Rp 52,900,000, or Euro 4.465,87, per house.

Most importantly, the attendees from the target villages pushed the issue of reconstructing their villages in ways that would foster harmonious village communities. This request implied that not only the brick houses would be considered for reconstruction but also the small wooden huts of the numerous poor in these villages. Many of the latter had refused to go to barracks after the tsunami and had repaired/rebuilt their former wooden structures. Mamamia promised to consider this matter in association with GITEC and KfW.

Some weeks later, it was agreed that the request of the village people was to be responded to by attending to the housing needs of such poor candidates as well. This became an important characteristic of the Bireuen program. It definitely contributed toward the success of the Bireuen RRHS-Aceh Program that proceeded without significant social problems.

As of early November 2005, the identification team of the base camp checked the lists of candidate-beneficiaries that were established by the target villages and BRR, and compared these with the figures in the MoUs established in July-August 2006. Each listed beneficiary was assessed, to make sure, among other things, that each person's SKT was in order. The first Grant Contracts were processed in December 2005 and construction work started at the beginning of January 2006. From then onwards, the speed of the RRHS reconstruction train in Bireuen increased steadily to reach monthly outputs in terms of equivalent houses (five installments equal one house) of: 161.8 in June 2006; 207.8 in July 2006; and 266 in August 2006. In July 2006, the sub-districts of Peudada and Pandrah were added to the original four sub-districts in Bireuen. In 2007, one village in Kuala sub-district was added to the RRHS Program as well. Expansion of assistance to additional sub-districts and villages came about due to the request of the sub-districts and villages concerned.

When the RRHS-Aceh Program in Bireuen was officially terminated with a closing ceremony in Peudada Sub-district on Aug. 26, 2007, the figure of 2,420 constructed houses figured on the memorial stone unveiled on that occasion. The stone shows the number of constructed houses per sub-district and per village. Boards placed at the side of the memorial stone display pictures of each beneficiary, standing in front of his/her house and holding his/her completion certificate. The houses in Bireuen were built from January 2006 to August 2007, a period of 20 months, not including the six-month identification/assessment period. Hence, an average of (2,420 in 20 months) 121 houses were built per month.

## Lessons Learned

1. Both, the number of houses and the speed of construction, point to the efficient and smooth implementation of the RRHS-Aceh Program in Bireuen district. The reported results were achieved by applying Mamamia's empowerment strategy in the reconstruction of tsunami affected villages. The strategy was first applied in Lhoong and this became the training ground for Mamamia's staff and personnel. Bireuen demonstrated the potential of the approach as a strategic tool for reconstruction in rural areas.
2. One of the results of the empowerment strategy was a strong feeling of belonging on the part of the beneficiaries. This can be concluded from a house occupancy study that was carried out by GITEC between December 2007 and April 2008. Two results are particularly significant as follows:
3. After the completion of the Bireuen Program, the occupancy rate of the houses averaged 98 percent with 20 out of 31 villages scoring 100 percent each; In April 2008, 751 beneficiaries in Bireuen had already carried out extensions/modifications to their houses. That represents 31 percent of the built houses.

The price of the *kalsi* plank house in Bireuen is Rp 52,900,000 per house, or Euro 4.465,87 per house (at the average exchange rate for the whole operation of 1 Euro = Rp 11,845.40) This price includes the additional 15 percent for delivery costs of goods and services. This price was maintained from the start until the end of the construction cycle in Bireuen, mainly thanks to the adequate and timely cash flow from the donor via GITEC to Mamamia in application of the Disposition Fund Arrangement that was agreed on between the governments of Germany and Indonesia. This ensured the continuity of the building activities. In addition, it allowed the more bulky and price-sensitive items in the package of building materials to be purchased at an early stage and stocked in the base camp, thus avoiding inflationary pressure.

4. The response on the part of the people in Bireuen can be seen from the fact that Mamamia's base camp in Bireuen received more than 5,000 applications for assistance, in particular from Peusangan sub-district.

## Main Conclusions and Recommendations

1. The Empowerment Strategy applied by Mamamia demonstrated the great potential of this approach as a strategic tool for both, reconstruction and smallholders' land development schemes in rural areas in NAD.
2. Cooperation between Mamamia and its donors has been positive and constructive. In connection with the RRHS Programs, it needs to be underlined that the Disposition Fund Arrangement between the governments of Indonesia and Germany and the execution thereof by the executive authorities KfW and BRR and the implementing consultant GITEC Consult GmbH, have greatly facilitated Mamamia in carrying out its duties under the RRHS.

### Two Notable Results of This Are:

1. The considerable cash flow needed to ensure the smooth and uninterrupted supply of goods and services to the beneficiaries was always adequate and timely; and
2. The cost price per type of house and per area of intervention was stable. ■

## Two Years of Settlement Recovery in Aceh and Nias

**I**N post-disaster contexts, planning policies often depend on real-space recovery shaped by decisions from people under duress. The difficult relationships between actual recovery and the problematic and dysfunctional templates used by many planners was reflected during the post-tsunami recovery and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. The behavior of the victims continuously and systematically went against the preconceptions of the planners. Survivors opted for recovery, not for re-planning. Two years after the tsunami, institutional planning capability continued through small sub-district undertakings, in ad-hoc workgroups, and in a multitude of recovery programs.

By December 2006, about 60,000 houses in Aceh and Nias had been either completed or were nearing completion. About 20,000 were still under construction and an equal number had yet to be started. Many people were still claiming housing support – often those who were landless but also many who had been displaced because of conflict or poverty. Settlement and other infrastructure development progressed slowly. The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh-Nias (BRR) started a hand-over and decentralization policy, but local authorities felt disenfranchised.

It was considered that even though professionals were often well meaning in acknowledging the importance of participatory principles and consultative processes, they often failed in the implementation of these principles and processes. The reasons were manifold:

- programs were supply-driven and disenfranchised people from taking recovery into their own hands
- professionals had little understanding of the behavioral drivers of communities making decisions in a post-disaster context
- professionals only saw a disaster context and lacked understanding of the conflict dimensions and the impact on governance
- professionals allowed people to participate only in micro-issues and disenfranchised them from participating in wider governance decisions.

## More or Fewer Houses?

After two years, it became obvious that inaccurate lists of beneficiaries could result in unjust distribution, or exclude some survivors from the system. BRR therefore undertook a beneficiary registration, which ultimately revealed another 30,000 beneficiaries – including those claiming assistance for repairs and for land lost to the sea, or for the loss of rental tenure.

New factors emerged that resulted in the fluctuation of the needs numbers. New families were formed or split due to remarriage or death. People had also moved, either from the barracks to return to their original villages, or from one place to another in search of work. It became more difficult to track them into aggregated total numbers. There were also people who had more than one destroyed house in different locations.

The way of calculating the number of houses to be rebuilt varied depending on the purpose of reconstruction: to secure tenure of shelter for survivors, or to restore the immobile capital (the properties, house and land) of the people. Clearly, organizations with an interest in building and people with an interest in restoring immobile capital had the potential to increase the list of beneficiaries.

A good lesson can be learned from Pidie, a district along the Aceh east coast, where survivors from the same village were accommodated in the same barrack, and NGOs were coordinated early enough to avoid overlapping. In Calang, Logica, an AUSAID program, helped BRR's regional office develop an accurate database. It demonstrated that accurate numbers could come only from the field, village by village, with clear names and addresses. Local authorities needed to be involved to determine whether continued housing assistance should remain a priority only for tsunami victims or whether a more comprehensive policy of housing assistance was needed.

## Transitional Shelters and Permanent Houses: Toward Phased Houses

Two years after the tsunami, much energy was put into debating the issue of transitional versus permanent shelter. In the first month, the government focused on the construction of barracks, or army-style compounds. When discussing the pros and cons of the barrack solution, arguments surfaced not only concerning the temporary nature, but also about the fact that it prevented people from “camping” outside, on their land, where their villages of origin used to be. Barracks were the government’s answer to deter people from returning to the dangerous coastal areas.

One year after the tsunami, about 20,000 transitional shelters worth over US\$100 million had been built by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) also built thousands of houses for temporary use. The Red Cross version could be dismantled and reassembled, while the IOM kind was likely to break in the dismantling process. Some of these temporary shelters were constructed in inappropriate places, such as on the banks of rivers and canals in Banda Aceh, which could lead to environmental problems in that they could ultimately develop into permanent slums.

These could be considered transitional shelters. However, from a technical and environmental point of view, anti-rust steel and well treated timbers are not temporary materials. Moreover, the method of assembling the materials made it possible to re-assemble them, thereby creating permanent, though movable houses. This kind of shelter proved to be particularly useful in isolated areas where logistics, infrastructure and labor skills were limited. These ‘transitional shelters’ started to become permanent houses in many west-coastal villages, in that they were built on locations that were adequate for permanent houses, and in that people who did not plan to dismantle or move them in the near future upgraded them with extensions and furniture.

If IFRC transitional shelters had been provided earlier within the original villages of the survivors, all the permanent houses would have been completed earlier. Transitional shelters in original villages would have given time for proper planning and would have facilitated the participatory process. It would be better, however, to incorporate the transitional shelter into the construction of a permanent house. An incremental approach could empower communities to make decisions on phasing and rebuilding. However, good technical assistance is required. Construction responses also vary depending on the availability of materials.

## Community-Based Reconstruction

There is a consensus that community-based housing reconstruction can respond quickly to urgent needs, deliver better results and satisfaction than other reconstruction methods and achieve relief at an early stage. It also strengthens solidarity among community members and thereby creates social capital; allows women to be a part of reconstruction work; strengthens local institutions; achieves good planning and better results; can limit disaster vulnerability; and can be done with good monitoring and thus achieve transparent accountability.

However, there is a need for a standard definition for the terms 'participation' and 'community-based'. Confusion among beneficiaries surfaced in cases where community-based approach clusters were surrounded by non-community-based projects. A community-based approach requires a fair lead-time, which is compensated by speed and satisfaction in the later stage. Most failures in the community-based approach were caused by delays in its start up, leaving little time for the participatory process. In some cases there was a genuine shortage of capacity to conduct a community-based approach, despite genuine good intentions to satisfy the aspirations of the community. There was a shortage of community facilitators, demonstrating the need to train more facilitators quickly, and the need for government policies that support, regulate and encourage such training.

Participation can also be specified for different aspects and stages and/or aspects of the reconstruction process: organization, planning of houses, villages, settlements and cities; procurement, construction, evaluation, etc. A matrix could be developed for this purpose by combining levels of participation and specific participatory activities in each stage and aspects of reconstruction.

## Toward Sustainable Reconstruction

In 2005, UN-HABITAT called for a "Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction" policy in post-conflict, natural and manmade disasters. It concluded that disasters can provide opportunities for sustainable development, but sustainable relief and reconstruction requires that rehabilitation efforts are integrated into long-term development strategies.

Specifically, sustainable relief and reconstruction requires permanent links between emergency relief and reconstruction on the one hand and the transitional phase of development and the development of local government capacities, which operate as active partner in the process on the other hand. It also requires development of productive economic activities; development of broad-based and long-term reconstruction and shelter strategies; protection of land and property rights of affected populations and development of long-term solutions for land and property dispute resolution; vulnerability reduction and disaster management; tenure security; the equal rights of women; and the creation of strategic partnerships and alliances at all levels.

Has the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias satisfied these requirements? Without a committed overall vision and “master” plan, there is a question of whether the reconstruction will contribute to long-term overall sustainability. The later an overall vision and “master” plan gets committed, the less sustainable reconstruction will be. It is vital for all actors to focus on this vision and make revisions and corrections wherever necessary. An environmental-, economic-, and socio-cultural- impact analysis can only be conducted and evaluated if this overall vision exists.

Participatory community-approach in all sectors, not only in house building, but also in local economic recovery and development is clearly the only hope for a truly sustainable formation of social capital. Therefore, enforcement and improvement with a clearly formulated minimum standard of participatory community-based practices is a must.

## Planning and Coordination – Revisiting the NGO Role

Rebuilding housing with communities was started by more than 100 organizations. They went in with ample funding and were received with open arms by communities as people were aware that large programs were likely to fail in a conflict area. The people of Aceh and Nias intuitively knew that it was better to trust operations of small and agile actors under the radar than large organizations with bureaucratic planning. For this reason 100 organizations engaged themselves in housing – many for the first time.

Almost all organizations agreed to a few simple reconstruction guidelines on land mapping, village planning and reconstruction. Many showed their house designs to local Public Works departments for approval. Once they were approved, however, a more complicated task awaited -- returning to the different communities in order to find materials, workers and skilled supervisors. Moreover, the organizations had to develop adequate processes to find agreements with communities and agreements with their head offices.

Many organizations, especially the smaller ones, started building without a clear overall concept. They worked in the limelight and often failed. In the best of cases, they then dropped out, halted or stopped their programs. Other postponed their start-up indefinitely, such as many Red Cross movements. In the worst cases, organizations built many bad houses and had to acknowledge costly defeats. A UN-HABITAT monitoring program with Syiah Kuala University was designed to give early feedback to organizations on built achievements and failures and on the aspirations and satisfaction of beneficiaries. It tracked many problems but did not always prevent early mistakes.

UN-HABITAT’s policy and sector support program never questioned the critical need to let the multitude of non-governmental organizations take part in housing reconstruction

in Aceh. These organizations created a swell of activities, to the desperation of logistics planners. They accumulated critical experience on housing and delivered more roofs to the people of Aceh than probably would have been possible through careful planning. The organizations fostered early-on empowerment among communities, which were emerging from a decennia-long armed conflict. They accepted that people returned to tsunami affected villages and often unwittingly prevented large-scale resettlement of people to locations with uncertain tenure security and historically untested sites in terms of earthquake safety – swamps, peatland and quickly filled-in areas that were being acquired at low prices by many a local authority.

BRR and UN-HABITAT stimulated simple consensual guidelines among organizations on land mapping, pricing indicators, equitable rights and options for renters and squatters and community-empowered resettlement. Moreover, with leaflets on housing rights and with cartoon-booklets on good house construction, UN-HABITAT and its partners reached out to beneficiaries, communicating their rights and responsibilities. Food distribution programs and civil society organizations, which previously only worked on conflict issues, were the intermediaries to reach people in often remote locations. UN-HABITAT also appointed Indonesian research institutions to survey background issues concerning problematic settlement and urban recovery.

In the years to come, it is likely that the remaining NGO budgets will be used more in development work, which aims to eradicate poverty. After BRR's mandate ends, settlement recovery will need to encompass genuine development and reach out to all community members, including those who did not lose their house.

## Planning While Building

After almost two years of building and planning simultaneously, there was an increasing demand for more committed planning, especially at macro-, citywide- and regional- coordinating level.

What is true for planning in general is certainly true for spatial planning. At the time, no apparent single spatial-planning approach had been adopted or coordinated. Different organizations made plans only so far as they were directly necessary for their programs or clusters. Local governments appeared too busy and weak to take control and make decisions on this issue. The creation of a wider infrastructure was in the process of being prepared, and included sea dikes along Banda Aceh's coastline and new road segments along the west coast from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh. The engineers, however, who were appointed to do macro infrastructure planning for Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar were first painstakingly doing the micro engineering for the district of Meuraxa. In 2006, Aceh was being rebuilt house by house. In the following two years, it would presumably be reconstructed drain by drain and road by road.

## From Action Planning to Spatial Planning

In the first months after the tsunami, many organizations were tempted to exaggerate the planning needs for the devastated settlements or for new resettlement areas. Many villages and neighborhoods were not at great risk to a new tsunami. UN-HABITAT and other experienced organizations tried to limit village planning to small improvements of basic infrastructure, including escape roads and other facilities. UN-HABITAT assisted communities by facilitating the elaboration of their own village planning. This was part of a Community Action Planning process, which took place prior to community contracting and house building.

## Lessons Learned

Ultimately, it was found that:

- needs assessments should involve communities and local institutions;
- transitional shelter should be provided early and allow people to return to their homes;
- community-driven housing development should be mainstreamed and improved;
- sustainable recovery requires people to take charge of their recovery at an early stage;
- for sustainability reasons, assistance should not be organized in segmented sector programs;
- NGOs have a vital function in mobilizing human resources and in approaching communities in conflict areas;
- planners should acknowledge that building is more important than planning in post-disaster situations;
- planning and spatial planning in particular can be used as genuine recovery tools geared toward rebuilding and restoring consultative governance.

In crisis management, a central tenet is that errors and failures prior to disasters will be repeated and amplified during the course of disaster response. Disasters rarely are opportunities to immediately start anew, because in fighting disasters, the legacies of the past are often not overcome but simply amplified. In the Aceh context, poor consultative processes prior to the disaster made it difficult to achieve strong consultative processes during the response. ■

# Transitional Living Centers (TLC): Immediate Shelter Solution in Emergency

## Background

**FOLLOWING** the tsunami, one of the strongest needs identified by the affected communities in the recovery phase was housing. In Indonesia, a total of 139,195 houses were destroyed in Aceh and Nias.

Post tsunami, tens of thousands IDPs (Internally Displaced People) lived under tarpaulins, in tents and schools and needed to have better places to live. During the earliest stage of the emergency, World Vision distributed 2,000 tents to the IDPs in the first two months of the crisis.

After the first 90 days, World Vision transitioned to the rehabilitation phase of its response. In this stage, rehabilitation to development, various activities were conducted, including the construction of Transitional Living Centers (TLC) as a housing option for the IDPs.

## Implementation

In World Vision's tsunami response, the shelter program was one of the most important areas. It was developed in two stages: temporary and permanent housing.

World Vision started to construct the first Transitional Living Centers (TLC) in March 2005. Therefore, people camped in tents and tarpaulins in the immediate area could move

into the temporary housing, as World Vision prepared to build permanent houses based on the people's need.

Some of the earliest Transitional Living Centers that World Vision constructed were in towns along the west coast of Aceh including Lhok Nga, Leupung, Lhoong (Aceh Besar), and Lamno (Aceh Jaya). Later on, World Vision constructed more Transitional Living Centers in close proximity to the village sites (where communities would eventually return to) in order to ensure maximum participation in the rebuilding process, and provide them with opportunities for skill enhancement and income for provision of their labor.

In total, World Vision constructed 97 Transitional Living Centers in communities across Aceh, each was designed to hold 60-100 people.

Each Transitional Living Center provided housing for 20 families, a kitchen area and adequate water sources/sanitation facilities to meet personal and domestic hygiene needs. There were separate male and female toilet areas. Each room was sized four by five meters room per family and all rooms had windows and proper ventilation. The Transitional Living Centers also provided children's areas and community centers to displaced people.

World Vision supported the Transitional Living Centers with access to clean water, toilet and laundry facilities, pavements, wells, water towers, drainage systems, rainwater harvesters, public bathrooms and boreholes. Sanitation and hygiene kits were widely distributed in these communities.

Later, another transitional shelter option was provided. More than 450 individual transitional shelters were constructed, providing shelter to at least 1.100 people.

World Vision took steps to ensure that every TLC was a safe and secure environment for all inhabitants – especially women and children – while operating on the principles of community leadership. World Vision adheres to the UN Guiding Principles for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) which state that:

- The displaced should be consulted and participate in the planning of solutions to the fullest extent possible.
- Information about Government plans for solutions, in particular relocation, should be shared with the displaced as soon as possible.
- When relocation is the best solution, it should take place as close as possible to the previous homes of the displaced.
- Return, relocation and resettlement programs should be multi-sectoral in design, incorporate all basic services, and be implemented from a perspective of community mobilization, empowerment and community self-management.

In the reconstruction process, World Vision worked in coordination with other organizations and was part of the Aceh Reconstruction Community Development Working Group. Here the agencies discussed common principles and developed mechanism to work more effectively to avoid overlap and overcome gaps. Moreover, the construction project was done in consultation with the involved communities.

After much planning and community consultation at every stage of the process, World Vision commenced the construction of 3,565 permanent homes across Aceh, which was then concluded in June 2008.

## Analysis

During the emergency phase, World Vision was one of a few of agencies involved in the construction of transitional centers (Transitional Living Centers / TLCs).

The TLC was one of World Vision's first actions to respond to the immediate need for housing. The TLC was a provisional shelter that was aimed to provide a better place to live for the families who had been living in the displacement camps. It was a temporary solution, although maybe not an ideal situation. It was considered that living in the TLC would be better than remaining in tents for months on end.

World Vision recognizes that the rebuilding process is a long-term endeavor, with challenges faced in identifying suitable land on which to build, the absence of land titles and inheritance claims, and rising costs of rebuilding and labor shortages. Comprehensive planning is very critical in the construction process of permanent housing, as World Vision aims to construct a house that provides a safe and secure environment to its owner.

While World Vision has worked over the longer term to help provide people with permanent homes, it was critical that the families and vulnerable children had a roof over their heads initially. Transitional Living Centers (TLC) were among the number of housing options made available to displaced people. Transitional Living Centers (TLC) were provided to ensure that the people who had lived in the tents for months had better places to live.

It was crucial that the designs of these TLCs could meet international humanitarian standards (Sphere Standards). Kitchens, toilets, water and electricity and road access were provided, as well as special areas where children could play safely.

World Vision supported the set up of community committees and assisted by providing access to food, health care and support for children. World Vision also worked alongside the communities over the long haul to ensure that people eventually moved back into a permanent home were also supported to recover their livelihoods.

As the main purpose of the Transitional Living Centers was to provide temporary housing, the people could occupy the TLC for up to two years. These temporary homes were not intended to become permanent residences for the people.

## Related issue: Landownership is a Human Right

The construction of housing – either temporary or permanent – was an important step to respond to the immediate needs of the inhabitants of the devastated land of Aceh. Nevertheless, it also drew out another important issue that captured the total interest of the affected people: the land recovery.

During the construction phase, land rights had become one of the most challenging topics. Addressing this issue, World Vision through its Protection unit had assisted the affected families since April 2005, in recovering their land as well as obtaining legal documentation needed in the process.

A number of trainings were provided to equip the community on how to proceed with the legal procedures in getting their land certificates. World Vision also supported the community in measuring their land as well as ensured the appropriate certificates obtained.

## Recommendation

Reflecting on World Vision shelter response in the tsunami disaster in Aceh raises several important issues with regard to future responses.

During the relief stage, 2,000 tents were provided in the first two months meeting the needs of approximately 2,000 families, continued with the provision of 97 Transitional Living Centers located across Aceh. In June 2008, World Vision completed the construction of 3,565 permanent houses.

Much of the recovery phase was centered on the construction of homes. Rebuilding a single home in any part of the world is a complex venture, which takes time. Rebuilding entire communities together with the entire infrastructure necessary to make it function properly is a huge task.

Due to the large amount of monetary donations after the tsunami, there were expectations that reconstruction work would be accomplished rapidly. However, pressure to rebuild quickly must be balanced with protecting and empowering the benefiting communities.

Permanent housing had become a difficult and higher risk sector, in comparison with other sectors. Permanent housing construction is a long-term time endeavor, which must be conducted within the framework of rebuilding communities. This requires extensive planning, consultation and negotiation. It also represents a significant monetary investment on the part of NGOs.

Significant issues around land ownership – titling issues, inheritance disputes, alternative land sites, changes in building regulations with respect to housing proximity to the sea – took time to resolve. During the transition phase, temporary and transitional shelter options became a substantial component of shelter programming for up to two years.

Moreover, a clear agreement should be made between the stakeholders: the community, landowner, the government agencies, and NGOs – regarding some issues potentially raised related to the construction, which includes the land sites for the TLC, relocation plan, etc. ■





# Infrastructure and Maintenance

THE sequencing of infrastructure development has been a central issue of the recovery program. Although a lengthy process, in some instances multiple years, the development of infrastructure is a prerequisite to the implementation of reconstruction in other sectors. In the 14 case studies appearing in this book for this sector, 6 in the printed pages and 7 on CD, the importance of establishing a practical and strategic infrastructure is discussed; practical in terms of providing a foundation for the development of other sectors and strategic in terms of sequencing and disaster mitigation.

*The road between Banda Aceh and Calang, Lhoong, Aceh Besar, has its road-mark which was rarely found in any inter-city roads in Aceh before the tsunami recovery took place, February 20, 2009. As per April 16, 2009, 581 kilometer road has been constructed by BRR and its recovery partners (USAID and JICS) compares to the total 702 kilometer road along the west coast of Aceh that has to be constructed in accordance to the Presidential regulation 47/2008. The remaining, particularly the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh section will be finished in mid-2010.  
Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

## Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

# Environment and Quick Reconstruction No Contradiction

A project supported by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) worked in conjunction with the Aceh Environmental Control Authority (BAPEDAL) to develop a fast-track environmental impact assessment process for building projects.

### Introduction

More than 100,000 homes, public buildings, and roads were destroyed in Aceh by the tsunami of December 26, 2004. Some half a million people were suddenly left homeless, and were housed in hastily-built barracks and tents or squeezed into schools and mosques. In order to help those affected build a roof over their heads as soon as possible, hundreds of Indonesian and international aid organizations made project applications to the provincial government. Was it necessary for every single building project to go through all the protracted bureaucratic test procedures – while the victims of the disaster got wet in their emergency shelters every time it rained?

No – was the decision of the Indonesian government. But nor was the work to be done completely without guidelines, even in this emergency, and particularly not the bigger building projects that could damage the environment. So the environmental control authority of Aceh province (BAPEDAL) ultimately selected 86 major projects to be examined for their environmental impact. However, to meet the urgent needs of the situation, a shortened version of the otherwise exhaustive test procedure had to



be found. With this in mind, the GTZ-supported project “Support for Local Governance for Sustainable Reconstruction” (SLGSR) – financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) – developed a method that focused on key environmental factors. This enabled a quick reaction to the people’s need for reconstruction, while keeping the negative effects on the environment to a minimum.

## Development and Implementation

In Germany, most building projects – regardless of whether they are publicly or privately financed – have to undergo an environmental impact assessment. For everyone who puts up new building influences the environment. He or she changes the place built in, and must also bring in natural materials such as sand, gravel, and wood. Therefore, the responsible authority examines every building project to see where such materials come from and how they arrive at the site. In addition, there is a review of how much land is needed for the project and whether important ecosystems such as wetlands or the habitats of rare animals will be damaged.

Since 1999, Indonesia has also had an international-standard legal framework for environmental impact studies (Analisa Dampak Lingkungan, or AMDAL). The Indonesian environment ministry and the relevant provincial governments are responsible for

*Sand and gravel mining – as here at the Aceh river in the district Aceh Besar in November 2006 – can alter the course of rivers and thus cause huge damage. The demand for sand and gravel in Aceh increased rapidly after the tsunami due to the needs of reconstruction projects.  
Photo: GTZ Documentation*

implementing it. As in almost any country, an assessment of environmental impact in Indonesia is a lengthy process. First, a team of geologists, geographers, ethnologists, hydrologists, and transport specialists examines the location and collects all the environment-relevant information. This includes the condition of the soil as well as the possible influence on nearby water sources and nature reserves. In Aceh, for instance, one aim was to prevent illegal logging in the Gunung Leuser National Park. All these factors are then analyzed by the local environmental authority and are checked once more by a higher authority. It is a complex but important procedure – only an independent review can reveal whether a project will hurt the environment. The person commissioning the building must then meet certain conditions meant to prevent or at least reduce the likely impact.

“At the end of all this, there is often a thick file that makes a telephone book look small,” says GTZ principal advisor Helmut Krist. “In the desperate situation after the tsunami, the challenge was to shorten these processes and develop the fastest possible procedure that would still cover all the important aspects.” At the same time, the guidelines had to be quickly and easily understood, so that every responsible official could apply them without having to take a lengthy course on them. It was no easy task, particularly as the construction of a road or canal is governed by different criteria from those for building a house. So the selection of key projects – reached by SLGSR workers in conjunction with the provincial environment authority – was of great importance.

In some cases, the choice was easy. For example, in the quarrying of sand and gravel – both are taken chiefly from rivers near the building site. But if there are no controls on their removal, the course of rivers can be altered. That in turn can cause flooding and landslides. If a river changes course, it can even undermine bridge supports and make the entire structure collapse – something that occurred in two cases in the district of Aceh Besar, where there had previously been no controls. So it was obvious that all projects for the quarrying of sand and gravel would have to be carefully checked. Other major project types selected were for the building of roads, ports, airports, water systems, power stations, and waste disposal sites. The SLGSR team also developed a checklist for all building projects that did not have to undergo a compulsory review by the authorities. Using this list, those commissioning a project were able to check the most important factors themselves. The goal was to make those responsible aware of possible damage to the environment, while offering possible solutions.

The Indonesian environment ministry quickly agreed to the fast-track assessment method and gave its backing to the project-run courses to train the responsible officials in its application. But most of the local institutions still preferred the lengthy process they were familiar with. Many of the authorities did not adopt the fast-track method until November 2007, when the Ministry declared it to be the legal standard across the country in cases of reconstruction. By then, about 50 of the 86 selected projects had been approved under the old rules.

In the meantime, SLGSR workers and the provincial government had already tested the new method with a pilot project: The first official use of the fast-track assessment process was for a new waste disposal site near the village of Makmur in the Aceh Besar district. Starting in 2009, the facility takes not only waste from its own district, but also from the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. “We started by looking for a location, and found the area near Makmur was the most suitable. In many other places, key ecosystems would have been damaged,” says GTZ advisor Helmut Krist. “On top of that, we found large, impervious layers of clay here – something a waste storage site needs so that toxins do not seep deeper into the ground.” When all the formalities had been dealt with, SLGSR workers and the environmental authority organized a public consultation with the nearby village community. “This tradition carries a lot of weight here in Aceh. Changes that affect everybody have to be decided together,” Krist explains. “In this case, the consultation was carried out with great feeling. Nearly 300 people attended, and a buffalo was even slaughtered in honor of the occasion.”

Using the conventional method, the impact study for the waste site would have taken more than a year. With the fast-track method, it only took half as long. Additionally, all those involved were satisfied with the result – even the villagers, who got an improved sanitation system out of the deal, and the prospect of new jobs.

## Analysis

It took two years from the day the decision was made to develop a fast-track environmental impact assessment for building projects to the method's official implementation by the Indonesian environment ministry in November 2007. By then, reconstruction work in Aceh had already progressed so far that the new method was only of use for some of the projects. A campaign run jointly with the province's environment authority and aimed at local environment offices could perhaps have been of help in getting the new method used more quickly. Other aid organizations could have adopted the fast-track method independently, without having to wait for the lengthy process of approval by the authorities. In addition, voluntary application of the fast-track method could also have helped government-run reconstruction projects to present themselves as environmentally friendly and effective at the same time.

But the implications of fast-track environmental impact assessment go far beyond the context of reconstruction in Aceh. The new checklists and test procedure developed in conjunction with the provincial environment control authority BAPEDAL can be applied in very different situations and – with some adaptation to local laws – can be used in different countries around the world. ■

## Government of Japan (GoJ)

# West Coast Road and Project Planning

**UNDER** the Japanese Non-Project Grant Aid, in January 2005 the Government of Japan disbursed funds to the Government of Indonesia for rehabilitation and reconstruction of various sectors affected by the tsunami in Aceh and Nias.

After the aid was extended, the two governments discussed how to allocate the funds for projects in each sector, which included the reconstruction of Sumatra's west coast road.

In view of the circumstances and demands in affected areas, it was important to determine what would be necessary in the planning and formulating stages for disaster rehabilitation programs through this project, with an emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness.

## Development and Implementation

There are eight points in procurement: efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, professionalism, competitiveness, value for money, fairness, transparency, and ethical approach. Although all eight points are essential, in this project it was necessary to decide on which one to focus, and how to balance the others to best meet the needs of the beneficiaries under such urgent circumstances.

Under this grant aid, all Japanese organizations involved in this project -- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy of Japan in Indonesia, the Japan International Cooperation

Agency (JICA) and the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS) -- focused on the speed and feasibility necessary for smooth implementation.

The donor determined common values and clearly defined responsibilities in the west coast road project. However, what also needed to be determined was which party would be responsible for which particular area, and the specifications of the new road through coordination with other donors. Japan was of the view that the road should be rehabilitated to its original condition as it was the quickest way to return normalcy to people's lives so that they could resume their economic activities.

On the other hand, if the road were to be upgraded and widened, more funds would be needed for land acquisition as well as time for negotiation with land owners. Land acquisition and ownership can be sensitive problems and can lead to legal problems, which can be a major hurdle to progress.

As it is Japanese policy to avoid such probable risks, the originally formulated rehabilitation work of 122 kilometers was adhered to and completed in December 2006, which improved the road's condition.

The results of the project showed that the Japanese policy met people's needs in the affected area and in disaster reconstruction.

The project also showed that sound judgment and the proper shift of balance in the aforementioned eight key points were necessary for maximum benefit with a limited budget.

## Lessons Learned

For success in a project, it may be necessary to shift the balance in the aforementioned eight key points as occasion demands. For the success of a project, it was found that balance must not be lost through adherence to regular policy.

It was vital that all extended members understood and shared a common policy throughout the project.

Feasibility was an important factor in ensuring smooth progress, especially in the implementation of such a reconstruction project. It was also found that any rigidity within the team may have put the project at risk.

By understanding and sharing these lessons, mistakes in judgment and direction in future projects can be avoided and help ensure that demands in disaster-affected areas are met.

Time and energy can be saved by sharing common ideas to advance a project. In preparation of emergency projects like disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction, proper structure should be established so as to avoid possible bottlenecks, because unlike in normal circumstances, once an emergency occurs there is no time for meetings and negotiations. ■

## Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

# Participation and Community Contribution Produce Quality Public Works: Experience from Community Infrastructure Projects in Aceh Besar, Aceh Barat and Aceh Jaya Districts

**LOGICA** has carried out various efforts to meet the needs of village communities for basic infrastructure. Yet, as the development in the region rapidly expands, so do people's needs. LOGICA's Community Infrastructure Grant Scheme (CIGS) enabled communities to decide for themselves what their most essential community infrastructure needs were and assisted them to plan and manage all aspects of implementation through inclusive, transparent and publicly accountable means. This program resulted in the building of basic infrastructure in 204 villages in three districts. Community self-determination was essential to success.

## Background

While LOGICA had worked with another AusAID project in the delivery of village halls and government offices, and had ensured their equipment in the post-tsunami period, other public infrastructure was also necessary to accelerate social and economic activities. The Community Infrastructure Grant Scheme (CIGS), which relied on participatory approaches throughout program planning, implementation and reporting, was developed in order to address these concerns. Supported by LOGICA facilitators, this program afforded vast leeway for participation by targeted communities. They were encouraged to establish a plan and build teams responsible for the execution of and procurement for community infrastructure projects. All community members were ultimately enabled to influence decisions on the type of infrastructure required, and to give input and feedback to the committees responsible at community meetings.

## Significant Events

CIGS projects began with the signing of a Grant Agreement between village heads and LOGICA in which the creation of a Village Development Committee (VDC), consisting of community members who were obligated to adhere to a set of guidelines in delivering the project. This agreement included Terms of Reference for the committee and other parties related to project, as well as guidelines for procurement, financial reporting and disclosure. The guidelines also suggested the formation of a procurement committee under the VDC's oversight to approve the procurement scheme: contracts, methods, and labor rates.

With the disbursement of the first allotment of funds to the VDC, a community meeting was convened and attended by LOGICA facilitators and citizens, as well as invited suppliers and laborers. The discussion concluded with project structure outlining – who does what, when, how and how many. After that, the project could be implemented.

The CIGS program provided communities with self-reliance learning methodology because the community was obliged to use local labor, materials and expertise as much as possible for project resources. LOGICA assigned both a Community Engagement facilitator to monitor and to assist VDCs in administration and accounting techniques, as well as an infrastructure specialist to assist VDCs on quality control and construction technical standards.

Through CIGS, LOGICA sought to stimulate the improvement of local capabilities: through setting development priorities, accountable project management and resource mobilization. Communities learned to produce good quality infrastructure under budgetary constraints. This process has also enabled communities to develop important skills in initiating and managing projects; all founded upon inclusive and transparent principles and practices. These are invaluable skills that can be utilized in the future in terms of allocation of both the annual village development budget, as well as funds from non-governmental organizations.

CIGS initially covered 204 villages from November 2006 to July 2007, successfully facilitating the building of village roads, bridges, fences, drainage, vertical-drilled water wells and drinking water distribution facilities. The success of the CIGS program led to the completion of three more CIGS phases in the areas in which LOGICA worked.

## Challenges

- **Personal interest.** There are people who tried to take personal advantage from the project for themselves. This dynamic very much influences the quality and quantity of public works. Assistance and supervision that involves communities generally results in better outcomes for communities and reduces incidences of corruption.
- **Disrupted supply.** Uncertain supply of project material and labor was an ongoing challenge in CIGS projects: geographical constraints, availability of material, equipment and labor were usually the most likely cause of project delay. This was largely consequent to the reliance on local human and material resources, and their availability, for project works. These variables must be factored into the timelines of programs such as CIGS.
- **Disputes.** To an extent, consultative and deliberative decision-making requires time. Lengthy discussion and conflict resolution have been a significant obstacle disrupting project progress.

## Lessons Learned

- **Project transparency and accountability.** Transparent dissemination of information to citizens on project progress, especially facts and figures, including the opportunity to question and address complaints, helped secure public acceptance and support for CIGS projects. This approach inspired communities to call for more transparency and accountability in relation to other local projects.
- **Learning process.** The built management capacity acquired through CIGS has positively influenced village administration to be more efficient, inclusive and accountable.
- **Ownership of infrastructure.** Through encouraging community participation in the planning, building and maintaining of infrastructure projects, the CIGS program has fostered community ownership in the constructed infrastructure or buildings.
- **Self confidence.** The program increased the community/village's confidence in their capabilities. By project completion, they were clearly capable of managing and supervising construction activities, both in terms of technical and financial aspects.
- **Community contribution.** Community contribution to projects in terms of land, materials and labor was essential to the success of CIGS projects. ■

## United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

# Making Aceh Safer through Disaster Risk Reduction in Development (DRR-A) – Keeping Development from Increasing Aceh’s Disaster Risk

### The Issue

**HISTORICALLY**, in Indonesia as well as in Aceh, reducing the community’s exposure to disaster risks was a normal part of everyday thinking, reflected in the design of buildings, the planning of land use or more simple family and community decisions about building a house, design of a new Mosque or expanding a village. Unfortunately, these practices have been undermined by unscrupulous businesses, population growth, the search for cheap land, the inappropriate application of new technologies for construction and agricultural production. Fortunately a shift is underway to re-establish this kind of thinking in Aceh’s future development planning process once again.

Over the last several years, the Government of Indonesia has taken some extremely important steps to establish the necessary policy and regulatory environment that is beginning to form the foundation required to encourage communities to invest in their own safety by reducing the risk of disaster damage. This started with the passing of new, forward-looking National Disaster Management (Risk Reduction) legislation that is now being put into practice. The Government also initiated an inter-governmental, public/private dialogue to put in place a National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) based on the internationally agreed United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Hyogo Framework. Earthquake-prone Aceh, Central Java and Yogyakarta have leapt ahead of local governments in the rest of the world by preparing their own Local Action Plans for DRR. And in the last two years, Annual Government Work Plans included substantial budgets for pre-disaster risk reduction programs.

In Aceh, the provincial government took important initial steps shortly after its February 2007 inauguration. From the start, the Governor pledged himself and his staff to make fundamental reforms to provincial and district government agencies. These reforms include DRR as one of the province's key development priorities. This commitment was put into action in the formulation of the Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJM) of NAD Province for 2007-2012. The RPJM officially makes DRR one of nine development strategies in NAD Province. But more still needs to be done.

## The Initiative

The strategic approach of the DRR-Aceh project is to address the underlying systemic root causes of disasters not currently being addressed by Aceh's governance and development planning processes. To do this, the project will support Aceh's government in its on-going efforts to establish a comprehensive, government-led, cross-sectoral framework of DRR processes as identified in the Gol-adopted, UN ISDR Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) on Disaster Risk Reduction 2005-2010 ([www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm](http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm)). There are five key DRR priorities for action addressed in the HFA. They are: 1) to ensure there is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation; 2) identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning; 3) use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; 4) reduce the underlying risk factors; 5) strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

Once these key actions and their many sub-actions are in place, DRR will have, for the most part, become an integral consideration imbedded in all governance and development planning decision-making and practices. The HFA will be applied by the Government of Aceh as a tool for measuring progress towards making Aceh safer from disasters. In practical terms, this means putting in place an integrated set of initiatives that enable the government and its local communities to cooperate in preparing and instituting actions to forestall or minimize damages from potential natural disasters that may threaten each community.

As a part of initial project activities, the Government of Aceh has begun to initiate this process through their recent Convergence Workshops - a series of government-led meetings to analyze who is doing what in DRR programming, and where, in Aceh. The initial output from this workshop will become a central part of Aceh's Local Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (LAP-DRR) that will be structured and used in the same way as the National Action Plan - as a tool for analyzing DRR progress, gaps and needs throughout the province. Preliminary analysis indicates there are a disproportionate number of projects that address HFA Priority 3 - Public Awareness and HFA Priority 5 - Preparedness and Response Planning. It also indicates that, so far, most projects tend to be based in Banda Aceh itself.

Once the full set of project activities begins they will include: 1) establishing the institutional and regulatory enabling environment needed to facilitate participatory and concerted implementation of DRR measures; 2) demonstration of projects implemented in selected locations to test and improve measures for reducing risk from natural disasters; 3) strengthening of Aceh's new Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center, Syiah Kuala University, so it can serve the province by providing science-based information, service and knowledge assistance to the local government and other DRR partners in implementing their DRR activities; 4) support DRR public awareness and education programs implemented in a way that promotes a "Culture of Safety" among the people and institutions of Aceh.

By the end of the project it is intended that DRR will have become integrated as a normal part of all aspects of the development planning and governance process in Aceh and the traditional emphasis historically placed by the people of Aceh on preparing for disasters and making Aceh a safer place to live and work will be revived.

## Challenges

A key social challenge to making DRR a development priority in Aceh, or for that matter most of Indonesia, is a broadly accepted fatalistic belief that disasters are uncontrollable events or 'acts of God', that cannot be prevented. Fortunately, in a historically strong center of Islam like Aceh, such fatalism can be reversed through religious references and teachings integrated into the education curriculum and through public awareness. The provincial government recently made good use of this during Aceh's first tsunami drill in the message of the prayers that during the drill were loudly broadcast throughout Aceh and on the radio. The basic message was "Oh God, we have *prepared* in every way we know to *prevent* this disaster - now that it is upon us we put our lives in your hands".

A major institutional challenge is that Aceh's provincial government has committed itself to putting development budgets, decision-making and planning processes in place that will support real, community-led development planning processes into which disaster risk reduction components will be integrated. The government has also committed itself to working in partnership, not only with its village and sub-district communities but also with and through NGO, CBO and CVO partners in Aceh. To do this, government agencies must change decades of development practices in which a) communities were rarely, if ever, consulted; b) possible disaster risks which were rarely, if ever, considered; c) NGOs, CBOs and CVOs were rarely perceived to be development partners.

## Implementing Best Practice

The shift away from the narrow and more costly focus on relief, response and recovery *after* disasters typical of the last 50-60 years, to a focus on DRR efforts and preparedness *before* disasters occur, represents a return to traditional ways that were somehow forgotten or ignored in the rush to modernize.

This shift is based on a long history of DRR in Indonesia and Aceh embedded in the ancient, very pragmatic and practical Islamic proverb "*Trust in Allah, but don't forget to tie up your camels*". Recently, this traditional way of thinking has been well demonstrated by 100-year-old houses built to withstand strong earthquake shaking that stand surrounded by contemporary houses that collapsed in earthquakes.

This kind of thinking is also embedded in the thinking of Aceh's public and its leaders who have recognized that relief, response and "build-back-better" recovery after a disaster only partially addresses the issue of how to reduce the future impact of disasters, leading to the clear recognition that sound development practices before disasters more effectively reduce Indonesia's all too regular human, physical and economic disaster losses. This important remembrance of the link between development and disasters - *wherein development decisions themselves either increase or decrease future disaster risks* - is necessary, in fact essential, in a community as highly disaster prone as Aceh, or the many other Indonesian provinces with similar disaster risks.

In concrete, everyday terms, this gradual return to traditional and wise ways of thinking about how to live with disasters simply means building houses and schools so they will not collapse in an earthquake, killing the family or students in them. It means fostering planning processes that result in villages, towns, districts or provinces that are more resilient to annual flooding or other hazards that might affect them. It also means assessing what effect environmental degradation, tsunami-induced land subsidence and climate change-induced sea level rise will have on Aceh's coastlines, and then adapting

to the anticipated changes. And it means preparing disaster-resistant infrastructure standards before disasters happen, so investments in infrastructure reconstruction programs won't have to be repeated again after the next disaster.

One of the most practical aspects of this approach is that it is a much less costly way for society to deal with disasters. International studies show that for every dollar spent on risk reduction in development decision-making before disasters, two to four dollars will be saved from the cost of relief, recovery and reconstruction. The reduced cost of relief, response and recovery underscores the more important result that ultimately there will be a corresponding reduction in human suffering and loss of lives when disasters do strike – and, in Indonesia, we know they will. ■

# Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Program (TRWMP)

## The Initiative

**I**N January 2005, the Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Program (TRWMP) was conceived to provide a coordinated, pragmatic response to the public health and environmental concerns associated with both tsunami/earthquake debris and municipal solid waste (MSW) management during the rehabilitation and recovery of Aceh and Nias following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami. It is currently being executed through partnership with local government sanitation departments in thirteen districts: Kota Banda Aceh (KBA), Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, Pidie, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Besar, Nias and Nias Selatan, Lhokseumawe, Aceh Utara, Bireuen, Sabang, and Simeulue.

The short-term aims of this project were in disaster recovery, namely debris clearance, restarting essential solid waste management services, creating immediate temporary employment, and recovery of recyclable materials for use in reconstruction. These short-term aims have been completed and are now superseded by longer-term goals: to improve and sustain the environment of Aceh and Nias through strengthening the capacity of local government to conduct effective efficient collection, recovery and disposal of municipal and tsunami waste; rehabilitation of critical waste management infrastructure; and supporting local enterprises in the creation of livelihoods opportunities in recovery, processing and recycling of waste, and clearance and rehabilitation of tsunami-impacted agricultural land.



Since September 2005, TRWMP has been funded through three phases with a total provision of USD 39.4 million grant from the Multi-Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF). TRWMP also received a contribution from the French Red Cross (FRC) for the amount of USD 600,000. TRWMP's total budget now amounts to USD 40 million.

TRWMP's implementation (management, monitoring and oversight) is undertaken by UNDP through the Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Program (ERTR). Execution is through partnerships with local government District Sanitation Agencies by Letters of Agreement, and through contracts with private sector firms and non-governmental organizations. The TRWMP core team consists of three international technical advisors and 19 national staff who provide day-to-day supervision, technical assistance and management of the program.

*Collection, recycling, & safe disposal  
of tsunami waste, Banda Aceh.  
Photo: UNDP Documentation*



*Recycled Tsunami Wood Furniture  
Project, Banda Aceh.  
Photo: UNDP Documentation*

## Impact and Results

### Capacity building local government; recovery, collection and processing of tsunami and municipal solid waste

The support and capacity-building program to 13 district government sanitation departments includes interim financial support for the operation of waste collection and disposal systems, rehabilitation/construction of interim landfills, capacity building to district government (Dinas) staff through training, financial support, on-site counterpart staffing support, and public awareness programs.

TRWMP used rented heavy equipment and some 400,000 person days of temporary labor to carry out essential clean-up and construction works during the disaster recovery, including the clearance of more than one million cubic meters of tsunami waste in urban areas, together with recovery of recyclable materials used to rehabilitate 100km of roads, provide 50 ha of daily cover at landfills and make 10,000 units of wooden furniture; clearance of some 900 ha of tsunami-impacted agricultural land that is now back in productive use to the benefit of some 1,400 households; demolition of 550 earthquake/tsunami-damaged buildings; support for street and drainage clearance; and provision of temporary waste collection vehicles until permanent replacement vehicles were provided by UNDP's partners.



UNDP continues to support the agricultural land clearance project (target 3,000 ha) and to provide day-to-day technical support to 13 districts for waste collection activities (>1,000m<sup>3</sup>/day) while developing sustainable integrated district waste management strategies with local Dinas.

*Farmers Working Land Cleared by TRWMP.  
Photo: UNDP Documentation*

### **Restoration and creation of livelihoods in waste management**

In May 2007, the project began creating and strengthening private sector Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in waste-related businesses, including collection and processing of recyclable waste, creating income and reducing waste going into landfills. Currently, 10 NGOs, 12 CBOs and 120 SMEs are supported in a wide range of activities including composting, mushroom production, collection, sorting and transport of recyclables including plastics, metal, glass and paper, processing of recyclables such as production of recycled plastic products, and organic detergents, and small-scale bio-gas from waste production. As of August 2008, the total number of direct (entire livelihood) and indirect (partial income) beneficiaries is 1,829 (1,655 men; 174 women) and 6,664 (3,548 men; 3,116 women) respectively. On top of the working equipment distribution, small grants are being distributed, now totaling IDR 1.3 billion.



*Plastics Recycling Plant, Nias.  
Photo: UNDP Documentation*

### **Preparation, design and construction of permanent regional and district landfills**

TRWMP has been supporting feasibility studies, design and construction of district landfills in all 13 program districts. As of September 2008, the project had achieved the construction/rehabilitation of 10 district interim landfills (25 ha of waste cells). These interim landfills provide safe, controlled waste disposal sites for eight TRWMP districts with storage capacity of up to five years, sufficient to allow construction of permanent long term sites. Further, the project accomplished the design, environmental and social studies and recently completed construction (by BRR) of Gampong Jawa Landfill extension, Banda Aceh, and its new mechanical workshop (by TRWMP); site selection, EIA, land acquisition and ongoing detailed Engineering Design/institutional arrangements for the Blang Bintang regional landfill for KBA/Aceh Besar; and is currently involved in on-going feasibility studies/site search/design of sustainable, permanent waste disposal facilities for 11 districts with programming to have all constructed by end 2009.



## Lessons Learned

**Gender Awareness.** Regular interaction between local communities and international/external actors over the past two years has resulted in a more ‘adaptive’ approach of local communities to gender issues. This increased awareness has indirectly contributed to the project’s success in implementing the gender mainstreaming strategy. Nonetheless, several areas of improvement remain to be taken into account by the project.

**Government Leadership.** The strong leadership of the Head of DKP in giving direction and managing the implementation of the large number of Letters of Agreement has been integral to project’s overall success. Without strong commitment and leadership to the project within the government, the ability of the project staff to effectively and efficiently implement the project’s activities would be severely hampered, and would undermine, if negatively impact, the project’s results.

**Coordination with the International Community.** Close coordination with other agencies such as GTZ and IREP has increased the effectiveness of program activities and prevented duplication of activities, which has resulted in the efficiency of program delivery and demonstrable effective sectoral coordination, which can and should be replicated to other sectors in emergency/early recovery situations.


*Construction of KM23 Landfill, Pidie.  
Photo: UNDP Documentation*

## Challenges

**Capacity Gaps.** Some smaller/rural districts (such as Nias Selatan) do not have dedicated waste management departments. This lack of capacity and funding for SWM activities is impacting their effectiveness. Furthermore, many district sanitation departments lack capacity in preparing Annual Work Plans (AWPs) and budget applications (DIPPAs). As a result they do not realize the funding they are entitled to.

**Cultural Factors.** There was a marked slow-down in activities in all areas during the fasting month of Ramadan. However, this is always expected and only has a short-term impact. A recommendation for the future is to adapt the quarterly work plans to reflect important religious holidays that have a decided impact on the ability of the project to implement activities in a timely fashion. ■

TRWMP DISTRICT WORKING AREA MAP



## United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

# SDN 51: A New School Makes a Difference UNICEF’S School Construction Program

## Introduction

IT had been almost six months since the new SDN 51 in Banda Aceh opened its doors. “I love the new school”, says Sinda, a second-grader at SDN 51. Sinda, who is the deputy class speaker, smiled as she looks around the classroom. “It was so hot in the old school, and there was no space.”

She said that studying had become much easier and fun now. “This school is soooo much nicer than the old one,” she said before continuing her math exercise.

The original SDN 51 had been damaged by the earthquake and flooded by the tsunami on December 26, 2004. Nevertheless, classes continued to be held in the building. “We even took in students from three other elementary schools, which had been completely destroyed”, said Ibu Cut Aji, the principal there.

Ibu Aji wanted better conditions for her 214 students. When she heard that UNICEF was building schools, she contacted the UN children’s agency directly and asked for help. To make things easier, Ibu Aji took care of all the documentation needed to make sure that the new school would have its own piece of land.

When what remained of the old building was demolished and construction of the new school began, the SDN 51 administration moved the school’s educational activities to another school nearby, where they had to hold classes in the afternoon.

“For us teachers, it was not much of a problem to have afternoon shifts. But the first and second graders struggled, because the lessons fell into their usual nap time,” says Ibu Yuliatik, one of the teachers. However, everyone managed to hold on; all the while watching as their new school continued to grow.

“I monitored the construction progress every month so that I could update the teachers and students. They were all so curious and wanted to know everything!” Ibu Aji remembered.

In July 2008, the new school was completed. Ibu Aji will never forget the moment when the construction fence was finally removed and she could see the completed two-story building; “her” new school.

“It was such an amazing moment”, she said. “I looked at it and was so proud and happy.” And so was everyone else. Students and teachers came, checking out every corner of the new building, wanting to move in ASAP. And so they did.

Teachers said the changes in their students’ behaviors were immense. “They are very excited about studying here,” says Ibu Yuliatik, who was teaching 6<sup>th</sup> grade that semester. “They are on time, attendance is almost perfect, they are active in class – they are simply happier now!”

SDN 51 is only one of the 346 earthquake resistant and child-friendly schools that UNICEF has built in Aceh and Nias. With its USD 90 million school construction program, UNICEF has set new standards in Aceh. Due to the close cooperation with BRR and the local government, UNICEF schools have come to be considered the model for all school construction, even into the future. From the beginning, UNICEF made no compromises regarding safety and child friendly standards.

All UNICEF schools are earthquake-resistant. Aside from large, well lit and ventilated classrooms, they also include a library, a multi-purpose room, a teacher’s office and separate toilets for boys and girls. A large courtyard gives students a safe place to play and a place to do their physical education activities.

## Building Back Better - History of UNICEF’s School Construction Program

Although UNICEF does not usually engage in construction projects, it became apparent after the tsunami and earthquake that new schools were desperately needed to provide a safe, permanent learning environment for children. In May 2005, UNICEF and the Government of Indonesia developed a plan to reconstruct 300 and rehabilitate 200 schools as part of a US\$90 million investment. Surveys subsequently conducted by UNICEF and its implementing agency, the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), showed, however, that rehabilitation was not an option as the school buildings

were too badly damaged or originally poorly built. As a result, UNICEF, the Ministry of National Education and BRR decided it was safer to completely rebuild all of the schools, and to use the budget initially earmarked for rehabilitation to reconstruct 67 schools. Thus, in total, UNICEF constructed 346 schools in Aceh and Nias.

From the start, UNICEF committed to setting new and higher standards in school construction by “building back better” by providing schools that are earthquake-resistant and child friendly – a new concept in Indonesia.

After the signing of the Aceh peace agreement in August 2005, UNICEF suggested reconstructing some of the schools burned down or damaged in areas affected by Aceh’s 32-year-long armed conflict where the need for school infrastructure for a large number of vulnerable children had already been identified. In August 2006, the government agreed that the UNICEF construction project could also cover these areas.

## School Structure

A typical UNICEF school has six classrooms – one classroom for each grade – with adequate ventilation and light; a teachers’ office with principal’s room; a library; and a landscaped outdoor area to give students a safe place to play. The school also features separate toilets and sinks for boys and girls. Ramps and wider doors for disabled children have also been installed, so that no child is excluded from education. At least two classrooms can also be divided by an internal sliding wall enabling teachers or the community to combine the space to form a multi-purpose hall or assembly room.

Eventually, a less utilitarian design, which respects UNICEF’s budget constraints and “child friendly” principles, was finalized in 2007. The new design includes converting the bulky concrete veranda to a light weight steel structure featuring a covered pathway connecting all buildings. Emergency exits are provided at the rear of the buildings to facilitate evacuation flows.

By changing the morphology of the classrooms, opportunities existed to improve the natural ventilation, lighting and hence the overall level of comfort. As part of the new design, skylights were provided at some schools to provide indirect natural light coming from the ceiling level to enhance the darker parts of the classrooms.

Overall, UNICEF has committed to constructing 346 schools in Aceh and Nias. So far, 175 have been completed, while the remainder are under construction.

## Overcoming the Challenges

The lessons learned from building permanent schools have been invaluable for UNICEF, especially those learned in the first year of activity. Major hurdles had to be overcome, including determining the most appropriate geographic spread of schools, establishing emergency schools and transitioning to permanent structures, budgetary constraints and inflation, sub-standard contractor capacity, lack of skilled labor, unavailability of required materials, supply transportation constraints,

## Site Selection

Making sure there was a geographical spread of schools has been perceived as highly important. No child's educational opportunity should be harmed simply because he or she lives in a remote area. For this reason UNICEF has built schools at both accessible and less accessible sites.

Another issue in school placement was that many of the proposed school sites had too few children living in the area, making it difficult to commit funds to building a permanent school if there were no signs that the population would resettle soon. Other sites posed different challenges, with obstacles like hills, swamps and large outcrops of rock; or their presence in areas difficult to access for transportation of construction materials.

Land issues, property disputes and other challenges also necessitated further discussion, resulting in the changing of sites or the redesigning of construction plans.

## Temporary to Permanent Status

In most cases, permanent schools were being built where UNICEF already established a semi-permanent emergency school in the wake of the Aceh and Nias disasters.

To ensure that every child affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and the earthquake in Nias had access to primary education, more than 1,000 school tents were erected by UNICEF within weeks of the disasters. This rapidly restarted school activities, helping to bring some normality to children's lives.

Due to extreme weather in North Sumatra, it was evident that the tents were a short to medium term solution. It also became clear that the construction of permanent schools would take several years, and so UNICEF, with implementing partner IOM, started the semi-permanent school project. A total of 235 three-classroom school units/166 schools were completed by the end of 2006. The last of the semi-permanent schools, SDN Bawalia in Nias, was officially handed over on January 26, 2007.

The “dual-school building approach” was complementary and offered continuity for the local communities. UNICEF actively promoted community participation for site selection and school design, and for the longer term, because it is important to ensure that the schools are properly managed and maintained by the local communities. New skills and knowledge were also passed on to develop the necessary capabilities.

## Strict Standards

Building earthquake-resistant schools takes much more time than that required for building a non-earthquake resistant structure. Every building stage requires close monitoring and continuous testing to meet standards. The capacity of local contractors to undertake most of the construction work was overestimated, which meant that identification and preparation of the sites and the training of workers took longer than originally projected. UNICEF did not compromise on safety and the quality of its learning environments. However, where possible, strides were taken to speed up the process.

It proved to be difficult to find construction companies with enough experience to handle the scope and quality needed for the construction of permanent schools within a competitive budget. Consequently the tendering process also took longer than expected. In addition, there was a lack of skilled labor for the high standards and new construction methods and UNOPS has had to train their laborers and maintain close and constant monitoring, all of which has required additional manpower and expertise.

In mid-2006, UNICEF established its own Construction Unit to oversee the permanent school project. In addition to UNOPS, UNICEF has contracted several Design and Supervision companies.

## Budgetary Constraints

Inflation in Indonesia, particularly in Aceh, has risen over the past years. A cut in the national fuel subsidy resulted in fuel prices soaring by more than 120 percent in 2006. This, combined with fluctuations in the exchange rates (donor contributions are made in US Dollars and payments made in rupiah), affected UNICEF’s budget.

As school construction proceeded and expanded, even more of a burden was placed on the availability of supplies in the building industry, meaning increased price pressures. UNICEF has countered this by:

- Surveying the market to make sure to get the best deals.
- Maximizing scales of efficiency in order to achieve the best possible prices for building.
- Looking closely at the prices paid by other organizations which have been building schools to similar high standards.

- Looking for alternative building materials which offer the same if not better quality and are competitively priced.
- Developing modular designs to reduce time for design and preparation for tendering.

## Supply Problems

Much of Aceh's road network was damaged and many parts had not been fixed yet, making the access to some sites difficult. Given that large quantities of building materials were being transported, this presented a problem particularly in locations far away from urban areas, a challenge particularly acute on Nias Island. As a consequence, UNOPS and UNICEF used modular designs and alternate building materials as a more flexible way of meeting specific requirements and easing transportation obstacles.

Because of these unforeseen complications, UNOPS designed standardized school modules of 2 and 3 classrooms to simplify the construction process, and these could also be built using alternative construction materials, such as lightweight steel frames and concrete substructures to ease the transportation of materials to less accessible sites.

## Expectations

Unmanaged expectations concerning school construction led to quick disappointment, with various stakeholders wondering why construction was taking so long. Site selection raised many expectations within communities. People's expectations that schools would be built overnight contrasted with the reality that more than a year passed from the first site selection to the first school being completed. Better communication would have not only alleviated some of those hard feelings, but perhaps drawn all stakeholders into finding a solution.

## Maintenance

An emerging challenge that can be readily observed is the issue of maintenance. A lack of ownership can be seen in some communities, and consequently not enough measures are in place in the communities and local authorities to ensure the maintenance of the buildings. It is strongly recommended to advocate and work with the communities and authorities on maintenance and ownership from the beginning, while construction is ongoing, and not to wait until the school is completed and handed over. ■

## United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

# Development of Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Program Coordination and Planning Working Group in Aceh

### Synopsis

**WATER**, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) is a multi-sector business with responsibility resting with various ministries, such as the public works, health, education and community empowerment departments. UNICEF started to advocate to the government in 2007 for the creation of a body led by the local planning development agency (BAPPEDA) with other departments as members. By March 2008, the NAD Provincial WASH Program Working Group (AMPL) was endorsed by the governor. By the end of 2008, this was established in six districts, namely Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Berner Meriah, Aceh Tamiang, Aceh Barat and Aceh Barat Daya. Various activities have been conducted to build the capacity of the group members to familiarize them with the community based water, sanitation and hygiene program, to train them in planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation. Continued support and strategic approaches are needed to mobilize the willingness and commitment from the government for the sector's development.

### Introduction

The coordination in the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector began in 2005 as the emergency tsunami response in NAD, led by UNICEF and Oxfam. The responsibility for coordination was then handed over to the Ministry of Public Works and continued by BRR.

Early in 2008, coordination was handed over to the provincial BAPPEDA facilitated by BRR, UNICEF and other organizations.

In the development phase, it is important to have good coordination and integrated planning, as WASH is a multi-sector responsibility. This has been observed globally through field interventions and scientific studies over many years. At the central government level, a Water and Environmental Sanitation Working Group (AMPL) development program was launched many years ago and has been promoted in many provinces and districts. However, it had not been established in Aceh due to various reasons.

The objective of establishing this working group is mainly to strengthen local government capacity in planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation in order to achieve the MDG 2015, i.e. to halve the population who do not have access to improved drinking water supply and sanitation.

## Development and Implementation

### Introduction of the Concept in Aceh

Late in 2007, UNICEF funded a consultation workshop conducted by the provincial BAPPEDA. The national Water and Environmental Sanitation Program planning group presented a review of the development of the program, the lessons learned, opportunities and constraints to the related government officers at both provincial and district levels in Aceh. The workshop also introduced and disseminated the national policy on the community-based water supply and sanitation program.

### Technical Consultation and Review of the Draft Decree

The provincial government of NAD has made a commitment to establish a Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Working Group. The infrastructure division of BAPPEDA prepared a draft government decree for the working group and shared it with 14 related government departments at the provincial level. UNICEF was invited to give a presentation again on the coordination strategy and the development and capacity building of the group in early 2008, which was followed by a discussion on the draft decree.

### The Endorsement of the Decree and Association at District Level

The gubernatorial decree for establishing the AMPL at the provincial level was signed officially on March 31, 2008. It was then presented to the members of AMPL working groups at the provincial level and to non-governmental organization partners in the area of water and sanitation.

The WASH working group is coordinated by the provincial BAPPEDA as the leading department for WASH program coordination, planning and monitoring and evaluation in NAD province, which will report directly to the governor of Aceh. A total of 13 government agencies are members of the working groups including the social welfare bureau, information and communication office, provincial health office, labor department, education department, public works, office of the governor, community empowerment agency, mining department, environmental department, and the PDAM association in Aceh province.

The main functions of the WASH working groups are to act as coordinator for the development of the water, sanitation and hygiene sector. The WASH coordinating team has several functions including (a) community empowerment and organizational development; (b) health, hygiene and sanitation; (c) provision of drinking water infrastructure facilities; (d) income development and rural productivity; and (e) project management component in the area of water, sanitation and hygiene.

The gubernatorial decree for the establishment of WASH working groups in NAD province was officially launched on June 12, 2008 by the governor of NAD, supported by GTZ, BRR and UNICEF. More than 80 participants from the provincial and district level attended the workshops, including the mayors of Banda Aceh and Aceh Barat, and other representative from the districts. As a result of the socialization, the district governments developed the WASH working groups in the districts. In total, there are now seven WASH working groups in NAD.

## Exposure of the Working Group to Community-Based WASH Program

In mid August 2008, 12 government staffers from BAPPEDA, the provincial health office, office of the governor, mining department, and community empowerment agencies, were exposed to the successful water supply project in Nagan Raya, with the aim of improving the government's capacity in the community based water supply project in rural areas.

They were introduced to the financial arrangements in community-based water supply projects, community participation and mobilization, operation and maintenance mechanisms, and the government's role in the community based project.

## Strategic Planning Training and the Outcome

As part of the government's commitment to WASH, on November 17-21, the BAPPEDA of NAD province supported by UNICEF organized strategic planning training for the government at the provincial level and five other districts. This was attended by representatives from BAPPEDA, the provincial health office, public works, community empowerment agencies, the state-owned water company, the environmental department and education department.

18 recommendations were made during the training, including a baseline survey on the condition of water, sanitation and hygiene in the province; the development plan for water supply projects; water, sanitation and hygiene for schools and a WASH facilitator at the village level.

For each recommendation, several activities were proposed for the period from 2009-2013, to accelerate the achievement of Millennium Development Goals 2015 in the area of WASH.

## Lessons Learned

Government commitment in taking the lead in the development of the WASH program through the AMPL is very important. The government has the authority and power to control and to monitor the development of WASH in the province.

Second, the government's strategic plans in the area of WASH should be available. The strategic plans should be designed based on real conditions in NAD province, supported by the baseline survey on WASH and developed systematically to achieve the MDG target by 2015, both in schools and the community.

Third, the various government departments need to be willing to share information and work together. There are several government agencies that are involved in Wash including those in the school sector, therefore a willingness to coordinate and work together is essential.

Four, the government budget allocation for WASH should be increased. This would cover WASH concerns in the community and in schools. Coordination should also involve NGOs and other stakeholders in the development of WASH concerns at the community level.

Five, to achieve the MDG 2015, the Aceh provincial government cannot rely solely on the government budget allocation. Without community involvement and participation, the MDG 2015 in the area of WASH will not be achieved. ■





# Economy and Business

CLOSELY linked to the reconstruction of housing, settlements and infrastructure, the economics and business sector has focused on the development of livelihoods. While macro economics remains a long-term development initiative, in the short-term, it has been critical to enable beneficiaries to maintain their families and ultimately their communities. In combination with small-scale infrastructure programs and the provision of micro-financing, many of these objectives have been met as described in the 10 case studies appearing in this book for this sector. Of these case studies, 7 of which appear in the printed pages and the remaining 3 on CD, a perspective on supporting small-to-medium enterprises is provided.

*Most of the community has their livelihood, as seen in a shop-residence in the Singkil Market, Aceh Singkil, December 20, 2008. In addition to focusing on rural-economic development, the Aceh-Nias recovery revitalized small businesses in large and small cities. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

## Forum Bangun Aceh (FBA)

# Creating Sustainable Community Development Through Microcredit

**THE** post-disaster implementation of a microcredit program poses many challenges, including huge amounts of grant funds available through other NGOs. Despite this, the experience of local NGO Forum Bangun Aceh (FBA), demonstrates the effectiveness of microcredit in assisting people to rebuild their businesses and in community development. This success grew out of FBA's decision to change the modality of support to a revolving fund, and the use of local people to review applications and tackle the problem of default. FBA views the sustainability of the program as a priority for community development. To date, more than 900 micro businesses in Aceh have benefited from FBA's microcredit program.

## Introduction

FBA's experience in microcredit demonstrates the humanitarian response of a small local NGO in the wake of disaster and how it transformed its program to reflect the growing needs and expectations of the community. The program not only helps people to rebuild their business but has had a huge impact on community development in Aceh. The long-term sustainability of the program is a top priority.

FBA did not exist prior to the tsunami; its creation sprang from an immediate, spontaneous will to do something to help survivors of the December 2004 tsunami. Azwar Hasan, a native of Banda Aceh who was living in Jakarta when the tsunami

struck, was one young man who came home immediately to look for his family. Initially overwhelmed by the scale of death and scope of destruction, Azwar was determined to figure out a way to help – quickly.

Azwar called 10 friends from Jakarta to come and live with tsunami survivors, and to buy for them what was needed. He then summoned 10 more friends, and thus began the people-to-people approach which remains the foundation of FBA's work today. From an initial donation of US\$1,000 FBA purchased a moped rickshaw for a man called Syarwan, who was living in a shack constructed from debris, and wading daily through mud to try to find a means to provide for his six dependents. With a means of making a living, Syarwan was able to provide for himself and his family again, and within a month he paid back \$50 to Azwar, so that someone else could be helped – a very charitable initiative given that he was struggling to provide for his family.

Soon funding was sent from generous international organizations and individual donors enabling the people-to-people approach to be formalized into the organization known as Forum Bangun Aceh.

FBA has prioritized financial sustainability to ensure its long-term operation. Its success has demonstrated that FBA is able to run an effective microcredit program.

## Program Highlight: Microcredit at Its Best

FBA began with a small group of Azwar's friends who lived and worked within several communities for several weeks after the tsunami. Each week, this dedicated group of volunteers met to discuss priorities and survivors' needs. Funds donated by individuals and organizations were used to purchase assets or materials for entrepreneurs to restart small businesses -- so that immediate action was taken to restore some sense of normalcy and income generation for survivors. This simple method allowed for immediate people-to-people assistance without the bureaucracy and red tape associated with many of the large-scale humanitarian relief projects.

From those early days until now, FBA's mission and structure reflect the conviction that it is the people themselves who can best identify their needs in order to improve their lives. Entrepreneurs and employees of Aceh have expressed a great desire and need to improve their livelihoods and to be self-sufficient and FBA is helping them to do this.

After assisting numerous entrepreneurs, it was apparent that the need was overwhelming with more and more people approaching the volunteers for assistance. At this early stage, FBA was one of the few groups working within the communities and delivering immediate small business support, enabling survivors to quickly generate income for their dependants and communities.

When Syarwan so generously approached Azwar with his first repayment of \$50, it became apparent that people were keen to support one another by ensuring funds were

returning back to where the need was greatest. It was at that point that Azwar decided to switch from grants to a revolving fund – allowing contributions to go further in providing sustainable livelihoods for the people of Aceh.

Officially formed in March 2005, FBA's focus was to rebuild Aceh from within – step by step – as FBA firmly believes that “small makes a difference”. Faced with the enormity of the tsunami, the realization that small contributions go far, kept FBA alive.

A revolving fund was then developed -- requiring beneficiaries to repay the amount given -- interest free, so that the funds could be distributed to the next micro business. This approach attracted entrepreneurs who were serious and driven to reestablish and sustain their micro business as it gave them an added sense of responsibility.

The emphasis was still on emergency small business recovery and FBA was assisting as many entrepreneurs as possible who had proof of an existing business, a captive market and whose businesses had an impact on their community, family and/or dependants.

Although loans were swiftly disbursed, they were approved without a full character reference and as a result of the quick turnaround, some clients circumstances altered. Some moved into permanent housing away from their business, changing business direction and/or closed down due to incurring further debt -- and it became apparent that some beneficiaries would not or could not make repayments.

FBA moved its focus from emergency small business recovery to sustainable economic development in 2007. It implemented a full character reference of potential loan recipients; applied a small interest on micro loans from the revolving fund; and imparted enterprise development support for entrepreneurs, including small business training; market access advice; and monthly motivational coaching via regionally placed Local Motivators (LM). This allowed FBA to fine tune its program and attract only serious micro-entrepreneurs who had the motivation and drive to conduct successful businesses, resulting in better outcomes for themselves and the economic stability of their community.

Through monitoring and evaluation FBA modified the microcredit selection process, thereby significantly reducing the portfolios at risk. With funds returning to the revolving fund, support for other micro businesses was assured.

Now an entrepreneur, wishing to establish or improve his or her small business, approaches FBA with a proposal indicating what the business requires. Upon approval of the proposal and budget, FBA purchases the required assets. A repayment schedule and rate of interest is agreed upon, depending on the size of the business, the loan and its duration. After a two-month grace period, the owner makes the agreed monthly repayments to FBA via regionally placed LM, and the repayments go back into the revolving fund so that assets can be disbursed to the next business.



FBA supports and monitors its micro-businesses on a monthly basis until the end of the agreed loan period. This strategy ensures the small business operates according to the agreement and reduces business risks such as bankruptcy.

*Photo: FBA Documentation*

As of December 2008, FBA had assisted more than 900 small to medium scale businesses within the districts of Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, Pidie, Bireuen and Aceh Utara; and is pleased to report that 30 percent of loans have supported women business owners.

FBA promotes growth and encourages entrepreneurs to apply for multiple loans as their small business grows – with each loan bigger than the last. This approach supports the growth and long term sustainability of the business with the possibility of employing family members or people within their community.

The results of monthly monitoring and evaluation become the basis for small businesses to apply for a second microcredit loan. FBA has been using the revolving fund to disburse second or third loans to small businesses that meet regular repayments, adopt book keeping and small business practices and have demonstrated direction and growth for their micro business.

## Problems and Challenges

FBA's microcredit model has faced challenges from the grants distributed by some NGOs. This initially saw prospective clients of FBA switching to those grants. However, the sustainability of these grants is now being questioned due to the end of the funding. Consistency and sustainability, therefore, are seen as importance issues in managing microcredit.

Other problems encountered were clients defaulting on repayments and using the microcredit for non-productive purposes such as daily needs.

These problems initially threatened the sustainability of the FBA's programs. FBA has reduced the problem of default by introducing local motivators and consistently monitoring and evaluating the performance of microcredit. Furthermore, FBA has also conducted training for developing the capacity building of the LM and the clients. These strategies not only reduced the incidence of default, but also increased the power of social capital, creating a real impact on community development.

## Analysis

The first lesson learned was "small makes a difference". Grants received from individuals and organizations were given directly in the form of materials and assets to entrepreneurs who needed immediate assistance. This people-to-people approach allowed donations to be transformed into necessary equipment or products to get small businesses up and running. This also reduced enormously the possibility of the money being used in an inappropriate way.

When grant recipients themselves wanted to repay the assets to FBA so that other members of their community would be assisted, FBA decided to work within a revolving fund in order to reach more people. By working closely with and listening to the community, it was established that grants are not always the solution – particularly in establishing economic sustainability.

While focusing on emergency small business recovery in 2005-2006, FBA did not conduct thorough character references and as a result some small businesses did not flourish or survive – which meant repayments were not returning to the revolving fund. Through regular monitoring and evaluation via regionally placed LM, FBA modified the microcredit selection process greatly reducing the risk of default and ensuring that funds were returning to the revolving fund.

FBA's microcredit program is a very simple and effective program to encourage Aceh to rebuild from within through sustainable micro economic practices. This program not only helps people to rebuild their business, but also has a huge impact on local community development.

## Conclusion

FBA's microcredit program prevailed due to proper management and consistency. Furthermore, by maintaining financial sustainability, microfinance programs have a broader impact in terms of outreach, and so are able to sustain their focus on social welfare. Financial sustainability, outreach and social welfare are the key objectives of microfinance development. ■

## Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Hivos)

# Enabling Sustainable Livelihood Through Developing Applied Rural Technology, JINGKI Institute, Lhokseumawe

**TO** overcome the lack of pro-poor technology that limited people's opportunity to take advantage of the many natural resources in North Aceh, JINGKI Institute introduced two main programs to restore livelihoods in North Aceh through applied rural technology: a liquid smoke program in a fishing village and small-scale feed production for poultry breeders.

In Bangka Jaya village, fish is preserved using chemical substances such as formalin and natrium benzoate. Due to their availability and practicality, these chemicals are used as preservatives in many foods such as noodles, soybean cake and meat balls. Most of the fishermen do not realize that chemical preservatives have health risks, and natural preservatives are not available on the market.

A non-governmental organization (NGO) called JINGKI Institute, with support from Hivos, aims to restore community livelihoods through the development of applied rural technology by introducing the production of liquid smoke in Bangka Jaya village. Liquid smoke is a natural preservative that can replace the use of formalin. It is made through the burning of coconut shells at a high temperature and capturing the condensation. This substance can be used as a natural preservative for food and fish. Beneficiaries can use the liquid smoke to preserve their own fish or sell it to generate an income. Liquid smoke can also be used as coagulant for rubber. JINGKI works with youngsters in the fishing community of Bangka Jaya village. Beneficiaries' lack of access to capital, lack of skills and access to information, as well as dependency on capital-intensive technology were among the reasons for their selection for participation in the program.

Another village where JINGKI worked is Paloh Raya in North Aceh. Many of the villagers in this village work as traditional poultry breeders. For many years they have relied on

processed poultry feed. In a study on the demand for chicken meat in northern Aceh, JINGKI found that demand at 10 markets totaled approximately 1,650 chickens (3,300 kg), a demand that traditional poultry breeders have been unable to meet due to a lack of knowledge and supporting technology.

## Programs

JINGKI designed programs to support livelihoods using rural techniques that utilize raw materials for product development. To realize the program, JINGKI Institute formed a partnership with Dutch NGO Hivos from May to October 2007, which was extended until December 2007. The project aimed at providing opportunities to beneficiaries to develop applied technology to ensure their self-reliance in using raw materials in a sustainable manner, and in establishing a center for study and application of applied technology in North Aceh. Three sub-programs were implemented: liquid smoke production, small-scale feed production and the publication of a bulletin on rural technology.

In the liquid smoke program, a community group called JALA was established, consisting of three female and 13 male members. The group was provided with technical facilitation and accompaniment. Two JINGKI staff conducted a field trip to a coconut center in Yogyakarta to build a network and learn about the production of liquid smoke from coconut shells and its application in food preservation. The knowledge acquired would be transferred to the JALA community group in the production of liquid smoke.

In the small-scale production programs, a community group for poultry feed production called Ikat Hatee consisting of 10 women and 15 men was established and provided with technical support. This group is ready to produce poultry feed. The main objective is to increase Paloh Raya villagers' incomes. The potential market for poultry feed in North Aceh could give small-scale businesses a chance to increase their production and therefore their incomes.

Meanwhile, three editions of Su JINGKI rural technology bulletin were published between July and December 2007. Apart from articles on applied rural technology, later issues also contained articles on liquid smoke production and beneficiaries' experience in the liquid smoke project with Hivos. Five hundred copies of each edition were published that targeted local government institutions in North Aceh, local NGOs, international NGOs, universities and individuals.

There are other programs in the development stage, such as bio-fuel, biogas, integrated cattle, organic farming and coconut shell briquette production. One bio-ethanol researcher from JINGKI Institute attended training on bio-ethanol energy production and management at the Center for Research on Surfactant and Bio-Energy at Bogor Institute of Agriculture, West Java, and subsequently held a workshop for Cisarua integrated farming cooperatives so they could learn about community-based integrated cattle, biogas and organic farming management.

## Time Constraints

The integrated approach chosen by Hivos to deliver the program through loans and offering intensive technical assistance meant that considerable time, effort and energy had to be dedicated to ensure the intended results and impacts. The eight-month loan duration proved insufficient for JINGKI programs and rendered them less effective. Similar future interventions should therefore make available sufficient time and human resources, which would ultimately help the sustainability of programs at the partner's and beneficiaries' level.

Aid that is time limited in a new area of work and when partners have not been sufficiently exposed to applied rural technology put the sustainability of the program at risk. Partner's lack of capacity in designing strategic interventions that ensure long-term support also deepens the risk. Local partners need to design appropriate interventions and provide grants for long-term programs (at least two to five years). This would require organizational strengthening in the field of agriculture and rural development, including technical aspects.

The need for allocating more time for the design and implementation of partner projects is also related to the fact that the partner and targeted beneficiaries were new to the use of the technologies introduced by the technical experts provided by Hivos. Sufficient time should be allocated to introduce the technology gradually and to establish awareness that results cannot be achieved overnight.

## Integrated Approach and Organizational Competency

Some of the applied rural technology projects implemented by JINGKI in villages of North Aceh had positive results for beneficiaries and JINGKI itself. At the local partner level, the local information center JINGKI established facilitated the adoption of applied rural technology by small businesses and for training communities to run small businesses effectively. An opportunity for JINGKI to further promote the use of applied rural technology also emerged. At the beneficiary level, mindsets were changed concerning the use of applied rural technology using locally available resources to improve livelihoods and income at household and community levels. Moreover, beneficiaries gained knowledge and skills on applied rural technology, which they can pass onto the rest of the community.

There were challenges in the integrated approach and organizational competencies that made the program less effective. Despite the relatively long process of project preparation that included field assessments related to the project themes and the assessment of potential partners, there were limited achievements related to the lack of prudence in the selection of beneficiaries. This in turn was related to insufficient attention

paid to a thorough analysis of the social, economic, cultural and political context of the targeted geographical areas, and insufficient analysis of potential risks to project implementation at the partner level. Future support should take these into consideration and ensure that more in-depth assessments are conducted.

Gaps also remain in aspects related to organizational management and program cycle management. If local partners are to meet the demands put on them as part of the ongoing process of Aceh's reconstruction, future programs should take into account the need to strengthen partners' capacities in this regard. By nurturing this, similar future assistance programs would contribute further to the strengthening of civil society in Aceh.

Time, funds, energy and patience are needed in order to realize JINGKI's dream to make technology work for marginalized people. For instance, developing applied rural technology by providing grants to local organizations combined with technical assistance to strengthen the capacities of selected partners as implemented by Hivos could be followed by other organizations in their relief and rehabilitation activities. ■

## Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

# Empowering the Poor through Group-Based Microcredit Organizations

**INCOME** generation through microcredit organizations is one solution to alleviating poverty. Using a group-based strategy, LOGICA assisted poor and women's groups to successfully organize themselves into a microcredit organization and start small businesses. This case study discusses the individuals' successful efforts to initiate and run their own microcredit organization. Self-reliance and mutual trust were core factors.

### Background

The revitalization of the post-tsunami economy was vital to improving the quality of life, particularly for the most economically vulnerable groups, namely women and the poor. The most common approach taken by donors, NGOs and development agencies to revive the economy and create jobs took the form of income generation programs, within which microcredit programs proved to be the most popular and acceptable form due to their suitability for low-income groups in the community including women.

In the post-tsunami era, Acehese women were forced to bear the bulk of the economic burden, especially in the home: paying for school fees, health care and the general upkeep of the household amongst other responsibilities. To keep their families going, many women worked informally as farm workers or as laborers. There was a palpable need for women to make higher incomes than they could in these sectors.

In general, it was difficult for women to access credit and other financial resources to start their own business. Women typically have little or no recognizable collateral as defined by normal banking practices, and banks and other financial institutions have traditionally discriminated against lending to women, considering them to be high risk, which has hindered women from accessing credit.

Under such circumstances, women (and men who find themselves in the same situation, usually the poor) commonly rely on other financial resources such as moneylenders (who charge exorbitant interest rates), relatives, or government direct subsidies if available. Under such circumstances, businesses belonging to women and other poor are at greater risk of stopping due to lack of resources. Thus, these entrepreneurs rarely succeed in breaking the cycle of poverty. LOGICA was mandated to develop a microcredit program specifically to assist women and the poor.

## Significant Events

LOGICA initiated microcredit initiatives in three districts, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, and Aceh Barat. It began the process by organizing community meetings facilitated by LOGICA's Village Facilitators, to which women and the poor were invited. Attendees were encouraged in these meetings to form a microcredit organization.

Once participants agreed to do so, an action plan was formed containing the following items, which had been collectively formulated and agreed upon by all group members: (1) each member had to save a certain amount of money in an individual account; (2) all members had to first demonstrate that they were capable of saving before they could access credit from the organization; (3) all members were responsible for the management of the group's activities. Under these rules, members could only borrow from the organization if they reached the agreed-upon savings minimum.

Individual loan sizes were determined by the borrower group itself, with an eye towards the amount of capital available within the organization. Loan sizes therefore varied according to the group assessment of the borrower's needs and ability to repay. Loan periods ranged from one to a maximum of ten months, with members borrowing available funds in turn. Interest rates and profit sharing arrangements were determined collectively. Although facilitated by LOGICA staff and by staff from local cooperatives, ultimately the borrower groups were responsible for determining the procedures and basic principles of their collectives.

Each microcredit organization held a mandatory annual meeting in which all members assembled to hear the organization's Executive Committee report on the overall performance of the organization and declare profits to be shared amongst members. This occasion also served as an opportunity for members to elect the Executive Committee for the next period.

In LOGICA's experience, most of these microcredit organizations grew rapidly. The organizations' progress elicited public interest as they expanded in size and demonstrated good performance. LOGICA assisted those that were well-managed to acquire legal certification from the Cooperatives Technical Agency (*Dinas Koperasi*). By taking on the legal status of a Community Cooperative, these organizations were then eligible to access resources from other sources and/or build partnerships with other financial institutions such the *Permodalan Nasional Madani* (a state-owned microcredit body) and other donors, and could use those resources to scale up.

By December 2008, there were 12 microcredit organizations, 7 of which were legally registered as cooperatives, serving more than 800 poor households within 21 less-developed villages across the districts of Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat. Of these 7 registered organizations, 4 were micro-finance organizations for women and 3 were cooperatives for women. Currently, the total capital in circulation per month is over IDR 75 million, with a default rate of ten percent.

## Challenges

Group-based microcredit organizations had to confront and overcome a number of challenges in the course of achieving their impressive growth.

- 1. Slow growth and limited credit funds.** Since micro-businesses generally rely on internal funds, microcredit organizations with fewer members and smaller businesses often have limited capital (savings) to draw on. This leads to continued rates of low growth and financial turnover within the microcredit organization, limiting the capacity of members' businesses – and thus the microcredit organization to which they belong – to expand.
- 2. Limited markets.** Micro-businesses are often constrained by limitations of resources, skill, capital and raw material to serve only their immediate market. Bigger, non-local markets are simply beyond their reach and resource capacity. Consequently micro-businesses rarely achieve fast growth and the development into a large business.
- 3. Social and cultural barriers facing women.** Social and cultural barriers often stand in the way of women's capacity to grow their business. As family managers, women cannot easily leave their homes to undertake business enterprises, making it difficult for women to get more customers and grow their markets.
- 4. Women's lower education and skill levels.** At the basic level, illiteracy and lack of skill are significant challenges to women in micro-business development. Overall, women typically have lower levels of official qualification than men due to the many obstacles women face in pursuing education and degrees. Most women must pick up bookkeeping and other basic management skills themselves; lack of these skills also hampers women in holding key positions in microcredit organization.

## Lessons Learned

It is safe to say that group-based microcredit organizations represent one of the most effective ways to empower disadvantaged groups. Drawing on the experience presented in the earlier part of this report, the key success factors in empowering the poor are as follows:

- 1. Organizational self-reliance.** Microcredit organizations operate well using just the human and financial resources of its existing members. The key factor is self-reliance, supported by establishment of sensible regulations within the organization that ensure the members work within their capabilities, thus ensuring the sustainability of the organization.
- 2. Start with real needs not wants.** Effective microcredit organizations operate according to the real needs, not wants, of members. This focus increases the likelihood of repayments and a constant flow of capital, and strengthens the mutual reliance upon which the microcredit organizations are built. ■



# Education, Health and Women Empowerment

UNDERLYING all efforts to rebuild a better and safer Aceh and Nias, lies the need to ensure an education for future generations, and health facilities. These fundamental and vital needs, combined with the important role women play in this respect, have received perhaps more attention than any others. The concern for this sector is reflected in the 20 case studies, 9 of which are included in the printed pages while 11 are on CD, appearing in this book for this sector. As described in these case studies, the development of education and health services at a community level requires innovation and the involvement of the community itself. The importance of women, as the lead-family caregiver, in the implementation of pedagogic objectives and health services practices, is also discussed.

*The maternity ward at the Gunungsitoli hospital, Nias, November 14, 2007. Since the 28 March 2008 earthquake, health services in the islands of Nias have been significantly improved, especially in terms of developing integrated health services. The Gunungsitoli hospital is a referral hospital for the islands. Photo: BRR/Bodi CH*

## Australia-Indonesia Partnership (AIP) Communities and Education Program in Aceh (CEPA)

# Implementing Active, Joyful and Effective Learning Teaching Techniques

**THE** Australia-Indonesia Partnership Communities and Education Program in Aceh (AIP CEPA) worked with the local government to improve the quality of elementary education by encouraging increased involvement of parents and communities in education.

The program consisted of building schools and training skills. An estimated Rp 2 billion was needed for each sub-district to build and rehabilitate seven to eight schools and train teachers in Active, Joyful and Effective Learning (AJEL) teaching techniques.

AIP-CEPA focused on Bireun, North Aceh and Pidie Jaya districts, where it supported activities in 43 state elementary schools and eight Islamic elementary schools, and through them more than 150 villages. The AIP-CEPA program was conducted in two phases. The first phase ran from February 2006 to August 2007 and consisted of a pilot project in Simpang Mamplam sub-district, Bireun district. The second phase was scheduled from September 2007 to September 2009.

Building schools alone is never enough but requires the development and improvement of teaching skills and proper school management.

Teachers play a key role in the learning process and are the prime movers of successful schools. Elementary school teachers lay the basic principles in education for children for the future of their nations.

AJEL was launched by the Indonesian government to create a pleasant learning experience in schools. AIP CEPA together with the local government aimed at improving the education system in Aceh, especially in post-conflict areas. AJEL teaching-learning techniques were taught to teachers, school principals, school inspectors and community representatives.

To improve of the quality of education, AIP-CEPA conducted AJEL training for teachers, school principals, school/madrasah inspectors and community representatives. Teachers were taught to actively monitor pupils' activities, give feedback, ask challenging questions and explore pupils' thoughts, and creatively develop learning aids.

AJEL Introductory training was given to community representatives and school committees to give them insight into the importance of community involvement, support and aid in the improvement of the quality of teaching and learning process. AJEL training for school inspectors assured that they gained knowledge and the skills required to effectively supervise teaching and learning in schools. Pupils were taught to actively ask questions, express their opinions and challenge others' opinions.

However, AJEL training to increase teachers' knowledge and skill in the implementation of AJEL did not initially have a direct impact on its implementation in schools. Teachers lacked commitment and enthusiasm in implementing AJEL in the classroom. Teachers faced constraints due to the limited availability of learning aids and a lack of parental support. Teachers also had difficulty implementing the knowledge and skills acquired from the training in the teaching process in the classroom.

To overcome these difficulties in the implementation of AJEL, CEPA used two methods, namely: (1) revitalizing KKG (Teachers Working Group) as a medium for teacher development and (2) giving assistance through on-the-job training programs. The KKG and on-the-job training programs were conducted by empowering tutors and instructors in their respective groups, and by actively involving school/madrasah inspectors and district facilitator trainers.

## Implementation of AJEL

In the implementation stage of AJEL, AIP CEPA faced several constraints. These included a lack of motivation on the part of teachers, who were more familiar with convention teaching methods and seemed unwilling to try something new.

Several Teachers Working Groups did not have rooms for meetings or for storing the teaching aids that they created, which had a negative impact on the program.

It was also found that some tutors, facilitators and instructors did not have sufficient skill to transfer knowledge.

There were also insufficient funds to support and guarantee the implementation of KKG in schools. A budget of Rp 5 million per group was provided by the local government in 2007, which was reduced to Rp 2,500,000 per group in 2008. No budget was allocated for this activity in 2009.

## Lesson learned

AJEL is an innovation and its implementation can only be guaranteed if teachers, school principals, parents and the community are made aware of its benefits, and if the local government commits to implement and replicate it. Experience in AJEL implementation in other provinces in Indonesia showed that it takes at least three years to develop awareness of local government and parents to support AJEL. ■

# Australia-Indonesia Partnership (AIP) Communities and Education Program in Aceh (CEPA)

## Increasing the Participation of the Community in the Management of Education in Post Conflict Period

### Introduction

**PRESENTLY**, the management of education, especially in the conflict area, involves very few school communities in planning and execution. Hence, many government education programs fail to elicit a positive response from the public.

The low rate of community participation and the public's concerns about the current management of education are rooted in the perception that education matters are the responsibility of the government and not their business. This attitude is exacerbated by the fact that in a conflict situation, in which people live in fear, education is the last thing priority, while the school managements say the community lacks the will and ability to participate in the management of the schools that educate their own children.

Education campaigns increase the awareness of the importance of community participation in education are imperative, so that people become convinced that they have a part in providing good quality education that will produce intelligent children with a brighter future.

Unfortunately, the old education management practices that failed to take local conditions and needs into consideration remained entrenched in society, making it very difficult to convince the community to involve itself (through school committees) maximally. It will take a long time and a lot of public service campaigning to change the ingrained social attitudes on the proper management of the education system and instill the idea that the public can play an integral role in improving the system and ensuring quality education.

It is expected that public education awareness drives will increase the community's sense of ownership of its schools and its education system, thus leading to more involvement in education programs on the part of parents and other members of the community. This sense of ownership, or belonging, as part of the system will increase if the community is fully involved in the management of education starting from the planning and on through to the execution and the control of educational systems and programs. The parents and other members of the community with a vested interest in bettering education should not be treated as objects (sources of funds), but as subjects in the government development programs.

## Implementation of Strategy

### 1. Drawing Competition and Meeting with Parents

One of the first and the key step to involving parents in the management of their children's education is to establish programs to get their attention about and foot in the door of the education system. An effective way to do this is conducting drawing competitions for pupils of elementary and madrasah schools. In this event, AIP-CEPA, in cooperation with school administrations, invited all parents to watch their children participate in the competition. The parents were treated not just as guests, but also invited moderators in the competition. This kind of event received highly positive responses from the parents. Never before had such activities taken place; they were delighted.

In the initial stages of the events that last two days, children begin to develop self confidence. The first day was the competition itself, and the second day was the appraisal of the drawings followed by discussions among parents and the organizers. These discussions constituted an opportunity to familiarize parents with the school and its education programs. By inviting parents to school building, they will know the school's condition and how their children learn there. Most of the parents had seldom or ever stepped into the school building before, in short, they had shown little interest in the school.

Such events bring the parents into the schools, where they will find out what has to be repaired or added. They will see what needs to be done to make the schools better places to learn for their children. They will see the poor conditions of the chairs and tables, the dirty walls, the insufficient number of books, the leaky roof, the foul toilet, and even meet pupils who do not wear school uniform or shoes because they can't afford them. Parents also immediately become aware of the insufficient number of teachers that leads to the children being left unattended in the school yard, etc. They will also realize how far the school is from their homes.

The important thing is that the parents have the opportunity to get to know the school, the teachers, the principal, and the school committee members (collectively called the school administration).

This event usually leads to an initial evaluation of school's physical condition by the parents. They get to see, at the very least, just what needs to be repaired or added; not to mention the professional aspects of education management. At this stage, the parents are expected to develop a sense of belonging and ownership of the school so that a spirit of responsibility and team work grows up among parents, teachers, school principals, and school committee members.

## 2. The Formation of the School Development Committee

This aid program will be available throughout 2009. The implementation of this program is carried out by the School Development Committee. The members of this committee consist of teachers, the school committee, religious leaders, community leaders, and community representatives who are elected democratically. Community leaders include former GAM (Free Aceh Movement) leaders (in the post conflict era they are called the Aceh Transition Committee: KPA). Before starting their activities, members of the School Development Committee will attend a 6 month training course on the following subjects:

- Introduction to CEPA (Communities and Education Program)
- School-based Management
- Community Facilitation and Relations
- AJEL Learning (Active, Joyful, Effective Learning)
- School Development Plan
- Block Grant Application Proposal
- Construction Quality Monitoring
- Block Grant Management for School Development Committee
- School Financial Management

## Development

1. The AIP-CEPA Program has proven successful; from the 51 elementary schools in this program, about 70% of the parents now actively help their children in doing school assignments and homework. They have also formed study groups within the community.
2. School building are now fenced and well maintained, the classrooms are in good condition, while 51% of parents in the 51 elementary schools in this program now help in improving the physical condition of the school buildings.
3. As many as 35% of the school committees in the 51 schools in this program conduct annual parents meeting to seek help for annual school activities.

4. **Case Study in Jeunieb Sub-district:** In this previously high tension conflict area, the level of graduation is now very high. Of the 539 six graders who took the national exam, 534 graduated; a 99% success rate.
5. In the **Jeunieb cluster**, of the 21 school buildings built between 1910 and 1985, as many 9 units do not need rehabilitation and 12 units were rehabilitated with government funds in 1985.

## Lessons Learned

1. The appointment of community representatives to be members of School Development Committees gives rise to a sense of belonging, ownership, and responsibility among parents toward the importance of basic education for their children. Community members involve themselves in the planning and monitoring of school construction and provide land for new schools.
2. Community leaders state that the community wants to give to their children a new beginning by providing schools and a better future through education. They say: "This quality school becomes a place to receive high quality education for our children, as well as a place for the community to congregate".
3. AIP-CEPA implemented comprehensive and integrative strategies in order to guarantee the support of education by the community. AIP-CEPA even integrated a strategy to build the trust of the community in the government through the implementation of the School-based Management System.
4. Training for School Development Committee members is very useful in their work in the field. For example, in order to monitor school construction effectively, they attended Construction Monitoring Training.
5. In places where education quality and standards had been affected by the separatist of several decades, AIP-CEPA united the disintegrated community through education issues. This approach has increased student and teacher attendance, as well as encouraging closer village bonds, and inclusive decision making. This program has helped to build a stable and peaceful village environment.
6. The future of Aceh is also brighter following the ending of the 30-year conflict. People now can make a trip to any place in the province without worrying for their safety. According to a former activist: "... this is the best time in Aceh in the last 30 years".
7. AIP-CEPA also works toward improving the participation of women in decision making positions in the school committee. The result has been awesome; the number of women participating in the school committee has increased almost by 40%. Studies show that participation of women in such social institutions has reduced conflict and increased the focus on the improvement of the quality of education. The composition of women in the school committees is 21% from among the total of 407 members. ■

# Australia-Indonesia Partnership (AIP) Communities and Education Program in Aceh (CEPA)

## Using “Conflict Sensitive Approach” in the Implementation of AIP-CEPA in Post-Conflict

**SERIOUS** obstacles can face aid programs being implemented in post-conflict regions, particularly if the approach employed is not conflict-sensitive. Many aid programs inadvertently create new problems in the community during their implementation, and sometimes have to be terminated because they do not achieve their intended purposes of introducing and maintaining positive change.

AIP-CEPA implements the Conflict-Sensitive Approach in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of its programs. Conflict analysis is done at the village level where aid will be given to collect vital information about existing community dynamics. The result of this analysis is used as a reference for strategic intervention by the program in its execution of activities, especially in the involvement of the community and other stakeholders in the program and the peaceful solution to any problem that may arise. Problem solving based on the understanding of pre-existing conditions and updates on potential conflicts in the program working area brings about the optimal achievement of program objectives.

The biggest challenge faced by the program is the unfavorable situation in the communities that have just emerged from a prolonged violent; especially as related the challenges of law enforcement and complying with the democratic principles of participative, inclusive, transparent and accountable community involvement. Overcoming these challenges requires the implementation of a three-phase approach (introduction/promotion, learning and practice, and principles reinforcement) in every intervention toward attaining program objectives.

## Constraints

One of the core difficulties encountered was the long-standing ingrained conflict era habit of the imposition of illegal fees of between 2 to 5 percent of the total amount of grants. The exact amount of the fee was always uncertain; it would depend on the negotiation between the two parties involved. The purpose of the fee was also vague; but such fees had long been imposed in all projects in Aceh, whether they were government or donor funded.

To overcome this problem, AIP-CEPA tried using its “conflict-sensitive approach” in the implementation of its programs. In applying this approach we involved the local culture and community leaders, as well as religious leaders, who acted as mediators and balance makers. In this manner, the opinion that the misuse of grants was “haram” (forbidden under religious law and practice) emerged and grew among the community. The result was zero imposition and disbursement of illegal fees.

The community also became convinced of the importance of education for their children. When communities reach this level of awareness, it is easier to implement the AIP-CEPA programs through the formation of the School Development Committee. This program is a community-based effort targeted at building the capacity to pursue common goals. The success of this program is also demonstrated by the transparency and accountable management of the grants, as evidenced in the eradication of the illegal fees predominant during the conflict period.

## Lessons Learned

1. Sensitivity toward local conditions can enable the initiation of change in areas in which the AIP-CEPA programs are implemented. A case in point is the leveraging of local culture through the belief in “*haram*” or forbidden behavior and its application in relation to all the grants for school development. The public came to see the previous custom of imposing illegal fees on all grants as “*haram*” or harmful and refused to continue the practice.
2. The appointment of community representatives to be members of the School Development Committee – including members of the Aceh Transition Committee (KPA) – developed a sense of belonging, ownership and responsibility among the community members toward their children’s education. The community began to actively participate in the planning and controlling of the construction process for new schools, and even donated their land for construction purposes. The empowerment of the community gave back their confidence in themselves and trust in their education system.
3. Many former members of GAM are now involved in planning and construction of new schools for their children. Psychologically they have the sense of belonging and ownership of the schools which they build and renovate themselves, so they will take care of and maintain them in a sustainable manner. ■

# A Code of Conduct to Improve the Quality of Education in Vocational Schools in Aceh

## Introduction

**WHEN** the tsunami of December 26, 2004, swept over the coast of the Indonesian province of Aceh, 139,195 houses were ruined or simply washed away. Along with that were 3,415 schools. All public life came to halt. To rebuild the province, however, simple reconstruction of the buildings was not enough. The regeneration of badly affected communities was just as important. Education for the surviving young generation became an essential factor.

The German government therefore decided to support – among many other projects – the rebuilding of six vocational secondary schools (SMKs) in Aceh and two on the neighboring island of Nias, which belongs to the province of North Sumatra. All schools are now in their final stages of reconstruction. The ongoing program is implemented by German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the German KfW Bank. The schools also received modern equipment and learning material to improve the quality of education. Among other activities the GTZ-supported program “Technical and Vocational Education and Training” (TVET) assisted with educational and technical training for around 500 school principals, teachers and administrative staff.

During workshops and training, the question arose of how to maintain the high standard of the specialized education and technical equipment. “People needed to become aware of this unique chance and not let it go down again,” says principal advisor



*Students of Business Trade learn together at the SMK Negeri 1 in Banda Aceh: Thanks to the new Code of Conduct, girls now also study technical subjects, while boys take courses in home economics. Photo: GTZ Documentation*

Heinz Dieter Harbers. Also, representatives of the provincial education department, school principals, parents, and community leaders felt that clear regulations were needed to improve the interaction between administrators, teachers, and students – both within the schools and with the outside community. So they approached the TVET staff and requested their assistance in drafting a Code of Conduct (CoC) for school administrators, teachers, and students of the relevant SMKs.

The subsequent discussion of new guidelines focused on greater transparency in school management, better training and salaries for teachers, and gender equality among the students. In response, the TVET consultants conducted a short survey on the availability of CoCs in Indonesia. The result showed that only one very general ethical code exists for all types of schools in the country. However, it has never been officially published and has never been implemented. So TVET took on the task of drafting an exemplary CoC for State SMK 1, 2, and 3 in Banda Aceh – also to be applied at the SMK in Bireuen, Blang Pidie, and Sinabang. This GTZ program was also supported by the German Development Service (DED).



## Development and Implementation

The first step was to work out a rough draft relating to the chosen schools. The regulatory requirements resulting from the initial survey had to be observed equally with the needs of students and teachers, local customs and the Islamic religion. To find an ethical code that would be appropriate in the special situation of Aceh – the only province in Indonesia in which Sharia law applies – the TVET experts needed to consult the provincial and district departments of education, school management, and parents' committees, teachers and students of the SMKs, as well as leaders of the surrounding communities.

The first rough draft was then compared with similar CoCs from other parts of the world. A long line of assessments, interviews and literature reviews finally lead to the second draft that was presented in a one-day workshop to 150 selected administrators, teachers, parents, and students. "I expected they would listen to our presentation and then most of the audience would go home," says Qismullah Yusuf, one of the GTZ national senior advisors. "But then everybody kept asking questions and making comments. And except for one person, everyone came back for the afternoon session with group work.

*Students of Technical Trade gather in front of SMK Negeri 2 in Banda Aceh: According to the new Code of Conduct, school management, teachers, students and parents have to work together to create a clean and healthy environment around the school campus.*

*Photo: GTZ Documentation*

Over lunch, some had even prepared written papers with very valuable suggestions. We were very excited about the great interest we had triggered.” A heated debate arose over the issues of gender awareness and equal educational opportunities for girls and boys. Before the tsunami, the SMKs in Aceh were separated into girls’ schools – specializing in cooking, sewing, and other homemaking skills – and different technical schools for boys. “More than half of the workshop participants were women who commented sharply on the gender issues”, Qismullah Yusuf recounts.

In the end, all of the valuable suggestions and advice were integrated into the draft. Together with the TVET consultants the participants formulated a regulatory framework and the rationale beyond the CoC. The revised draft was then distributed to the provincial and district departments of education, administrators, principals, and teachers for further comments. In order to achieve a broad-based consensus, all participants were continuously involved in the final formulation of the Code. The feedbacks were also provided by the two leading teachers’ organizations – the Indonesian Teachers’ Association (PGRI) and the Teachers Coordinating Body (Kobar GB). Further feedback came from the governor of Aceh and from district mayors.

The handbook that was finally approved formulates the tasks and responsibilities of school management and teachers as well as the rights and responsibilities of parents and students. Besides the quality of teaching, the regulations determine, for example, how teachers should dress and behave appropriately in front of a class. Or that the school management is responsible for health and sanitary standards, but not solely – the students and their parents, too, should develop habits of cleanliness and honesty, to foster environmental awareness and greater integrity on the campus.

The implementation of the CoC appears to lay an extra burden on teachers in particular. The handbook demands that they not only teach, but also act as guides, counselors and role models for the students; as administrators and as mediators between the school and parents. But all other parties involved must also work together to improve the quality of education at the SMKs. Furthermore, the code defines the professional rights of teachers – for example their right to receive payment for overtime. In Indonesia, teachers still often have to have a second job to feed their families. One aim of this CoC is to guarantee the SMK teachers in Aceh more security. Of course, in return, teachers are obliged to improve their teaching in order to cope with the changes in technology and methodology.

School funding was a matter of particular concern. The workshops showed that many of the participants were not informed about the expenses for running a school, registration fees and maintenance costs and works of a school. The handbook also details how the proceeds coming from the schools’ production units should be used – in the past and in several schools, these were an endless source of corruption.

Parallel to the drafting of the CoC, the TVET staff was also involved in the development of Education Strategic Plans (ESP) for the Province of Aceh. The aim was to find a strategy for all sectors and levels of education in the province from 2008 to 2012.

The special challenge here was to combine the rationale of the ESP with the ethics of the CoC, which must safeguard customary and traditional Islamic values. Here too, gender awareness was an important point.

## Lessons Learned

After the tsunami had swept over coastal regions in Aceh leaving unbelievable damage, most of the help coming from inside and outside Indonesia was primarily focused on physical reconstruction and human capacity development. This was also true of the TVET project. Initially there was not enough time spared for tasks beyond the requirements of immediate reconstruction and recovery. The main aim was to get students and teachers back into their schools as quickly as possible. Thus, school development plans, subject matter, and teaching methods had to be adapted to the new economic needs. Additionally, teachers had to be trained in the use of modern equipment. Little attention was given to further quality control.

More important were that the approach used by GTZ was the bottom-up approach, and the close work among the project partners and related communities. The continuous sharing of information – both officially and informally – has led to mutual understanding as well as revealing further needs. “School is not only an institution where teachers help students realize their academic potential. It is also a place where the character of a people is formed”, writes the head of the provincial education department, Mohammad Ilyas, in his foreword to the CoC handbook. He calls for students to become not only intellectually skillful, but also to apply moral conduct in their lives and to voluntarily make sacrifices for their people.

In this spirit, the procedures, discussions, and final drafting of the CoC have contributed greatly to the appreciation of inherent cultural and religious values and differences for all parties involved. However, it also broke down stereotypes: for example, gender-specific studies. As early as 2007, quite a number of girls began studying at technical SMKs, while more boys started taking courses in home economics and even cosmetics. Although an ethical code is not equal to the law, it can stimulate a lot of awareness of social issues.

Finally, the project was able to accommodate not only local, but also regional requests. The governor of Aceh province, the mayor of the provincial capital Banda Aceh, and the head of the provincial education department all asked for permission for the CoC worked out by the TVET program to be implemented in other schools all over the province.

The latest regulations and requirements from the National Department of Education even suggest that CoCs be developed and used as a standard when applying for approval of an International Organization of Standardization (ISO) certificate for a school. This is needed, particularly when a SMK is to be upgraded to an International Standard School (SBI), which is under the direct control of the National Education Department and therefore eligible for special funding from the department. ■

Government of Japan (GoJ)

## Gunungsitoli Hospital and Project Coordination

**GUNUNGSITOLI** Hospital on Nias Island was seriously damaged in the 8.7-magnitude earthquake on March 28, 2005. Gunungsitoli was the sole referral hospital on the island for the 712,075 population, and its reconstruction, development and medical function were essential in the island's health sector, especially after such a catastrophe.

This large-scale project required a comprehensive approach in reconstruction, human resources and in establishing an efficient medical system due to the large number of organizations that would be involved in making the hospital fully operational.

The successful reconstruction of the hospital was a result of these organizations' efforts in coordination, and a product of the flexible grant aid scheme that enabled effective coordination.

## Development and Implementation

The reconstruction and resumption of medical services of Gunungsitoli Hospital were strongly emphasized as the main health focus in Nias by the Government of Indonesia. This opinion and policy were shared by organizations such as the Agency for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation for Aceh-Nias (BRR), the North Sumatra Health Ministry and the Nias District Police.

Many organizations were involved in this project because it involved the training of human resources and the introduction of an efficient operational system as well as the reconstruction of infrastructure. For example, a scholarship was allocated to train doctors from Nias island.

Moreover, the reconstruction master plan of this hospital was drawn up by MERCY Malaysia in collaboration with the North Sumatra Health Ministry, based on the medical system in Indonesia, under the instruction of the Indonesian Health Ministry and the World Health Organization (WHO) and with financial and technical assistance.

In addition, a working group was established consisting of the Government of Indonesia, WHO, MERCY Malaysia, BRR, UNICEF and Meltzer International.

Japan accepted responsibility for Phase 3, which included construction of the outpatients' ward, mortuary, access road and generator building and procurement of medical equipment at the request of the Indonesian side.

Phase 1 and 2 was funded by other donors and work had already commenced. Phase 4 was funded by another donor. Even though several construction projects were being undertaken simultaneously by several donors at the same site, no problems were encountered due to effective coordination and planning.

Japan normally implements construction projects under grants, in which Japan decides on procedures according to requests, a basic survey and a detailed construction study in accordance with Japanese rules and guidelines. In this project, however, MERCY Malaysia conducted the study and coordinated with the executing agency and other donors, while Japan was involved in the construction stages of Phase 1 and 2, and before the engineering design stage of Phase 3: mainly in the selection and procurement of a construction firm and project management in the construction stage of Phase 3.

Although projects normally require more coordination with other organizations, and partial implementation is irregular for conventional Japanese grant aid, flexibility of Japanese Non-Project Grant Aid enabled and contributed to reconstruction and operation of the medical center and activities in Nias.

## Lessons Learned

Due to coordination with the many relevant organizations and a flexible grand aid scheme, Gunungsitoli Hospital was successfully returned to full function as the sole referral hospital on Nias and was able to offer improved medical services to the island's population.

In addition, equipment necessary to medical treatment at the hospital was procured and the level of medical services was also upgraded.

From the Japanese point of view, as one of the donors of this project, the key to its success was the flexibility of the Japanese Non-Project Grant Aid, which enabled fund disbursement in accordance with the needs of the reconstruction project in Nias and Aceh.

However, grant aid schemes can meet with challenges due to the limited time for comprehensive study in such an emergency situation, in which circumstances change on a day-to-day basis. Thus a flexible scheme was required in this project. ■

## Government of Japan (GoJ)

# Japan Offers Emergency Medical Support

**THE** Government of Japan (GOJ) took immediate steps to offer support to the people of Aceh by providing necessary goods and equipment (tents, generators, blankets, etc) on Dec. 27, 2004, as well as by dispatching a survey team to Aceh to collect information for the consideration of cooperation in emergency relief.

On Dec. 28, GOJ announced the provision of a US\$1.5 million emergency grant to Indonesia for food and medical equipment.

On Dec. 30, GOJ dispatched an emergency medical team (three medical doctors and seven nurses) to Aceh, which stayed until Jan. 12, 2005. This team was the first batch of medical teams.

On Jan. 8, 2005, GOJ dispatched another emergency medical team to Aceh for two weeks. The task of this second team was to take over the activities of the first team in providing medical care to the injured.

On Jan. 18, GOJ dispatched a third medical team to Aceh. The task of this team was not only to provide medical treatment for the injured but also technical cooperation on public hygiene and measures for infectious diseases.

A total of 64 medical personnel (such as doctors, nurses, experts for infectious diseases) were dispatched in three batches and treated a total of 2,758 patients in Aceh in January 2005. In addition, 28 medical personnel (divided into two teams) were dispatched to Nias in April 2005 and treated 1,953 patients with the support of equipment worth 15 million Japanese yen.



## Lessons learned

One reason that Japan could act so quickly to offer support immediately after the disaster was the quick decision to dispatch a survey team, which arrived the day after the disaster. As Japan is a natural disaster-prone country, it has a lot of experience in natural disasters and understands the importance of supporting other countries affected by a disaster.

As a result of the team's survey of the damage caused by the tsunami, GOJ could grasp the general situation and collect information for emergency medical support as well as for reconstruction in Aceh.

Japan has had diplomatic relations with Indonesia for 50 years, and has had cooperation agreements with Indonesia for more than 30 years in which many Indonesians have taken part in cooperation activities with Japan. Because of these activities, Japan's Emergency Medical Team was able to collect useful information on what was needed in the relief program and coordinate with relevant organizations to communicate with victims of the disaster. ■

*A man (left) helps a Japanese medical worker communicate with a mother and child. Photos: GoJ Documentation*

## Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

# Community Voice as the Basis for Improved Health Services: The Case Study of the Meureubo Community Health Center Summary

**COMMUNITY** Health Centers (*Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat: Pukesmas*) represent a vital health service for local communities, especially for the disadvantaged at the village level. However, the quality of Community Health Center service is often a cause for complaint. The Community Health Center Service Reform, facilitated by AIPRD-LOGICA, helped improve the quality of Community Health Center services and, with the support of community health volunteers known as ‘health ambassadors’, bolstered hitherto neglected preventative health care efforts. This case study discusses the role that the development of a public feedback system and the health ambassadors’ efforts played in the Community Health Center Service Reform, resulting in improved services.

## Background

The Community Health Center system was originally established by the national government to be the primary contact point for community health care, a key element in addressing community health concerns. Community Health Center also targeted specific health concerns, pushed disease prevention programs, and provide medicines at the Sub-district level.

Many of the Community Health Centers in Aceh, among them the one in Meureubo in Aceh Barat District, primarily concentrated on providing medicine at the expense of other health services within their mandate. As a result, local community health standards

stagnated. The majority of the people in the health cadre supporting the Meureubo Community Health Center, which was made up of volunteers, were working below capacity. The health cadre tended to be active at the Community Health Center only when Community Health Center staff was actively visiting. Otherwise the health cadre was generally passive. The situation was even worse at the village-level Integrated Health Posts (Posyandu).

In July 2007, Midwife Ena Herisna, who had previously been a staff member at the Community Health Center, was appointed as the new manager of the Meureubo facility. Herisna had firsthand knowledge of the generally poor quality of health care services there. Staff discipline was poor, with low attendance rates despite official work hours from 08:00 to 14:00. There were also conflicts between staff and uncertainties caused by a lack of clear job descriptions and delineation of responsibilities. Education programs on preventing disease were run only sporadically and not as part of a coordinated plan, and the health cadre was overly dependent on guidance from the Community Health Center.

The Meureubo Community Health Center was selected to participate in LOGICA'S Health Reform program due to its demonstrated commitment under Herisna's leadership to improve the delivery of health services. Previously LOGICA had assessed several Community Health Centers in Aceh Barat to identify levels of commitment, the availability of health equipment and staff, and the quality of health service delivery provided.

Herisna led the reform process, motivating staff to participate in all aspects of the process: rebuilding partnerships with health cadres, the sub-district head and informal village leaders; and spreading awareness of the service reforms to the community, the head of the District Health Office, the regent and local legislators.

## Significant Events

AIPRD-LOGICA began the reform process by facilitating meetings between the Community Health Center staff and local community to map out the problems in service delivery. A questionnaire was distributed by the health care cadres to get feedback on the current state of health services from past users of the Community Health Center. The findings identified the ten most common complaints, along with proposed solutions. Complaints ranged around a number of issues including physical Community Health Center building conditions, a lack of staff expertise and professionalism, and vague customer service procedures. Proposed solutions were divided between internal solutions, i.e. those that could be carried out by existing Community Health Center staff and resources, and external solutions, i.e., those needing assistance from other parties such as the District Health Office, the District Administration and the District Legislative Council (DPRK).

The Community Health Center pledged to improve customer service and productivity. It worked with AIPRD-LOGICA to carry out several activities, namely: workshops on

handling complaints, training on standard operating procedures, the development of clear job descriptions (Terms of Reference), including improvements in shared workload, redesigning the office layout, and improved capacity building training for health cadres. External solutions were also applied through discussions with the District Health Office, the district administration, and the District Legislative Council regarding the new Community Health Center developments.

These efforts helped reform Community Health Center health care delivery. Following the various training activities, Community Health Center staff was better motivated and able to deliver on its pledge of health service improvement. Immediate results were apparent. Staff attendance rose, staff was friendlier to patients and more disciplined in following procedures, and information was more effectively disseminated to the community.

The layout of the Community Health Center was also reorganized to improve its functionality and make patients feel more comfortable. Office spaces were demarcated, and the reception space improved. The patient waiting room was expanded and an administration counter added.

Internal Community Health Center improvements also energized the health cadre at the facility. After participating in workshops and training within the Community Health Center, at LOGICA's suggestion and with LOGICA facilitation, the health cadre formulated a new role and plan to take on a more active role in village health service delivery by becoming 'health ambassadors'.

The health ambassadors' responsibilities were a step up from those of a health cadre, working more actively in villages. They catalyzed health service improvements and disseminated information. They also provided input and advice to the Community Health Centers based on their own experiences and community feedback.

Working with the Community Health Centers, the health ambassadors ensured that health guidance and counseling reached even the most remote villages in Meureubo sub-district. One result of the counseling with regard to maternal health was reduced mortality rates for expectant mothers.

In addition, health ambassadors held monthly meetings to share and monitor one another's work. Ambassadors were also active in village assembly meetings, providing advice on health-related matters. Health ambassadors also provided invaluable feedback to the Community Health Center in evaluating its own performance. Additionally, monthly and quarterly workshops took place between health ambassadors and the sub-district administration, providing an ongoing health monitoring and evaluation loop within the new system. These meetings provide valuable feedback on the ongoing operations of the .

The improved health care system centered on the Community Health Centers successfully lobbied the district administration to provide improved dental health care at

the Community Health Center level, with the service of dentists being provided for the first time. The district administration commented favorably after visiting the Meureubo Community Health Center, recommending that all Community Health Centers in the district adopt the Meureubo reforms. Facing budget constraints, the Aceh Barat District Health Office allocated funds in its 2009 budget for such service reforms in six other selected Community Health Centers .

The designation of the Meureubo Community Health Center as a model Community Health Center by the Aceh Barat Health Service further encouraged staff to improve health services. To date, the Meureubo Community Health Center staff has successfully addressed the ten most significant complaints in the initial survey of community health care services, and has moved to address a further twenty-two other complaints that the survey turned up.

## Challenges

1. **Returning Community Health Center to its primary function.** Although service standards have improved, all too often Community Health Centers pay too much attention to providing medicines and not enough to community health awareness and prevention. These areas are integral to the initial philosophy behind the formation of the Community Health Center . A greater proportion of energy must be spent on prevention and promotion.
2. **Maintaining the consistency of the health ambassadors.** The health ambassadors were volunteers and their focus on health care work often wavered in the face of other responsibilities and demands. The District Health Office needs to increase efforts to build out their capacity and to provide remuneration, which could be sourced from village grants provided by the district administration.
3. **Feedback and support from higher echelons of government.** The district administration needed to monitor performance, give feedback and provide incentives to improve customer service at contact points such as the Community Health Center . Such support should consist of regulatory, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and sufficient funds allocation. This in turn will lead to staff motivation and improved customer service.

## Lessons Learned

1. **Customer-oriented service.** Efforts to improve public services delivery must be in line with the interests of the recipients. By listening to community demands, Meurebo Community Health Center successfully improved the quality of its services in accordance with the community needs. The Meurebo Community Health

Center conducted regular meetings with community members to gather input and recommendations and to gain community support for the health services improvements it had in mind.

- 2. Tackling initiatives systematically.** The Meureubo Community Health Center reform was initiated by an individual, a new manager. Listening to community concerns was the basis for commencing reform and depended greatly on the commitment of the manager. To ensure that reforms were not dependent on just one individual, and in order for these reforms to be replicated in other Community Health Center , the procedures and regulations supporting the initiatives should be structured systematically and then consistently applied at other Community Health Center . Related to this, budget allocations in the general Health Budget to Community Health Center and its related community initiatives also need to be increased.
- 3. Committed leaders are the key to service reforms.** Many government staffers view reform as a threat to their position and work culture. It is therefore key to have a leader who is committed, willing to take initiatives and able to provide guidance for his/her staff in demonstrating that reform will bring positive results not only to community but also to the institution. ■

# PLAN International

## Report from CTAs in Immersion Program

### Introduction

**COMMUNITY** Transformation Agents (CTA) make up the frontline team having direct interaction with assisted tsunami victim communities. They are also Acehnese, but most of them were not directly affected by the tsunami, but they are concerned about those who were. Every CTA has the responsibility to give attention and be willing to serve assisted villages. There were 15 CTAs living in 15 villages in 3 sub-districts of Aceh Besar District.

No.	Sub-District	Village of Work
1.	Lhok Nga	Lampaya
2.	Lhok Nga	Lamkruet
3.	Lhok Nga	Lambaro (Neujid)
4.	Lhok Nga	Mon Ikeun
5.	Mesjid Raya	Meunasah Mon
6.	Mesjid Raya	Ladong
7.	Mesjid Raya	Lamnga
8.	Mesjid Raya	Durung
9.	Mesjid Raya	Meunasah Kulam
10.	Mesjid Raya	Neuheun



No.	Sub-District	Village of Work
11.	Peukan Bada	Lam Hasan
12.	Peukan Bada	Lam Geu Eu
13.	Peukan Bada	Lam Awe
14.	Peukan Bada	Lampisang
15.	Peukan Bada	Keuneue

The CTA lived-in to immerse and become a part of the community, in order to feel and understand the real problems or potential impact of programs and other activities on the children. The immersion was a part of a Child Centered Community Development (CCCD) approach that requires a frontline staff to live in the community.

A year after tsunami, the social condition had changed and become relatively normal except for in certain areas that still needed aid intervention. Given the changing situation, a new strategy and approach was required to make the effort more effective and efficient. Plan Aceh then undertook strategy changes in relation to program planning that would affect their programs for the following three years.



## Situational Assessment

At the time, the situation was as follows:

1. Many International non-governmental organizations (INGO) and UN organizations had given cash money to the tsunami victims for various purposes, such as small capital for household economic recovery, start-up grants for home-based industries, etc. Some funds were even disbursed on the assumption that the tsunami victims didn't have any money to survive.
2. Food and water supplies were still provided by INGOs and UN organizations to IDP's camps/barracks.
3. NGOs were still conducting surveys as a basis for developing aid programs.
4. Reports were heard that some tsunami victims/survivors didn't occupy the new houses that been provided, and that some were renting their granted homes to construction workers from Medan (the nearest city, 12 hours by car from Banda Aceh) and Java island (5 days by car from Banda Aceh).
5. The housing construction continued even though some homes went to the wrong beneficiaries or one household got more than one house.
6. Skilled local human resources capable of effective involvement in the construction process were scarce.
7. Low level of community participation.
8. The Helsinki MoU between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM (Free Aceh Movement) provided a peaceful situation conducive to the involvement of GAM members in community daily life.; thus shifting the dynamics of community interaction.

## CCCD approach

During the recovery period, the establishment of the CTA was the first step toward implementing CCCD that involved local cadres, volunteers and local agents. The CTA program provided these locals with capacity building training to enable them to become facilitators for developing their own community. Trained Child-to-Child (CTC) workers played an important role in raising the participation of children in community activities during recovery time. CCCD was continued among the cadres and community members so that child-oriented development would become stronger and more familiar to the community.

The strong patriarchal traditions of the local culture in which men were dominant in the directing of recovery development activities placed women and children

in a subordinate position. It took complete immersion of the CTA into the community in order to be able to undertake their activities together with all levels of the community.

## Fact Finding

The following issues became apparent as the local CTA began collecting information and working out programs for the benefit of the local communities:

1. Villagers were suspicious of anyone from the outside. If the outsider (NGO staff, etc.) did not appear to offer any immediate benefit to the community, the local would prefer that they just leave. They said, "The NGO only collected data and gave promises".
2. The tsunami victims/survivors quickly became savvy about figuring out which aid coming in would be of most benefit to them individually. There were opportunists who attempted to use any survey or assessment as a chance to benefit themselves. If an NGO was giving away boats and fishing equipment, village administration officers would sometimes turn in lists of their relatives and close friends as beneficiaries, claiming that they were fishermen. Or, everyone in the village would claim to be fishermen if the NGO was offering cash. One CTA said, "I wonder just how it is that each and every household in this village has received the exact same kind of aid; how has this happened?"
3. Many tsunami survivors were unwilling to leave the temporary camps/barracks or other shelters and to settle in the new houses provided for them because, at the camps, they received benefits such as rice, monthly cash from the government, and money from INGOs, a clean water supply, household equipment, working tools, etc., while those who moved to their new homes got only life-skill training.
4. The continuing cash disbursement support beyond the initial crisis had created dependence among the community. The villagers became accustomed to attending meetings and participating in recovery activities only if they were given "transportation" money. The Acehnese are an independent people, and the cash-based assistance by the UN, local NGOs & INGOs had inadvertently introduced a new, heavily influential paradigm toward dependence.
5. This paradigm also affected the children because their parents and other adults in their community told them to accept money.
6. This cash orientation, along with a lack of experience and skills, also contributed to the low level of community participation in recovery efforts.
7. Some locals were strongly suspicious that the foreigners (INGOs) were bringing the influence of Christianity to the local people, who are predominantly Muslim.
8. The assumption also emerged that data collection by local NGOs would be used for the benefit of the NGO, not the community, mostly because there was often no follow up activity of the NGO. The community would sometime give incorrect data to NGOs unless some kind of direct aid was provided immediately.

## Voices of the Children

The following comments were made by the young people from various villages that the CTA worked with in the field. These remarks regard the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the presence of the NGOs and INGOs, and what the children themselves would do if they were working for either local or international NGOs.

### (a) Advantages:

"They have rebuilt the damaged houses. They have helped with basic food supply support for our daily life." (Saddam Husein, 15-year-old boy, Lamhasan, SMK 1 Banda Aceh high school).

"The NGOs are the messengers of Allah sent to help the people who are victims of the tsunami. They helped me to recover my life, especially for my education. I just hope the presence of the NGOs will not make Acehnese become lazy about earning their own livings." (Safrina, 17 year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of SMA 1 Lhoknga high school).

"The NGOs have supported the children to recover from the disaster, and the NGOs can help the people who are really needed helps." (Hidayani, 16 -year-old girl, Lamhasan village, student of SMA 1 Peukan Bada High School).

"They helped the children recover from the trauma of the tsunami and they helped the poorest people of the community." (Sarah Nadia Febrina, 12-year-old girl, Lampaya village, student at SLTPN 1 Lhoknga junior high school).

"They helped to reduce the life burden of the community. They gave some positive activities to the children and teenagers." (Azhari, 16-year-old boy, Lampisang village, student of SMA Peukan Bada high school).

"They brought the overseas funds and aid." (Muksal Mina, 13-year-old boy, Lampisang village, student of MTsN junior high school).

"They could speed up the recovery and rehabilitation of tsunami affected regions." (Lisa Rahmadani, 16-year-old girl, Neuheun village, student of SMUN 4 Banda Aceh high school).

"We got scholarships and basic food supplies." (Achlia, 16-year-old girl, Lamgeueu village, student of SMA 1 Peukan Bada).

"Increasing the motivation to go to school for the children. (Nur Hakimah, 12-year-old girl, Meunasah Kulam village, student of MTs. Krueng Raya junior high school).

"I can go to school again because the NGO has rebuilt my school." (Khairul Rizal Fahmi, 14-year-old boy, Beurandeh village, student of MTsN Krueng Raya junior high school).

"Reducing the life burden of tsunami victims and reducing unemployment." (Khisnati, 18-year-old girl, Lampaya village, student at Akper Politeknik college).

**(b) Disadvantages:**

"None." (Sri Yunita Lestari, 12-year-old girl, Neuheun village, student of SMPN 2 Neuheun).

"The community is becoming very spoiled. They don't need to work because the NGOs provide support." (Dahlia Ananda, 15 year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of senior high school of MAN Model Banda Aceh).

"The community has become lazy because they hope for support from NGOs." (Sittati Zainiah, 14 year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of junior high school of MTsN Meraxa).

"The people are lazier now because of so much aid. Before the tsunami, there were many women washing clothes to earn some money, but now many of them don't work anymore." (Hidayani, 16-year-old girl, Lamhasan village, student of SMA 1 Peukan Bada).

"There is a dependency of the community on the NGOs." (Fatimawati, 15-year-old girl, Ladong village, student of SMPN 2 Neuheun).

"The uneven distribution of aid among the community has caused jealousy and quarrel among neighbors." (Irfan Syukri, 14-year-old boy, Lamreh village, student of MtsN Krueng Raya junior high school).

"So many lecturers have begun working for the NGOs that this has disadvantaged the students' educations." (Khisnati, 18-year-old girl, Lampaya village, student of college of Akper Politeknik).

"Many teenagers my age don't adhere to Muslim dress codes anymore after being around the NGO people and outsiders/foreigners." (Rahmatina S., 17-year-old girl, Lamgeueu village, student of SMAN 1 Peukan Bada).

"The community doesn't care about the village activities. They don't care about the maintenance of cleanness of public facilities. There is low participation in NGO recovery activities." (Chaerul Riedzal, 13 year-old boy, Durung village, student of MtsN Krueng Raya junior high school.)

"After collecting data population from 'Pak Keuchik' (village head), the NGO said will promise their support, but the fact is they don't do anything here and we are waiting. Are they only collecting the data and then taking the aid for themselves?" (Safrina, a 17-year-old from Keuneu-eu village, who studies at SMA 1 Lhoknga high school).

"Most NGO staffs are too proud to get involved directly in the field and that has caused the data to not be accurate." (Nana Ahzarina, an 18-year-old from Keuneu-eu village, and student of Unsyiah state university in Banda Aceh).

**(c) Responses to: "What would you do if you worked for an NGO?"**

"I will help the community without expecting any payback, and I will try to redevelop Aceh." (Safrina, 17-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of SMA 1 Lhoknga).

"I want to rehabilitate my village." (Saddam Husein, 15-year-old boy, Lamhasan village, student of SMK 1 Banda Aceh)

"I want to work as the community requests." (Sittati Zainiah, 14-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of MTsN Meraxa junior high school).

"I will only do the projects or programs that are really needed by the community of the village." (Lisa Rahmadani, 16-year-old girl, Neuheun village, student of senior high school of SMUN 4 Banda Aceh).

"If I were NGO staff, I would approach the community with a positive attitude. When we get close with the community, we will get their trust so every effort will be smooth and get a positive support from the community." (Nanda Mariska, 15-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of SMAN 3 BNA).

"I would like to get the full participation of the community so that the community will not feel strange about the NGO's presence." (Nana Ahzarina, 18-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student at Unsyiah university).

"I would like to rebuild a village with every effort possible so the community will get support in a fair way." (Marzuki, 17-year-old boy, Lampisang village, student of SMA 1 Peukan Bada).

"I would like to teach the younger children." (Azhari, 16-year-old boy, Lampisang village, student of SMA Peukan Bada).

"I would like to give basic need supplies and make a football field in my village." (Rizal Fahmi, 13-year-old boy, Meunasah Keude village, student of MTsN Krueng Raya junior high school).

**(d) In response to: What kind of program would be most advantageous for your community?**

"The various competitions, working together, agriculture projects, and life-skill training." (Safrina, 17-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of SMA 1 Lhoknga high school).

"A Children's Center (*Balee Anak*)." (Wan Surya, 14-year-old boy, Lamgeueu village, student of junior high school MTsN 1).

"Education and agriculture program, because the community here is not serious enough about the fact that education and agriculture are keys to better livelihoods for them." (Dahlia Ananda, 15-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, student of MAN Model Banda Aceh high school).

"A supported library to open our global window." (Nindi Mariski, 14-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, SMPN 7 Banda Aceh junior high).

"Working together in unity so that the village becomes clean. Reading Al Qur'an after the dusk prayer so that we learn and understand our religion." (Bahrizal, 13-year-old boy, Ladong village, SMPN 2 Neuheun junior high school).

"The road rehabilitation and infrastructure program because the facilities will be utilized by everyone to access transportation." (Ita Purnama Dewi, 16-year-old girl, Lamtengoh village, SMAN 1 Peukan Bada high school)

"Reconstruction of houses so we will have a house again." (Rahmatina S., 17-year-old girl, Lamgeueu village, SMAN 1 Peukan Bada high school).

"Training and small capital support for jobless people." (Ika, 14-year-old girl, Lamgeueu village, MTsN 1 junior high).

"Cleaning up the village, so that the environment becomes healthy and clean, to prevent diarrhea and cholera." (Cut Kemalhayati, 13-year-old girl, Meunasah Kulam village, MTs Krueng Raya junior high).

"Study groups." (M.Syubban, 14-year-old boy, Lamkruet village, SMP Lhoknga junior high).

"Playgroup activity because it can improve the quality of someone since the time of early of childhood care." (Ida Lailyani, 18-year-old girl, Lamkruet village, Midwife Academy student).

"Free healthcare and medicine for tsunami victims, and providing education for the poor children." (Qusnila, 14-year-old girl, Lampaya village, SLTP Fajar Hidayah junior high).

**(e) Responses to: "What is the most useless or disruptive program for your community?"**

"I think, there isn't any program that is useless. Alhamdulillah (thanks to God) all the programs are useful for us." (Dahlia Ananda, 15-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, MAN Model Banda Aceh high school).

"None. Every activity in my village is useful." (Safrina, 17-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, SMA 1 Lhoknga high school).

"Anything that does not educate people." (Nanda Mariska, 15-year-old girl, Keuneu-eu village, SMAN 3 BNA high school).

"Cash grants for small capital support." (Khairul, 17-year-old boy, Neuheun village, SMK 2 Banda Aceh high school ).

"...dividing the support unequally that has caused the quarrels among the community." (Liswatun Husna, 15-year-old girl, Lampisang village, MAN 2 senior high ).

"Useless meetings, a kind of meeting that doesn't make us understand. The kind of meeting by NGOs at the 'Meunasah' (community center)." (Ita Purnama Dewi, 16-year-old girl, Lamtengoh village, SMAN 1 Peukan Bada senior high)

"Unplanned activities, such as the sewing machine being given to the person who doesn't know how to sew." (Meutia Diana, 14-year-old girl, Lamgeueu village, drop out)

## Lessons Learned and Recommendations

1. Baseline assessments should be conducted simultaneously and involve government coordination to prevent confusion and overlapping of data.
2. Follow-up assessments should be done through immersion or live-in experiences with the tsunami affected community, so that we will know exactly the needs, the numbers, and how to implement assistance in the best way by integrally involving the community to ensure effective and efficient implementation of programs.
3. It is better to provide supplies than cash during the emergency response phase or response.
4. Direct cash support should be given out very sparingly and carefully on the basis of clear need and objectives. Inappropriate cash disbursement caused inflation and dependence. made the people lazy and dependent.
5. Mutual understanding of the purpose of aid among the donors, NGOs, agencies and the communities themselves is vital to ensuring effective assistance.
6. The orientation of emergency responses should be shifted from cash assistance to a training focus that can improve the life skills and knowledge of the disaster victims in order to create livelihoods and facilitate support of small-scale productive businesses/home industries.
7. The community must be involved directly in the recovery process in order to ensure sustainability of programs and a long-term positive impact. ■

# Children's Participation in School Development Planning

**SAVE** the Children's primary school education programs have worked to improve children's access to quality education. This has included reconstructing schools damaged by the tsunami or conflict, providing capacity building for teachers, and engaging community members and children in developing school plans. Save the Children is also implementing education programs that focus on Early Childhood Development (ECD), life skills education for adolescents, health and nutrition in schools, and the promotion of inclusive education for children with disabilities.

At the beginning of every school year, schools receive a government funding subsidy called School Operations Support. This funding is intended to support the students' educational expenses and improve the quality of learning, such as for registering students at the beginning of the school year; procuring textbooks; conducting additional learning courses; implementing sports, arts, scientific writing, boy scouts, Red Cross or other extracurricular activities; financing daily, monthly and final examinations; procuring teaching aids; supporting disadvantaged students' transportation costs, etc.

In order for a school to obtain approval to use this source of funding as well as any other funding for school improvement activities, the school along with the school committee has to develop a School Development and Budget Plan. In practice, however, most school principals develop the plan by him or herself without involving the school committee. To legalize the school development plans the principals only ask the school committee to sign the draft. Teachers, parents and students are not generally represented.

As a result, often the money is not used for improving the quality of educational services, but for the personal interest of the principal, such as for buying furniture or a TV for the school, covering his/her travel expenses, etc. In most cases, very little is spent on the students or their welfare.

In Education Ministry Regulation No. 44/2002 on educational boards and school committees, it is stipulated that every school must have a school committee. School committee is defined as an independent body to facilitate the role of the communities in order to improve the quality, even distribution and management efficiency of education at school. The school committee consists of parents, community figures, entrepreneurs, professional organizations, teachers, alumnus representatives and student representatives. A school committee is aimed at facilitating and channeling the aspirations and roles of the students in generating the operational policy and education program at the school level. The school committee plays the role of advisory body in determining and implementing educational policy at school, supporting body in terms of finance, ideas and physical support in conducting the mission of education and as controlling body to encourage and promote transparency and accountability in the education implementation and output.

## Experience

The common practice of a principal developing the school development plan violates children's rights. Indonesian law, specifically Law No 23/2002 on children's right to protection, clearly states that every child under 18 years old has the right to be heard and to express her/his voice, especially in areas that pertain to a basic right, such as the right to education.

In the process of developing a school plan, Save the Children saw an opportunity where children could be actively engaged and exercise their right to participate and be heard. Through their involvement, they can shape their own future and contribute to education improvement. This opportunity is particularly relevant since a school development plan is a legal document, acknowledged by the government, which can ensure that children's voices are heard.

As of December 2008, Save the Children had involved more than 140 students from 14 pilot primary schools in developing school plans. Applying a module developed by Save the Children's Aceh program, staff invited students in Grades 3, 4, and 5 to attend a five-day workshop held after school hours. The students were also accompanied by one school teacher. Through the workshop, students had the opportunity to express their opinions through drawings, letters, poems or stories.

Their input focused on two aspects: teaching/learning improvement as well as community and parent participation in education. Nearly all of the children's concrete recommendations were incorporated in the final School Development Plans (SDP).

Their ideas included working together with communities to clean up the school toilets, repairing broken furniture, learning outside of the classroom (through new teaching methods), etc.

Below are two comments given by children during the workshop:

**1. As student from SDN 10 Simeulue Tengah:**

*“Harapan saya ingin warga desa dan orang tua rapat ke rumah sekolah untuk bekerja dan orang tua saya ia menuju rumah sekolah untuk gotong royong untuk membuat rumah sekolah saya lebih bagus dan lebih cantik daripada yang dulu jelek dan banyak kotoran yang berserakan.”*

“My hope is that community members and parents can come to the school meetings, and my parents can come to school to work together with others to make my school more beautiful than before, since before it was ugly and had a lot of rubbish around it.”

**2. A student from SDN 4 Simeulue Tengah:**

*“Yang kami inginkan ada perpustakaan, yang saya ingin guru yang baik, saya mau halaman tetap bersih, setiap jam pelajaran orkes harus keluar dan belajar, saya ingin ada tempat bermain komputer.”*

“What we want is a library. I want a teacher who is kind and caring, I want the school yard to stay clean, and during the sport/health class I want to go outside and study. And I want there to be a place to play computer.”

What the children expressed each day was recapped into one page and shared with them at the end of the day. After the five days were completed, all of the summaries were compiled to form the children’s SDP recommendation, which was given to the school principal and school management committee during the adults’ school development plan workshop.

## Challenges

After conducting children’s SDP workshops and trying to integrate their recommendations with the adults’ ideas, it was still challenging for adults to internalize the habit of sharing ideas, and even more so sharing authority and decision-making with children.

The other challenge is to convince school stakeholders, like teachers and principals, to continue facilitating the children’s SDP workshops in the future.

Lecturing and giving one-way instruction is the practice most teachers are used to, so this interactive and consultative approach may take time to internalize. In addition, the members of the school committee still lack understanding of their roles and function in preparing and developing school development plans.

At the SDP implementation level, school principals and school committees need to be committed to the document they developed. To encourage this commitment, Save the Children conducted strong and continuous mentoring activities. Sub-district school supervisors and Save the Children staff regularly conducted school visits to check to see if the SDP was being implemented in accordance with its proposed schedule.

## Lessons learned

Children's participation in the SDP process is a way of hearing their voices, and the resulting SDPs reflected many of their needs and desires. The effort to provide opportunity to children to participate and be heard can also be done through familiarizing all school stakeholders with the roles and functions of the school committee in line with Education Ministry Regulation No. 44/ 2002 in preparing school development plans.

While some adults found it challenging to change their habits and share decision-making with children, others were simply amazed at how many good ideas students could contribute through appropriate exploration and encouragement. Through this process, it was learned that children could be very critical and were capable of contributing to the so-called "adult business" of developing a school plan.

Furthermore, children who were directly involved in the planning process became strong advocates in rallying their fellow students to seek support from their teachers, school principals and parents for the realization of the SDPs. ■

## United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

# Creating Learning Communities for Children – Improving Quality of Education

**THE** Creating Learning Communities for Children (CLCC) programs started operating in Indonesia in 1999, following changes to the education system which resulted in a decentralization and democratization of the pedagogic system. Schools were given decision-making rights while the central government continued to provide resources.

While rapid decentralization of the education system occurred, several issues persisted, such as ingrained customs and practices. The issues of role definition, funding responsibilities, quality standards, accountability, education information management and public finance were not fully addressed.

The CLCC program aimed to promote improved teaching and learning practices, school-based management and community participation at targeted schools and districts. To achieve the goals and ensure the education system benefited the people and contributed to the National Action Plan (Educational Strategic Planning 2005-2009), the Indonesian government sought external assistance. The resulting model is to be replicated in other districts and provinces.

One objective of the CLCC program was to institutionalize good educational practices at the sub-district, district, provincial and national levels. This necessitated working closely with individual teachers, school principles and school communities by providing examples of models of good practices, particularly in disadvantaged districts.

Continued work at the schools and cluster levels was intended to provide an illustration of how well planned and executed programs could have a positive impact on students and contribute to the strategy of developing a more systematic approach to work within existing structures to empower people to provide leadership and systems to manage and coordinate school-based management and student-centered learning.

To achieve this, assistance was given in capacity building, resulting in the sustainability of good practices. As provinces and districts demonstrated commitment and the foundations for capacity building, more focus was placed on the institutions supporting the schools rather than the schools themselves.

The program was not designed to own school-based management in districts and provinces, but to be part of the support network to empower existing institutions legally responsible for the management. It cooperated with other initiatives designed to support school-based management, share learning experiences to ensure that coordination produced unity of purpose and harmonized activities. This support was in the form of:

- High quality policy advice at the district, provincial and central levels;
- Professional development in higher level skills directed at key personnel in the institutions responsible for supporting development of good education practices, and
- Enhanced monitoring and evaluation practices to inform education decision-makers of the results being achieved as the basis for sound future decision-making to maximize the effective use of limited resources

To provide effective support, the CLCC program reorganized its governance and management practices so that it could better monitor and evaluate the achievement of the output requirements and implement the changes necessary to meet the goals and objectives.

The strategic goal was to improve the quality of elementary education in Indonesia by contributing to improved equitable access to higher quality and better governed and managed elementary education services in CLCC targeted districts.

The CLCC program goal was to be achieved through five linked component objectives. The first component was the continuation of the focus on the three pillars of CLCC to promote:

- (a) Active, joyful and effective learning in CLCC targeted schools (AJEL)
- (b) School-based management (MBS), and
- (c) Community participation.

The second and third components related to building the capacity of government organizations at the central, provincial, district and sub-district levels to manage and coordinate the benefits to students of AJEL, MBS and community participation so they could be institutionalized and sustained. The fourth component was to ensure sound educational monitoring and an evaluation framework to allow program partners to have quality student achievement information as a part of a process of ongoing review and

as basis for well-informed future decision-making. The fifth component was to develop a 'one program' approach for CLCC where good governance and management would allow for maximum efficiency in the use of program funding.

Each of these components had a stated objective, output requirements, key indicators of output achievement and a description of the means of verifying achievement of key indicators.

The CLCC draft monitoring and evaluation framework built upon initiatives conducted during Phase 1 of the program and simplified the overall process. It was based upon four fundamental principles:

- Simplicity
- Participation and ownership
- Capacity building
- Sustainability and institutionalization

The framework focused on a mechanism to monitor and manage recognized and perceived risks associated with the program's design with two inter-related responsibilities when monitoring and evaluating educational programs:

- Support for program management and performance
- Interpreting educational outcomes relative to program implementation

Program evaluation relative to ongoing program management was in the form of regular standardized reports to the Program Steering Committee. Educational performance evaluation relative to program implementation was through an annual education progress report against key education indicators.

Reporting was based on clearly defined and articulated output and indicators as outlined in the Program Design Document. All program reporting was collaborative and structured in such a way that local capacity and systems could be developed. Wherever possible and appropriate, lessons learned, existing structures, organizations and institution were to be used to facilitate the sustainability and institutionalization of the monitoring and evaluation process.

Besides the national education office, other stakeholders of this program in Aceh and Nias were the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Exxon Mobile Corporation. Exxon Mobile Corporation acted as a donor.

## Development and implementation

CLCC was implemented at all 23 districts in Aceh province and two districts in North Sumatra (Nias and Nias Selatan). The technical and financial support from the UNICEF Aceh office covered more than 1,000 elementary schools in 147 school clusters, comprising 118 school clusters in Aceh and 29 in Nias.

Constraints faced during the implementation were mainly related to human resources. The main concern was the institutionalization and the sustainability of the CLCC programs as there was no strategic plan to address these issues at the district level.

Meanwhile, there was limited capacity of government counterparts and the community to implement education projects in line with a significant increase in the 2008 budget and the high turnover of government officials responsible for UNICEF-supported education programs, which led to delays in implementation. Other constraints related to unequal distribution of resources and administrative procedures caused delays in fund transfer.

To address these constraints, UNICEF aimed to introduce the following measures:

1. Focus on technical support and capacity building for provincial and local authorities, particularly in policy development.
2. Develop a replicable and sustainable integrated model of interventions packaged with other programs (water and sanitation, health and nutrition and child protection).
3. Establish an effective monitoring and evaluation and coordination mechanism between UNICEF, government counterparts and other partners.
4. Advocate for better distribution of resources: between rural and urban areas, elementary and secondary schools.
5. Advocate for an increase in budget allocation to education quality improvement with focus on rural and conflict-affected areas.
6. Support the government to strategize and effectively use the huge increase in the special education budget, monitoring and evaluation design and tools.
7. Activate the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Education Database as a planning, monitoring and evaluation tool.

As of Nov. 5, 2008, the key annual results were as follows:

1. Of the 60,000 elementary school students planned for inclusion in the annual education work plan in 2008, 53,820 have access to an improved quality of education
2. Of the 2,000 teachers targeted in the annual work plan, 1,239 have implemented better teaching-learning practices
3. Of the 286 principals targeted in the annual work plan, 229 have trained and implemented school-based management practices. In addition, another 226 principals received training due to the inclusion of UNICEF constructed schools in CLCC programs. Meanwhile, 129 supervisors attended CLCC training.
4. Four hundred and fifty-eight community representatives have been trained and have implemented school-based management, including in UNICEF-constructed schools. Targeted community representatives in 2008 totaled 572. Meanwhile, 92 government officials committed to supporting and following up the institutionalization of the CLCC program.

A number of MBS programs operate to support basic education at the elementary level. These programs often are not coordinated, although there are positive indicators of this happening and there has been discussion on a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp).

An operation framework for cooperation between the CLCC program and the other MBS programs is an important requirement to avoid an overlap and seek mutual benefits.

The Indonesian government is also seeking coordination and harmonization of MBS programs – whether donor, central government, provincial or district funded.

## Lessons learned

Lessons from the implementation of CLCC programs include:

1. The importance of good donor coordination and partnerships with the government can facilitate the move toward the first SWAp in Aceh.
2. It is important to institutionalize and formalize project/program progress to keep data and information during a high turnover of government officials, thus preventing delays or termination of planning and training programs.
3. Once developed and promoted, evidence-based planning, local capacity improvement and local ownership can ensure program sustainability.
4. Strong commitment on the part of government officials to take the lead in planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation in their respective work areas improves and sustains the quality of education. ■

## United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

# Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in School in Cooperation with Provincial and District Governments

**GOOD** health, nutrition and development, and hygiene behavior in the early years set the stage for learning potential in later years. Safe water, sanitation and hygiene-care practices are essential elements in ensuring that children get the best start in life to enter school healthy, alert and ready to learn.

The WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) in School Program was implemented as part of the UNICEF water, environment and sanitation strategy after the emergency phase ended in Aceh.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) built water and sanitation facilities and conducted hygiene promotion activities in many temporary schools together with government counterparts. It also initiated a water and sanitation facilities construction project with a local NGO in 106 existing schools that were not heavily damaged in the tsunami. Similar activities were also initiated by other NGOs.

The cooperation with the local government in developing a systematic WASH in School Program started at the end of 2006, and planning and implementation started in 2007. The objective of the cooperation with the provincial and district governments to develop the WASH in School Program was to ensure that the program would be institutionalized and become a responsibility of the government and the local community, and that the complete package including both hardware and software would be developed and implemented in the aim for behavior change and healthy growth of school children.

## Concept Introduction and Coordination

Formal cooperation between UNICEF and Aceh provincial government through the steering committee for the school health program (TP-UKS) started in December 2006 at the WASH/TP-UKS Program coordination meeting. The regulation for the TP-UKS to include the WASH in School Program working group was later revised and endorsed, and all districts were requested to do the same at the district level.

Several government agencies were members of the WASH in School Program working group under the coordination of the Provincial Team Advisor of Health School Effort, which reported directly to the Aceh governor, the Education Ministry, the Health Ministry, the Development Planning Board (Bappeda) and the Religious Affairs Ministry.

## Exposure of the WASH in School Program Working Group

The WASH in School Program was officially launched in March 2007. In October 2007, 10 government staff members, the key members of the provincial TP-UKS, were exposed to the successful WASH in School Program in Vietnam. The TP-UKS members were introduced to the importance of water, sanitation and hygiene in schools. They also witnessed the smooth coordination among government agencies in the WASH program, the government's target in the WASH sector, and the annual work plan to achieve the WASH target.

Learning from the successful WASH in School Program in Vietnam, the Aceh TP-UKS members committed to developing a better school sanitation and hygiene education program in Aceh than the one in Vietnam, having considered that Aceh had better resources in term of funds, expertise, human resources and other facilities needed to improve the program.

## Government/UNICEF Joint Pilot Project

In 2008, UNICEF and the Aceh TP-UKS committed to allocating US\$120,000 to support the government's pilot project in the WASH in School Program. The Aceh government, through the provincial education office as a leading player of TP-UKS, allocated around \$60,000 to construct six school bathrooms in six districts, while UNICEF allocated \$60,000 for software development, such as training, engineer design, information development, communication and education materials (IEC) in the same pilot projects.

At the district level, the North Aceh municipality allocated more than \$600,000 to build 157 school bathrooms in districts of North Aceh, while the Central Aceh municipality allocated funds to build 13 school bathrooms. This illustrated the government's attention to the WASH in School Program had increased, not only at the provincial level but also at the district level.

## UNICEF Supported and NGO Implemented WASH Projects in Parallel to UNICEF/ Government Program

UNICEF contracted with several NGO counterparts, namely the John Hopkins University (60 School Sanitation and Hygiene Education), United Methodist Committee on Relief (water and sanitation facilities construction and School Sanitation and Hygiene Education), International Relief for Development, Project Concern International and others. These NGO counterparts were participants of the UNICEF/government cooperation program annual planning and review meetings, and facilitators for the government project experience exchange program.

Many other agencies and NGOs were in consultation and communication with UNICEF on the development of the program, requesting necessary materials such training packages, IEC materials and hygiene kits. They included Save the Children, Plan International, Mercy Corps, IOM and CEPA.

### Results

The WASH in School Program achieved improved conditions at schools in Aceh. Achievements of this program include:

- WASH facilities were constructed and the School Sanitation and Hygiene Education program was implemented in 231 schools
- 2,074 school children (peer educators) were trained in School Sanitation and Hygiene Education (SSHE), and 777 teachers were trained in SSHE and development of the curriculum.
- Schools developed a curriculum for routine water, sanitation and hygiene education
- A maintenance mechanism was created in schools for WASH facilities, school compound and classrooms involving school children, school staff and the community.
- IEC materials and personal hygiene kits were developed, distributed and used as communication and education learning tools. More than 25,000 personal hygiene kits were distributed to schoolchildren as well as posters, flipcharts, booklets, leaflets, stickers, puzzles, snakes & ladders board games, monitoring books, etc.

Study on knowledge, attitude and practice about WASH was designed and done in several projects.

Parameter	Result of Baseline Survey	Result of End line Survey
Knowledge of Diarrhea	Proportion of students who could correctly name a symptom of diarrhea was 29%	Around 62% of total respondents could correctly name the main symptoms of diarrhea
Washing hands with soap at appropriate occasions (after defecating and before eating)	Percentage of students washing their hands with soap was around 14%	Percentage of students washing their hands with soap reached 85.5%.

Source: JHU CCP Final Report

Parameter	Result of Baseline Survey	Result of End line Survey
Knowledge of WASH	Percentage of students, teachers and other staff knowledgeable about water, environment and sanitation was 81%	After the WASH program, knowledge of students, teachers and other staff concerning water, environment and sanitation was 91%
Washing hands with soap at appropriate occasions	Percentage of students washing their hands with soap before and after eating was 62%	Percentage of students washing their hands with soap before and after eating was 75%

Source: UMCOR Final Report

A training manual was developed for educator and for teacher training on curriculum development and routine education.

School committees created at all schools that have an SSHE program number more than 100 schools in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Bireuen, West Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, South Aceh, Aceh Barat Daya, Simeuleu, Central Aceh and Bener Meriah, Pidie, Aceh Tamiang, a total of 13 districts.

A number of TP-UKS were established and/or strengthened by technical support and supply support.

## Lessons Learned

Introduction of new programs and ideas to local governments and communities should be through exposure to a real model, and by providing technical assistance to build a model themselves.

Government commitment to take the lead in the WASH program was vital. The government has the authority and power to control and to monitor the development of the WASH program in Aceh. Both the provincial and district governments were responsible for mobilizing all the resources to implement school sanitation and hygiene education. Good and regular advocacy was needed to maintain government awareness and attention to school sanitation and hygiene education.

NGOs projects should be documented and successes recorded as lessons to be integrated into future program planning.

Involvement of government authorities at all levels was important, especially legislators as they control government budget allocation.

The implementation of the WASH in School Program also needed to bring students and communities together to interact so that the program had an optimal impact for overall improvement in the community as well. This could be achieved through the establishment of a good school committee and regular extra-curriculum hygiene education events. ■





NEVER MIND  
THE BOLLOCKS  
MINI'S CAN  
SOX PISTOLS

# Social Development

THE development of communities, their religions, culture and traditions, while often regarded as less tangible compared to physical development, has been an important aspect of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh-Nias. Given the significance of these aspects in day-to-day life, many implementing agencies focused on social development as a means to strengthen communities, their involvement in the recovery, and the sustainability of both the physical and social achievements of the recovery. A total of 15 case studies concerning social development have been included in this book for this sector, 10 in the printed pages and 5 on CD. Each of these studies provides an insight into the importance and complexities associated with the redevelopment of religion, culture and social structures.

*Enjoying the afternoon atmosphere while jogging at the international park known as "Aceh Thanks the World", at the Blang Padang, Banda Aceh, has become a new and popular activity for the community, February 20, 2009. Along the development, the local village heads, land owner, local government, and the military were actively involved so that high sense of ownership was achieved, ensuring the sustainability. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

Government of Japan (GoJ)

## Project on Self-sustainable Community Empowerment Network Formulation in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province

**THE** project on Self-sustainable Community Empowerment Network Formulation in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province was launched by the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh-Nias (BRR). Activity for Community Empowerment (ACE) is the main component of the project and was formulated on the basis of the following considerations:

1. To gradually shift the reconstruction work toward community-based self-reliance rather than resorting to external assistance,
2. To place responsibility with inhabitants and the administration, e.g. cost sharing, contribution of labor through participatory process,
3. To promote a community-oriented project rather than top-down project so that project benefits could be distributed uniformly and evenly to all inhabitants,
4. To place emphasis on supporting methods, such as input of technical expertise, rather than providing direct investment for community activities in order to ensure sustainability, and
5. To extend community empowerment projects to other parts of the project area.

The project area encompassed seven administrative areas, namely one city: Banda Aceh City, and six regencies: Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Jaya, West Aceh, Bireuen and Central Aceh.

The project was designed for a 26-month period from February 2007 to March 2009 and included a preparatory stage from February to March 2007.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) extended technical cooperation throughout the project implementation period by dispatching a team of Japanese experts (JICA Expert Team).

Aiming at coordinating and making ACE available to as many people as possible, a Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) was created by representatives of BRR, various organizations and officials of the local governments concerned, JICA Indonesia Office and the JICA Expert Team.

Technical assistance was extended to ACE from March 2007 to March 2009. This project also extended assistance to three Ulee Lheue model ACE groups established by JICA Indonesia Office in October 2007.

## ACE

ACE was designed to increase residents' income through community-based micro business, contribute to the acceleration of unification of dispersed people after the 10-year conflict and to strengthen capacity for possible future disasters.


Every community or community group was eligible to participate in the ACE project, with each ACE group being formed at the initiative of community members.

Each ACE group planned and executed an appropriate and sustainable micro business. JICA and the JICA Expert Team only supported requisites necessary for actual realization of proposed micro businesses and technical support for the formation of ACE groups and plan for each proposed micro business.

The JICA Expert Team employed a number of Indonesian experts to work with the team and act as consultants. This aimed at transferring knowledge of ACE technology from the JICA Expert Team to the Indonesian experts and determining the real demands and needs of communities for improved livelihood.

## ACE Mechanism

Conceptual design of ACE is as illustrated (right):



Through the implementation of the project, 21 ACE groups were initially formed, with the expectation that ACE activities would gradually be extended to as many communities as possible on the basis of the performance of 21 ACE groups.

## ACE Network

The ACE network intended to inter-link all the ACE groups to provide opportunities for an exchange of community ideas, to contribute to the reunification of dispersed people and to expand ACE activities.

### Method of Implementation

Since community members and the local government staff concerned were not familiar with the ACE program, the JICA Expert Team proposed the following implementation method to JCC and actual implementation as show in the table.

#### Steps of Formation, Implementation & Monitoring of 21 ACE groups

Phase		Step	Outline	Main Activities	Implementation Method
No.	Primal Activities				
I	Formulation of ACE	1	Base-line survey	① Survey on similar projects ② Collection of each Kabupaten's base-line data	Local consultant
		2	Fist selection of ACE (Selection of Kecamatan)	① Distribution of 21 ACE groups to 7 kota/kabupaten ② Need survey of relevant local government institutions	Consensus between JICA Expert Team and JCC
		3	Second selection of ACE (Potential ACE groups)	① Community Need Survey ② Community Consultation Meeting ③ Survey on traditional local industry and home manufacturing ④ ACE preparatory plan	Local consultant
		4	Final selection (Evaluation of Business Plan)	① Development of Business Plan for Potential ACE groups ② Estimation of required equipment and initial fund ③ Final selection of ACE groups ④ Setting-up of Operation Rule	Co-working of JICA Expert Team & Local consultant, Consensus at JCC
II	Start-up of ACE groups and build-up of business	5	Preparation of start-up of ACE groups	① Development of Operation Plan ② Procurement of equipment ③ Injection of initial fund	Local consultant
III	Full-implem tation of business and monitoring of ACE groups	6	Full-implem tation of business and monitoring	① Full-implementation (Full-scale production) ② Monitoring of ACE activities ③ Advice on business improvement, Development of Operation Manual	Local consultant
		7	Formulation of ACE Network	① ACE Festival ② ACE Workshop	Co-working of JICA Expert Team & Local consultant
		8	Bridging of ACE groups to Local Government	① Conclusion of MOU on ACE bridging among JICA Expert Team, Local Government & Local consultant ② ACE Workshop on Bridging Operation	JICA Expert Team

### Selected 21 ACE Groups

In the formation of ACE Groups, a large number of prospective ACE groups were identified and/or proposed. After assessing the proposals, financial requirements and business soundness, distribution of ACE groups within the project area, 21 ACE groups were selected for implementation and reported to JCC. These 21 ACE groups are listed in the following table.

## ACE manual

The JICA Expert Team prepared an ACE Manual for the purpose of facilitating communities and other stakeholders to support community empowerment activities. Copies of the manual were distributed to international organizations and other visitors, and 194 copies of the Indonesian version were distributed to organizations.

## ACE workshops

As the formation and implementation of ACE involved many local government organizations, NGOs and communities, the JICA Expert Team conducted workshops at various locations aimed at disseminating information on and expanding the ACE program within the project area.

In total, four workshops involving 176 participants were held during the implementation period.

### **Bridging Operation of ACE Groups to Local Government**

As the technical cooperation by JICA was due to end in March 2009, all the existing ACE activities were transferred to local administrations. Three different workshops were held for local government staff to ensure continuity of the ACE program and activities. Workshop activities were: Visit to ACE groups to observe activities; development of business plans; and monitoring of activities and financial management. In total, 311 staff members took part in the three workshops.

## ACE Festival

To develop the ACE network and disseminate information on the ACE program to as many people as possible, two-day ACE Festivals were held in four cities, namely in Banda Aceh in February 2008, in Bireuen in June 2008, in Meulaboh in August, 2008 and in Banda Aceh (Lambung village) in November 2008.

At each festival, representatives of previously established ACE groups displayed and sold their products to visitors, and questionnaires were distributed to visitors to collect comments on the products and the ACE program implementation. The comments obtained were shared by the ACE groups and considered for improvement of the quality and packaging of the products and activities in subsequent stages.

### **Radio Dissemination Program**

During July 2005 to January 2009, JICA supported the Radio Dissemination Program through *Radio Republik Indonesia*, which was broadcast live once a week for one hour and involved interaction with listeners who phoned in. Initially, the program mainly

covered issues concerning the tsunami, the progress of rehabilitation and reconstruction by BRR and trauma support for affected people. In the later stage, it focused on the reunification of people after the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and dissemination of information on the ACE program, including live broadcast of the ACE festival.

## Disaster Management Drill

One of the targets of the ACE program was to reinforce capabilities of communities to deal with future disasters. The JICA Expert Team in cooperation with the Japanese Red Cross Society organized the Community Disaster Management Drill in Meuraxa district in Banda Aceh on Aug. 24, 2008, with the following objectives:

1. The formation of a community disaster management organization (Satgas) in each target village,
2. To facilitate cooperation among villages,
3. To raise awareness of disaster management, and
4. To ensure that community buildings and equipment provided through Japanese government assistance were utilized and maintained.

Many people actively participated in the drill.

## Expansion of ACE Groups

There was a gradual increase in the number of ACE groups, all of which were created at the initiative of community members with support from existing ACE groups. By January 2009, new ACE groups formed were:

Coffee production group in Banda Aceh with five members; desiccated coconut in Aceh Besar (six members); traditional cakes in Aceh Besar (six); *melinjo* (*Gnetum gnemon*) nuts in Pidie (three); mouse traps in Bireun (five); cakes in Bireun (three) cassava plants in Bireun (five); cakes in Central Aceh (five); and cakes in West Aceh (six).

A majority of the original 21 ACE groups generated money through their activities and distributed a portion of it to group members, which led to the creation of more groups.

## Conclusions

The ACE program was implemented over two years with JICA technical cooperation and BRR policy guidance. It had a bottom-up approach to improve the livelihoods of residents in seven administrative units in the province.

With the cooperation of the local administrative units concerned and BRR, 21 ACE groups with a combined 232 members were established in the initial stage, in addition to four existing groups in Meuraxa district in Banda Aceh, which were created as model projects in 2006.

The ACE program was effective in improving the livelihoods of residents in that existing groups created new ACE groups at their own initiative and allocated a portion of their earnings to them. ■

## Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

# Building women's solidarity to effect changes in village governance: The case of the Village Council Women's Forum in Aceh Barat

### Summary

**ENSURING** that all segments of the society have equal access to participation is essential to development. This is critical to guaranteeing that traditionally marginalized groups of society, such as women, will be involved in development programs. When women are empowered, they can contribute to significant social change in their community. The solidarity built by women through a network or an organization is an effective mechanism to consolidate women's 'power' and to imbue them with the 'spirit' to come together and contribute to social change in their communities. The Village Council Women's Forum (*Forum Tuha Peut Perempuan Gampong*) is an example of how networking has helped transformed forum members into influential public agents and advocates in their community.

### Background

Before the tsunami political conflict in Aceh had lasted for approximately thirty years and had caused enormous damage to Acehnese social life. Women suffered tremendously from the social tensions and armed conflict. Because it was dangerous to be involved in public activities during the conflict, women simply did not participate. The conflict similarly influenced the level of public participation of all segments of society, and an active social and civil society was not possible.

Following the tsunami, many social norms of the conflict period have continued, including the lack of women's participation in social and civil life. The political turmoil is now over in Aceh, but the barrier for participation remains. Women require strength and courage before becoming involved in public and political activities. Women continue to strive for social equity and equality in the social, political and economic fields in the predominantly patriarchal Acehnese society. There is a need for continued support of women in Aceh through programs designed to promote awareness, empowerment and capacity building.

## Significant Events

Generally, LOGICA's Gender Unit supported gender equity and equality by mainstreaming or integrating gender concerns throughout all of LOGICA's programs activities. This was primarily accomplished by conducting training for LOGICA staff on issues of gender equity and equality. Gender principles were included as integral elements of all training programs run by LOGICA's staff with other stakeholders.

LOGICA also paid particular attention to ensuring that women gained a stronger political position in village governance, such as by becoming members of village councils. The Gender Unit advocated: an affirmative action policy set out in district government by-laws ensuring a 30% quota for women's representation in village councils; a public awareness drive on the significance of women's participation in village decision making processes; and the building of capacity in women involved in village governance through training, workshops and focus group discussions.

The district government by-laws (or *qanun*) initiative was a significant foundation for further affirmative action policies. Nevertheless, the existence of the affirmative action by-laws will not be adequate to make implementation effective without greater public awareness of the by-laws within the community, which was undertaken by LOGICA village facilitators. This public awareness process included informal advocacy to women's groups by Gender Unit staff and LOGICA facilitators to encourage them to become actively engaged in development programs and decision making roles.

LOGICA's Gender Unit facilitated female members of village councils to consolidate into a forum known as the Village Council Women's Forum (*Forum Tuha Peut Perempuan Gampong*) in the three districts of Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat. By consolidating the potential of women members of village councils to contribute to the betterment of themselves and their society, this forum has become politically influential. Their active participation has particularly influenced better accountability in running village governance, as well as progressing gender quality and equity concerns.

Women have not historically participated in village councils in Aceh. This is a new phenomenon in Aceh, and therefore there is resistance to this development from some groups in society. The forum has conducted various activities, including regular monthly

meetings with all members, and the establishment of women's cooperatives for economic empowerment, most intensively in Aceh Barat. Thanks to the enthusiastic participation of the members of the forum, these activities have fostered women's solidarity and reveal that they can support each other in well organized and self-sufficient ways. More importantly, however, is that women have demonstrated they can contribute significantly in politics and local governance. The below examples provides a pertinent example:

*"In one of the Forum's regular meetings, due to the efforts of a particular village council member, they discovered that the village administration in a particular village in Panton Reu Sub-district of Aceh Barat did not allocate its entire budget. The member of this Village Council Women's Forum, who came from that village, decided to find out the truth about the missing budgetary funds. In response to her eagerness, all members of the Forum were very encouraging and gave her full support. Her courage and determination inspired other members of village council to take part in this effort.*

*Their enquiries eventually proved that corruption had occurred in the budget and that corrective action was necessary. The village head, who was responsible for overall control of budget implementation and formulation, stepped down following calls for his impeachment by the village council that had been triggered by the investigation initiated by the village council member and strong demand for transparency and public accountability in village governance. (Ibu Ratna Karmila, Village Governance Facilitator)."*

*It is noteworthy that the changes summarized above were the direct result of women's participation in local politics. Moreover, this would not have occurred without well organized mutual support and solidarity among women facilitated by the Village Council Women's Forum. The changes also suggest that women traditionally can break historical cultural inhibitors and actively participate in and influence political life and community development.*

## Challenges

- **Women realizing their potential.** At the very beginning, it was a challenge to convince the community and the women themselves of the importance of gender balance in village governance and community decision-making. It also took time to convince women of the importance and benefits of a forum of solidarity like Village Council Women's Forum (*Forum Tuha Peut Perempuan Gampong*). The eventual proven success of women in influencing village governance and political decision making processes in their communities, however, helped women realize their important and potential influence in these forums.
- **Local resistance to women in public life.** Resistance from members of the village council, particularly men, was part of a former cultural mindset that saw women as incapable and inappropriate for public positions. In recent times women have

demonstrated their capacity to contribute significantly to village governance, proving they are more than capable holders of public positions.

- **Personal capacity of women.** As women have been historically discriminated against in relation to holding influential positions in public life, men previously generally had more opportunities to gain higher qualifications than women. Women have to work harder to bridge this experiential gap, and require ongoing support from government and non-governmental agencies to help them build their capacity and realize their potential. It is an ongoing challenge to ensure that women have adequate and relevant capacity in leadership and negotiations skills, and that their community and the bureaucracy will support them in fulfilling their work and potential.

## Lessons Learned

- **Relevant capacity building.** Enhancing women with relevant capacity building, including public speaking skills and training on motivation and leadership, assists women in maximizing their potential. This helps women to perform with greater capacity to influence village council decision making (their right via by-laws), ensuring that they can maximize their influence as members of village councils.
- **Creating women's networks strengthens empowerment.** Assisting women who have attained public office or positions of influence to create networks and forums through which they can experience solidarity and empowerment, as well as leading them to greater efficacy in affecting change in their communities, is highly recommended for future programs. ■

## United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

# Gender responsive governance and strengthening women's legal rights and access to justice in Aceh

**UNIFEM** has been working with partners in Aceh to strengthen women's legal rights and access to justice by mainstreaming gender into the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) and by-law making processes. UNIFEM's focus has been on building the capacity of gender advocates to engender by-laws, and through building the knowledge base of materials on gender equality and Islam in Aceh.

### Introduction

Based on LoGA and National Law No. 18/2001 on Special Autonomy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Aceh has the right to develop and pass *qanun*, local by-laws, which are informed by sharia law. This is a critical time in Aceh to ensure that the by-law making process is gender responsive and does not discriminate against women.

UNIFEM is focusing on mainstreaming gender equality perspectives into the development of by-laws, aiming to strengthen key institutions and a core group of strategically positioned advocates to promote women's legal rights in the context of Aceh's legal reform. One vehicle for this is increased awareness and application of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which Indonesia ratified in 1984.

After witnessing limited involvement of women in the process that led to signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), women's groups mobilized to ensure women's

needs and aspirations were more adequately reflected in LoGA. Led by JPuK (Women's Network for the Policy), gender advocates, with the support of UNIFEM, developed an alternative draft to LoGA with a range of recommendations to strengthen the legislation to support gender equality and women's empowerment. Six recommendations were included into the LoGA, covering economic, social, and political spheres, making it a stronger and more equitable piece of legislation.

During this period of legal reform in Aceh there are great opportunities to increase women's legal rights. Drawing on Aceh's existing network of committed gender advocates, UNIFEM planned to replicate the model of advocacy into LoGA to intervene in a range of priority by-laws that impact greatly on women's lives in Aceh.

The key stakeholders and driving force behind the project were the growing numbers of government officers, activists, academics and legal professionals. People who are concerned about and willing to work for gender responsive legislation and the rights of women in Aceh.

## Development & Implementation

Rule of law and access to justice are critical to securing peace and good governance in Aceh. Recognizing this necessity, UNIFEM is supporting gender advocates in Aceh to mainstream gender equality perspectives into by-law making. To ensure women's access to justice, UNIFEM has worked closely with a core group of advocates from government, CSOs, the judiciary, and academia to build their skills on legal drafting, CEDAW and gender justice principles in Islam. Equipped with a growing knowledge base on gender and Islam in Aceh, gender advocates are working together with UNIFEM to engender key by-laws in Aceh's legislative reform.

UNIFEM identified three essential components to reaching the goal of strengthened legal rights and access to justice for women in Aceh.

1. By-laws are gender responsive;
2. Increased leadership and capacity among gender equality advocates and mainstream institutions to support women in claiming their rights; and
3. Strengthened institutionalization of a knowledge base on CEDAW and Islam applied to women's legal rights in Islam.

To reach these outcomes UNIFEM is supporting partners to engage in by-law drafting processes, formulating drafting teams, sitting on draft review committees, attending public discussions and advocating directly with members of the DPRA (Aceh House of Representatives) and the Executive branch of the Government. Selected by-laws have been tagged as high priority for gender equality outcomes, including the By-laws on Women's Empowerment and the Protection of Women's Rights, The By-laws on the Execution of Elections, and the By-laws on Compilation of Jinayat (criminal) Laws. UNIFEM's partners are involved in other ways in a range of other legislation,

attending public discussions, sitting on drafting and review committees and discussing the importance of gender responsive legislation in public forums, the media and with community leaders and decision-makers.

The process of advocacy into by-laws is structured and planned. For coordination and cohesion, UNIFEM's partners reached a consensus on which organizations would lead interventions into priority by-laws and which partners would lead advocacy campaigns. Formal agreements were signed between the Law Bureau and the relevant organizations.

Capacity building is an essential component of this project, as the task of engendering by-laws requires specialized skills, such as legal drafting skills, and specialized knowledge on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), gender equality principles in Islam and how they can be applied in the context of Aceh's legal reform. In support of partners engaging in by-law reform, UNIFEM implemented an energetic program of capacity building on CEDAW, gender responsive legislation in an Islamic context, and legal drafting skills, and facilitated widespread socialization of CEDAW for government officers, journalists, women ex-combatants and with community based groups. Stemming from these activities, partners developed a framework for analysis of by-laws to support advocacy based on the convergence of CEDAW and principles of gender equality in Islam.

In a relatively short timeframe, this project has seen tangible and lasting results. Women's political rights were successfully integrated into the By-laws on the Execution of Elections in Aceh by inclusion of a 30% quota of women in the provincial level Independent Election Commission (KIP), the district level Election Commission (KP) and the Election Observation Committee (Panwaslu Aceh). The By-laws on Local Political Parties includes a 30% quota for women candidates, which put Aceh's legislation in line with national commitments, a progressive piece of legislation compared to other provinces. UNIFEM's partners have drafted the By-laws on Women's Empowerment and the Protection of Women's Rights, the quality of which has demonstrating substantial growth in legal drafting and advocacy skills among partners.

Those participating in capacity building activities have reported an increased ability to use CEDAW as an analytical and advocacy tool and a framework for the review and drafting of by-laws. The materials and tools being produced to analyze gender and Islam in Aceh are contributing significantly to the burgeoning field of research.

A foundation of this work is CEDAW which provides clear guidelines on the definition of substantive equality, discrimination and temporary special measures. Utilizing CEDAW has ensured clarity of terms and a common understanding of discrimination and equality. This has been especially valuable for the core group of advocates who come from varied educational and experiential backgrounds and ideological viewpoints. CEDAW has been ratified by Indonesia and thus UNIFEM's partners can draw on the strength of an international convention when advocating for the rights of women.

*“The CEDAW training has given me the skills to analyze the legal systems in Aceh, particularly the sharia legal system in line with CEDAW principles... More and more we see that Islam and CEDAW actually promote similar values and principles.”*

*Soraya Devy, PSW-IAIN A-Raniry*

The lasting impact of this work will not be realized for many years to come, but there are indications that progress is being made toward advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment through improved awareness and application of CEDAW, LoGA and by-laws, which will build strong foundations for Aceh’s legal and justice systems to strengthen women’s legal rights and access to justice into the future. Indicators of early impact of advocacy include:

- The upgrading of the Aceh Women’s Empowerment Bureau to Agency status. This demonstrates a serious commitment from government to women’s empowerment.
- Requests to UNIFEM’s partners for inputs to the process of drafting by-laws in various districts/municipalities. An increased number of invitations are being received by project partners from government and legislative agencies to attend policy discussions, including consultations facilitated by the Law Bureau to obtain inputs from gender advocates on draft by-laws.
- A pool of gender equality advocates equipped with expertise in CEDAW and Islam and gender responsive legal drafting skill.
- Two key election laws in Aceh (the By-laws on the Execution of Elections in Aceh and the By-laws on Local Political Parties) mandating that women are represented in the Independent Election Committee (KPI) and in all local parties who wish to contest elections.

## Lessons Learned

The strength of this project is in the positioning of CEDAW regarding the contextualizing and localizing of CEDAW principles of gender equality in Islam, without losing sight of its universality. In Aceh all advocacy must consider the socio-cultural context and the role of Islam in society. Thus the convergence of gender equality principles in Islam and CEDAW provides the framework for advancing women’s legal rights in Aceh. Work on defining this convergence has been done in different parts of the world, including Morocco, South Africa and Malaysia and will support the work of gender advocates in Aceh, who are contributing their own findings to the body of work on gender equality in Islam globally.

It has been important for this project to debunk the idea of CEDAW as “western”. A useful process has been to compare gender and human rights equality principles in CEDAW and Islam and differentiate the principles of Islam from everyday cultural and religious practices which marginalize women.

*"I believe in the principles of CEDAW, and I believe its values go hand-in-hand with the Islamic principles in the Aceh context. CEDAW is aimed at elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and those values are shared by the Islamic society that wants to create a better future for women."*

*-Nursiti Amin, General Secretary, Balai Syura Ureung Inong Aceh*

An invaluable strength of the project is the multi-stakeholder approach. Working with a range of stakeholders including key government agencies, legal institutions, religious institutions, CSOs and academic institutions has ensured that a range of views and experiences are represented in the dialogue, ultimately strengthening the quality of policy discussions and fostering linkages that will outlast the duration of the project and strengthen the women's rights advocacy network.

Buy-in from stakeholders is crucial in the implementation of this project, particularly in the dialogue and engagement with various stakeholders on the convergence between Islam and CEDAW. Building trust and fostering partnerships with stakeholders opens up spaces in which this dialogue can be initiated.

It is essential to the success of the project that UNIFEM fosters collaboration with male partners. Since the beginning of the project UNIFEM has been consulting and developing relationships with key male partners with different strengths and areas of expertise. Most of the key figures in Aceh's legislative reform are men, thus strategic alliances with any of these men create greater space for engagement. This approach widens the discourse, and makes the point that gender equality and women's empowerment through strengthened legal rights affects the whole community positively, not just women. In the strongly patriarchal culture of Aceh, a man speaking about the necessity of gender equality has important resonance with the community.

This project has fostered ownership and sustainability through engagement with partners selected on the basis of the role that each sector and stakeholder group can play, and active involvement from partners in design and implementation of the project. Project partners include key government agencies and institutions involved in by-law making. The project also partners with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) with experience in mainstreaming gender into legal reform in Aceh. The project also works closely with academic institutions.

Challenges for this program have included instances when partner organizations have overcommitted themselves by taking on many projects from different donors, thus compromising their capacity to meet deadlines and perform required tasks. Enthusiasm and willingness to participate in the project must be balanced with genuine capacity and resources.

A method of advocacy in which network building, skills development and a framework for analysis are supported and created can be replicated in myriad other settings. The model employed by UNIFEM balances challenges to successful advocacy well by providing a foundation for a strong and ongoing network of advocates to carry the work into the future. A sustainable network of advocates is necessary for this work which can take many years to reflect the lasting impact. For replication in Aceh, this program has provided essential foundations to be built upon including:

- Strengthening capacity of institutions such as the Women's Empowerment Agency,
- Enhanced leadership and advocacy skills amongst advocates,
- Greater cohesion and networking between groups concerned with gender equality and women's empowerment,
- Gender-disaggregated data to inform evidence-based planning, programs and policy,
- A growing knowledge base, materials which can be shared and developed for future interventions.

Important factors that need to be considered to apply this model in other situations include investing in capacity building, and considering interventions as the beginning of a long process that requires sustained efforts. An awareness of the socio-cultural context of Aceh has been essential and shaped the direction of this project enormously. Any replicated activities must also do the same. ■

## United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC) for Aceh and Nias

# Peace Building in a Post-Tsunami Setting: Understanding Post-conflict Situation in Aceh: Why it Matters

**ACEH'S** recent history has been impacted by two major events: the 2004 tsunami and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of Aug. 15, 2005, between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI). Although peace talks were made possible by political changes in Indonesia that occurred prior to this, it is generally acknowledged that the disasters of 2004-2005 provided the necessary humanitarian and diplomatic space for ongoing peace talks to finally conclude in the signing of the MoU.

This withstanding, the unprecedented scale of the post-tsunami recovery, along with the victory of GAM members in the provincial and district elections in late 2006, created a false perception that peace in Aceh was secure. As such, limited attention was given to post-conflict recovery and longer term peace building.

## Institutional Arrangements

As a follow up to the MoU, a newly established Aceh Reintegration Board (BRA) and the Forum for Communication and Coordination were tasked with implementing the terms of the Helsinki Agreement at the provincial level.

In this context, the “peace process”, came to be exclusively understood in terms of implementing the MoU, a process led by the two signatory parties. Considerable time and energy were channeled into drafting the Law on Governing Aceh as a first step in translating the MoU into practice and addressing issues fundamental to Aceh's long-term governance and economic development.

In parallel, substantial central government funding (approximately \$250 million) was allocated in the period August 2005 to 2008 for ad hoc reintegration schemes.

In practice, due to institutional funding arrangements, BRA was repeatedly assigned the impossible task of delivering its annual budget in a three-month timeframe. As such, by the last quarter of 2008, all 3,000 GAM ex-combatants, 6,200 GAM non-combatants and 3,204 GAM members who had surrendered before the MoU had received assistance, as had 77 percent of the 6,500 militia members. However, only 65 percent of 33,424 beneficiaries entitled to compensation had received reparations and only 3,075 out of 31,187 houses had been rebuilt.

## Fragmented Support to the Peace Process

On the international front, initial steps to implement the MoU were supported by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), a joint EU-ASEAN initiative, which provided critical support in building confidence between the MoU parties. Despite this, AMM's somewhat premature withdrawal in December 2006, reinforced misconceptions that peace in Aceh was secure. Moreover, in light of the central government's strong leadership, efforts by international organizations to support the peace process were generally restricted to niche activities – limited in terms of scope and geographic coverage.

## Applying Lessons Learned from the Rest of the World

As mentioned, most recovery partners working in Aceh either totally ignored post-conflict issues or at best, considered them in the margins of their tsunami programs. Some felt they lacked the necessary technical expertise to engage in post-conflict activities or claimed it was outside their mandate while others felt hampered by donor demands for expediency and pressure to deliver visible results on the ground.

As a result, the post-tsunami – post-conflict divide deepened and the two recovery operations evolved in two, separate parallel lines: with the around US\$230 million post-conflict assistance being dwarfed by the US\$7.2 billion pledged for tsunami reconstruction.

Moreover, rising inequalities in aid provision began to give way to local level conflicts. From March 2007, the World Bank recorded an average of 30 disputes per month in their post-conflict updates.

The consequence is a story of missed opportunities to build back better, earlier. The US\$8 billion strong post-tsunami recovery operation could have accomplished much more if partners had adopted a conflict sensitive lens from the outset. Those organizations accustomed to 'Do No Harm' principles organized training for their project

staff or made operational changes based on expert analysis. These few positive initiatives aside, conflict sensitivity needs to be applied on a broad scale by all partners at both field and policy levels to have optimum impact.

## From the MoU to a More Comprehensive Approach to the Peace Process

Three years after the tsunami and the MoU, Aceh entered a delicate period marked by a gradual phasing out of BRR and preparations for forthcoming elections in April 2009. The transitional benefits from the post-tsunami reconstruction's economic bubble and the euphoria following the 2006 elections that brought GAM leaders to top local administration posts are fading. Moreover, an escalation in political violence demonstrates how uneven distribution of recovery dividends has undermined the peace process in some of Aceh's poorest regions.

Aceh also faces the paradox of having substantial resources at its disposal over the next 25 years - close to US\$1.7 billion a year - with limited capacities to use these resources to achieve meaningful development. While the post-tsunami relief funds helped pave the way for a better Aceh, the MoU has transformed Aceh into a pilot province in Indonesia in terms of fundamental reform processes: decentralized governance, economic development and conflict resolution.

A shift from reparation and compensation schemes toward longer term peace consolidation through economic empowerment and social cohesion is therefore urgently required. To oversee this transition, two inclusive and strategic mechanisms have been developed: the Aceh Recovery Framework and the District/City Recovery Forums (KRF).

The Aceh Recovery Framework (ARF) is the governor's road map on key challenges to be addressed in 2008-2011. Peace and Reintegration - identified as the first of six clusters - builds on BRA's strategy on peace building and highlights immediate post-conflict requirements described in the MoU.

The KRFs, designed to assist district level coordination, will be instrumental in promoting peace-building capacities of district stakeholders and promoting Do No Harm principles among its members.

## Follow up to the Helsinki Peace Framework: A Comprehensive Action Plan

While the MoU remains the foundation for translating peace into practice, a peace-building system is in fact something much larger and more complex. It involves a series of interlinked activities that work to prevent disputes from escalating, or relapsing into violent conflict by addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of conflict.

With this in mind, BRA in the last quarter of 2007, proposed a new and comprehensive, three-pillar approach to post-conflict recovery and peace building. These three pillars, encapsulated in the post-tsunami recovery slogan “Build Back Better” include:

- Return, Reconstruction and Reintegration: assisting conflict-affected persons, build back a safe and secure living environment;
- Truth, Reconciliation and Social Cohesion; assisting conflict-affected individuals, build back a peaceful society, embedded in the values of mutual trust and respect;
- Peace Consolidation and Conflict Prevention: building back a sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of the conflict and integrating conflict sensitivity at policy and operational levels;

The Action Plan outlines steps to implement the strategy:

- Strengthening and enlarging the strategic partnership
- Building on BRR’s experience, the government would lead a wider and more result-oriented partnership that draws upon sufficient funding and expertise at national and international levels.
- Developing tools and procedures for improved monitoring of partners’ contributions and progress in addressing the needs of affected populations:
- A results based matrix (RBM) translates the strategy into programmatic terms, with results-based indicators for securing long-term peace. The RBM will assist information management and progress monitoring.
- A Post-Conflict Partnership Database has been tailored to provide accurate and timely information on partners’ contributions. The added value of the database is to facilitate policy level dialogue and advocacy, taking stock of ongoing efforts, identifying gaps and promoting aid effectiveness.
- Bridging the gap between policy and practice: Recognizing that project impacts will remain limited if the peace process fails to comprehensively address the wide range of complex, interrelated issues at stake.

## A common Purpose: Peace Partnership and Aid Effectiveness in Practice

With this basic framework in place, the following concepts would assist future policy-making and programming.

### 1. Improved Information and Knowledge Management

- Academic research on Aceh and the peace process and global expertise on post-conflict re-integration more generally would be incorporated in policy-making and programming.
- The UN Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC) website will feature a post-conflict portal to serve as an information resource and a stock-taking tool. Access to intranet will also assist operational collaboration and informal information sharing.
- The Solutions Exchange online community of experts provides a forum for discussing post-conflict issues. Plans are currently under way to develop a separate community of practice dedicated to peace and reintegration.
- The Aceh Recovery Newsletter will remain an important tool for advocating and informing readers of the key issues at stake in the Aceh peace process.

### 2. Building on Experiences – From Practice to Policy and Vice Versa

The Multi-Stakeholder Review (MSR) builds on previous initiatives and additional analysis to provide a foundation for informed decision-making on post-conflict programming.

The IOM Meta Analysis is one good example of post-conflict analysis that informed the BRA peace framework. It highlights the gaps and overall effectiveness of IOM assistance up until 2007 and evaluates the last three years of collaborative work between Gol, the people of Aceh, GAM and international actors.

### 3. Peace Dialogue and Coordination

Forbes Damai is a forum that draws together national and international partners to discuss post-conflict issues. It assists data management, monitoring and evaluation and promotes a more coordinated, coherent recovery strategy in Aceh.

The Commission for Sustaining Peace in Aceh conducts monthly meetings, bringing together representatives from Gol and GAM to engage in security discussions. It has proven useful in preventing escalation of violence on several occasions.

## Conclusion

In the midst of the post-tsunami transition period, understanding post conflict in Aceh is more important than ever before. Post-conflict recovery and peace consolidation are critical for sustaining the gains from an unprecedented multi-billion dollar investment and paving the way for longer term development.

The comprehensive peace framework and action plan developed through BRA provides clarity on steps taken to date as well as an agenda for how to effectively engage in future peace building. It also provides a platform for further advocacy and policy discussions. Initiatives to improve information management and coordination structures will further assist partners build on positive experiences in Aceh and draw upon post-conflict expertise in Indonesia and elsewhere. ■

# Counselling People in a Relief Setting: The Aceh Experience

## Introduction

**FOR** an international humanitarian organization like World Vision, gender equality and participation are among of the key components for success in implementing relief programs. The World Vision approach is primarily based on a strong emphasis on community participation in which men and woman have the same opportunities to contribute to the development process. World Vision is confident that this approach is effective in overcoming poverty, promoting civil society engagement, and strengthening communities.

This approach has been employed in the face of the crisis in Aceh that resulted not only from the earthquake and tsunami, but also the 30-year armed conflict there. In both prolonged conflict and disaster situations, women become more vulnerable and highly susceptible to human rights violations. This is why it was imperative that the special needs of the women in Aceh become a focus of planning for any humanitarian assistance program.

If the needs of internally displaced people are not analyzed thoroughly within the gender context, any humanitarian assistance program will only meet the needs of a certain segment of the populace, and likely fail to meet the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, among which women are a large element. After the tsunami, women, particularly widows from villages and remote areas, experienced serious

difficulties in getting access to humanitarian aid. This was mostly due to their inability to reach aid distribution sites and their belief that it would be improper for a woman to go to places filled with men to ask for help. Many women had lost all of their belongings, meaning they did not even have suitable apparel, not even a headscarf.

The trauma of having lost their loved ones made them even more insecure amid a conservative community in which there were different rules applied specifically for men and for women. In this context, gender mainstreaming had to become the fundamental approach. In this approach, women are viewed as an important element that must be considered and integrated into all disaster handling planning and procedures.

## Development and Implementation

To ensure participation and protection of vulnerable segments of the population, World Vision's Indonesia Tsunami Response set up a Humanitarian Protection Unit. This department was responsible for guaranteeing that humanitarian requirements emerging from the internal displacement situation were properly addressed within World Vision programs and that humanitarian assistance was addressed in such a way that it cut across gender lines and ensured participation of all.

The Humanitarian Protection Team conducted several participatory assessments to highlight immediate needs such as shelter, water and sanitation. The 58 Transitional Living Centers (TLC) built by World Vision were monitored by humanitarian protection officers in Banda Aceh.

This assessment yielded sorted data about the number of refugees (Internally Displaced People: IDP) in terms of whether they were men or women, or male or female children, and the differences in their needs. Sorting the data was very important toward determining and designing the types of aid required because they had different predominant needs; for instance, health and economic.

However, in any emergency response, it can be difficult to determine the precise needs of women. In the immediate wake of the tsunami, it was rare to see women attending community meetings or training sessions. At the outset, the majority of people, including public figures and some non-governmental organization (NGO) staffers, assumed that any effort to involve women in various activities would only be a waste of time. They felt sure that it would be impossible to convince the community to allow the women to participate. One of the obstacles most critical to women's participation was the resistance of public figures, especially religious leaders, who felt threatened by western approaches that could shift their traditional decision-making roles and value/standing in society.

To solve this problem, several Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and informal meetings were conducted only with women and led by female staff to ensure confidentiality. These activities functioned to identify women's needs and to inform World Vision about how

it could redesign its programs according to the women's recommendations. Most of the FGD focused on livelihood, shelter, security and participation. Women highlighted that livelihood was their major concern because the tsunami had forced many of them to become the heads of their households. However, they did not have the skills, training or money needed to develop a small business or gain employment. Women stated that many NGOs encouraged women's participation but did not provide any livelihood programs for them. Women declared that participation without economic independence would be insufficient. As a result, the economic initiatives conducted by World Vision were re-oriented to meet the women's needs. Also, World Vision's Female Friendly Spaces project was refocused to include innovative programs that respected the long-standing local cultural norms and promoted traditional and non-traditional income generation activities for women.

Within a few months, this scenario had changed significantly. Women were participating actively in different stages of the humanitarian aid and recovery process. In many communities, women—despite their cultural limitations—took on extremely active roles. In many cases it was the women who were the first to express their opinions and to openly discuss the problems that they and their communities faced.

World Vision and a number of NGOs working in Aceh helped make significant changes in women's participation through capacity building so that they could be involved actively in the process of making decisions. However, major challenges awaited, especially in the effort toward more effective integration of women in planning, implementing, and monitoring humanitarian activities and government programs. Many organizations had assumed that gender participation would be fairer if there were a balance in the number of male and female participants attending community meetings. However, the effort made to ensure that as many women as men attended turned out to be only the initial step necessary toward guaranteeing gender equality in humanitarian aid programs. Without a special strategy focusing on women's empowerment in order for them to acquire the self-confidence necessary to expressing their opinions, the women would not dare to talk, and their needs would not be met. Therefore, World Vision felt it was important to design a strategy which could involve the women in the process of giving humanitarian aid and various social activities, while accommodating local social, cultural and religious norms.

Economic issues were the main concerns expressed by women at the various FGDs because the entire economic infrastructure in the communities along the Aceh province coast line had been swept away by the tsunami, leaving them without their accustomed sources of livelihood. As a result, in addition to housing, the most basic need for the populace after the tsunami was the opportunity to get employment.

However, in the case of livelihood, women particularly faced major challenges when they tried to get jobs. This situation was primarily due to the fact that the patriarchal culture of Acehnese society dictated that men were the heads of households and had to

be prioritized in relation to employment/hiring. In fact, in this emergency and recovery situation, women, many of them widows, were forced to become the head of their households. There was no other choice for them except to try to sustain their household income. Unfortunately, government programs and many humanitarian institutions simply overlooked them.

Cash for Work Programs were designed to solve the problem above. It was hoped that these programs would provide valuable opportunities for the women to gain income on a daily basis through temporary jobs such as cleaning up debris left behind by the tsunami in former settlements. However, those efforts did not provide them the chance to them to develop any kind of sustainable business.

World Vision, not wanting the women to be left in a state of neglect after the Cash for Work Programs ended, designed an innovative program respectful of the cultural norms which prevailed. The activities of the livelihood program carried out carefully accommodated women's special needs, such as secure place to do their activities and the arrangement of training schedules that took their domestic responsibilities into account. The livelihood programs were designed to provide the opportunity for women to engage in specific micro-economic activities.

Although economic concerns were the main focus of the women's attention, the Humanitarian Protection Unit's concern also encompassed their safety and security. This unit made an effort to ensure that violence against women could not continue to occur in the shelter/transitional living centers. Crowding, lack of foodstuffs and clean water, as well as poor lighting, along with the psychological impact of alienation, were among the main problems encountered by all of the disaster refugees. For women, in particular, the issue of violation of their gender emerged to exacerbate their suffering at the shelters/transitional living centers.

Villagers living in shelter/transitional living centers came from various communities. The majority of them had not have any social relationships with the others before they were all thrown together by the disaster. They were being forced to lead their lives contiguously in the refugee centers.

The lack of sufficient lighting, particularly around the toilets and kitchens, led to a decidedly risky situation for the more vulnerable groups among the populace, such as women and children. Women and children were easy targets for physical violence of all sorts, including sexual harassment or attacks.

World Vision had no other choice but to take action to prevent gender violations in transitional living centers. A community-based security system was established through discussions with the villagers living there. This effort involved both men and women in order that they would all feel responsible for keeping the refuge secure. In these informal meetings, it was always emphasized that preventing various forms of harassment or violence was important. If any kind of related problem came up, World Vision would

involve both men and women in meetings in order to prevent actual criminal acts from occurring or to keep their incidence from escalating.

## Analysis

Due to the fact that all of the people living in the transitional shelters were experiencing similar levels of difficulty and discomfort, attempts to specifically address the problems of women were often considered as giving special treatment to women. Some even went so far as to suspect that certain complaints were fabricated to gain special attention. This type of thinking tended to undermine the importance of gender considerations in the initial rationale for disaster handling.

The experiences encountered in the effort to include the aspect of gender in aid planning in Aceh can provide a lot of valuable lessons. First, the gender-based analysis of humanitarian aid indicates that men's basic needs are different from those of women. Therefore, the sorting of data about the number of male and female refugees was very helpful in aid planning. Second, men and women have their own different vulnerabilities within the dimension of religious, cultural and social norms, as well as in relation to age. For that reason, men and women have their own different problems during their stays in transitional living centers. Third, livelihood programs, such as the cash for work programs, did not always fully benefit women because of social attitudes that tended to make them invisible.

To determine the specific needs of women and the problems they faced in the transitional living centers in Aceh, it was necessary to recognize that it would not be effective to bring women and men together at informal meetings and in discussion groups. The culture of Aceh dictates that men and women's activities must be separate. Therefore, it was necessary to hold group discussions for women only. These women only gatherings yielded valuable data and information about various things that would not have been obtained had men been present. However, this does not mean that disaster handling was primarily focused on either men or women; gender mainstreaming included both in an effort to ensure fairness in disaster handling processes. ■





# Institutional and Human Resource Development

**SUSTAINABILITY** of the recovery can only be achieved through well-developed institutions and local human resources. As local government services will take control and continue the work carried out by implementing agencies, many programs designed to enhance the capacity of local human resources have been implemented. These programs, some of which appear in the 9 case studies included in this book for this sector, have introduced a range of different ways and methods to ensure local government engagement in the recovery. These 9 case studies, 4 of which appear in the printed pages while 5 are on CD, project across different sectors and describe ways in which capacity building has been achieved.

*The Aceh Geospatial Data Center (AGDC) in operation at the Regional Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, BAPPEDA), Banda Aceh, October 27, 2008. The AGDC, which was established by BRR, is one of the first facilities for prompting good governance to be handed over to the provincial government. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

## Canada Aceh Local Government Assistance Program (CALGAP)

# Development of Municipal Services through Pilot Project Approach: Composting Project in Banda Aceh City

**I**N February 2005, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) invited FCM to participate in a mission to Indonesia to determine what assistance its Canadian municipal partners might be able to contribute to the reconstruction and rehabilitation process. In April 2006, CIDA approved FCM's proposal for the Canada/Aceh Local Government Assistance Program (CALGAP), which began operating the following month.

The City's Sanitation and Parks Department had very limited assets to provide collection services throughout the municipality but a spirited and dedicated leadership was working hard to provide a modest level of service on a regular basis. Lack of widespread and coordinated public outreach activities on waste management issues and waste diversion initiatives contributed to stresses on collection assets and landfill space. Numerous unorganized recycling initiatives had been initiated by private venture capitalists. Scavenging of plastic, steel, glass and aluminum containers at the landfill, by collection workers and the community had spawned an informal recycling network to generate small personal income from the sale of these products. A residential waste audit was conducted in June 2006 estimating approximately 70 percent of organic waste in the waste stream.

In response to those factors, CALGAP staff and municipal partners worked with the Sanitation Agency (DKP) to establish a project called Developing Small-Scale Backyard Composting in Pidie and Aceh Jaya districts in Banda Aceh city. The project team worked with key stakeholders in Banda Aceh to establish priorities, goals and objectives for the

project. In addition to providing a practical solution to the city's waste management dilemma, the backyard composting program exemplified how through good corporate management the municipality could work with the community to improve services provided by the administration, and ultimately the quality of life and health of residents.

## CALGAP's Approach to Capacity Development

Between June 2006 and May 2007, FCM undertook six technical assistance missions to Banda Aceh for the implementation of this initiative. The focus of these missions was, first, to build the capacity of DKP staff, giving them the practical skills to plan and operate a waste diversion program in the region and helping to promote community engagement and transparency. These missions also had the objective of helping develop and launch a pilot small-scale backyard composting project in the tsunami-affected village of Gampong Jawa, and also in two local schools: SM12 and Bambun Naja. The project aimed to supply practical solutions to the waste management problem and was also geared toward awareness-building. The missions focused on finding innovative opportunities to use and market the finished compost, thus contributing to other local restoration, rebuilding and beautification projects while providing a potential revenue source for the community. Some attention was also given to the possibility of extending the pilot project to more villages and eventually the whole Banda Aceh.

During the initial mission, the CALGAP team assessed current waste management operations, including the municipal-run landfill, private sector recycling programs and an NGO-funded compost demonstration house. With the assistance of DKP, the team visited the village of Gampong Jawa, SMP 12 and Bambun Naja religious school. They also identified leaders in the community who were interested in supporting the pilot project. A series of workshops provided DKP staff with hands-on experience with composting technology. Finally, CALGAP and DKP staff collaborated to complete a waste composition study in the pilot areas to determine the baseline conditions.

During the second mission, the Canadian project team and DKP staff researched potential local suppliers for the provision of household composting units. The team met with school administrators, teachers, children and village residents to discuss the project and gather input on the preferred sizes and types of containers. Education was a major focus of the mission, with the launch of composting logo design and essay writing competitions at the schools. The team also consulted with the schools regarding the development of a composting workbook to be used as part of the curriculum. In addition, the team led capacity building workshops with DKP staff, village and school representatives, imparting technical waste management advice as well as sharing Canadian approaches to public consultation and community involvement.

Intense preparation was required for the third mission, which saw the actual launch of the pilot composting program. DKP worked closely with local leaders, the mayor's

office and the CALGAP project team to coordinate the launch, distributing invitations and educational materials. Composting pails and containers were inspected carefully and delivered to participating households. Staff worked together to build two large composters for the pilot schools. The project was launched on Feb. 11, 2007 to great public acclaim, garnering a strong endorsement from municipal officials, the local community and the international community working in the waste sector in Aceh province. Door-to-door visits following the launch allowed the team to answer questions, resolve any problems or concerns and survey the roll-out process.

The fourth and fifth missions were used to plan and start the extension of the pilot project to the rest of Banda Aceh city. The last mission followed up on and evaluated the project with DKP and a number of stakeholders. Waste audits conducted at the village and schools allowed the team to benchmark the success in comparison to baseline waste composition figures. The team continued to investigate opportunities for the marketing of finished compost to developers for their landscaping needs. Building on the success of the pilot project, a plan to scale up the composting program was developed with DKP.

## Result of the Pilot Project

The launch of the project was attended by about 1,200 people and received print, television and radio media coverage. This widespread exposure, heralded by the slogan “Clean and Beautiful Banda Aceh”, contributed to increasing community awareness of waste diversion and management issues. In the pilot village of Gampong Jawa, follow-up evaluations showed that 75 of 350 households were participating in the project, a rate of about 21 percent. However, the waste audit of village garbage, conducted three months after the pilot began, showed a huge reduction in the percentage of organics in the waste stream. Only 17 percent of audited waste was compostable material, compared to the 70 percent baseline figure measured prior to the pilot project. This impressive benefit is explained by the fact that composting households are those with more members; the project successfully engaged the main generators of organic waste.

At SMP 12 and Bambun Naja schools, two composting clubs were formed to take responsibility for managing the school’s organic waste. Ten male and 10 female students from the high school science class participated in the clubs, in keeping with CALGAP’s gender equality objectives. Waste management responsibility among staff and students has transferred into other areas, resulting in marked improvement in the cleanliness of the school yard. Finished compost has also been used to maintain the school’s garden.

The project successfully developed the knowledge and skills of DKP staff in the technical aspects of composting and conducting waste audits, seen through their integration in regular operations of the department. DKP staff also developed their ability to carry out public consultations, engage the community and deliver educational programs such as the recycling of paper. Finally, through the preparation of funding

applications and budgets for the extension of the pilot program, the DKP was able to strengthen its project management and proposal development skills, while also taking steps toward CALGAP's mandate of integrity and fiscal accountability.

Following the launch of the pilot project, DKP received a number of requests for composters from residents of other villages. The department organized community meetings in three villages and conducted training sessions with about 30 interested households from each of the villages. There was great support from Banda Aceh's political leaders to expand the composting program to encompass the entire city. In response, CALGAP developed a comprehensive work plan for developing home composting throughout Banda Aceh. This pilot project extension included ongoing technical assistance, ad hoc training, distribution of supplies, program monitoring and a promotional and educational strategy.

## Tools for Developing a Community Composting Program

### Tool 1: The Waste Audit

A waste audit provides a low-tech solution to understanding waste management issues, while capitalizing upon existing equipment, infrastructure and human resources. A waste audit is a structured process to document the types and quantities of waste generated by an entity. The audit's objectives largely determine the waste types and physical locations to be audited.

It is useful to meet with those involved in waste collection, engineering and public health officials to review the protocol, terminology and forms to be used during the project. It is important to educate and train the workers in the proper ways to handle hazardous materials and in all other pertinent safety measures.

#### How to Plan and Conduct a Waste Audit

1. Plan the audit carefully and define the study area: Obtain get management support, define the objectives of the audit, define the study area and the approach, establish the categories for the sorting of waste, organize people, etc. Crews must also be trained to recognize the various waste categories to be used in the audit. This may take some time, but the effort will pay off when the audit is under way.
2. Collect and sort the waste from the study area: A basic layout for a sorting area should be defined. Contents should be emptied onto a clean, flat surface so that workers can visually assess the load and identify the primary waste components. All materials are sorted in baskets according to predefined categories. Each category is then individually weighed and recorded on pre-printed forms. The area is cleaned and the sorted waste disposed of.

3. Analyze the data and write up the results: Once all the waste is sorted, a data sheet is compiled showing the quantity of waste by material categories generated within each area sampled. These figures can be converted into percentages of the total amount of waste collected in the sample. The data is then carefully considered and analyzed, and the results can be written up and recommendations made.

### Analysis

Audits require limited staff and resources, and are easy to put in place as regular operations. A simple, regular and well conducted process can then be made to evolve in complexity to provide more detailed information on specific waste categories (by sub-dividing initial categories) or sources of waste generation (by targeting more specific locations).

A waste audit can be a very useful tool for prioritizing the most practical local waste diversion initiatives. It can also support the monitoring and performance evaluation of waste-related operations, programs and projects. As such, it can allow local governments to introduce facts and other rational elements into the decision-making process. Management support is essential for ensuring the smooth completion of the audit, and that any findings or recommendations are considered and implemented.

Initiatives like this are also useful for the training and capacity-building of municipal staff for future waste diversion projects, as well as for fostering collaborative efforts to solve waste management issues.

## Tool 2: The Composting Technique

This practical tool explains the essence and usefulness of the composting technique, and the main challenges to expect in applying the model. Composting is applicable to all municipalities. It can be done by all sectors of society, young or old, male or female, and can be fostered through simple community outreach and education initiatives.

All organic waste, whether food waste, leaves, grass clippings or other materials, is naturally broken down by earthworms, bacteria and other microorganisms. Composting speeds up this natural process by creating the optimal conditions for decomposition. Finished compost can be used by residents to improve the performance of their household gardens or it can be sold as a product to replace artificial fertilizers.

### Analysis

Composting provides a low-tech solution to managing large volumes of residential waste in an environmentally responsible manner. Backyard composting has the advantage of removing a huge percentage of residential waste from the waste stream, taking pressure off collection services, landfills and the surrounding environment.

Composting recycles nutrients and organic matter back into the soil, improving friability and soil quality. Especially in tsunami-devastated areas, it has the added

potential to remove salt from land that was salinated in the disaster. Compost can also be used to revitalize home vegetable gardens that provide a source of sustenance and assist in numerous landscaping projects to beautify the community.

### Tool 3: The Community Outreach Plan

The objectives are to raise awareness of the composting program within the community, to transfer knowledge and build consensus. Community outreach activities evolve as the project develops.

1. Start a community outreach plan by establishing a network of stakeholders that can contribute to the project
2. In the planning stages, gain as much information as possible about the project's target population.
3. Decide what key messages should be shared with the stakeholders.
4. Determine the best way to contact and communicate with members of the community.

#### Analysis

The community engagement approach and the promotion of voluntary participation were key elements of the project's success. Outreach activities identified the key stakeholders and champions among politicians, senior municipal staff and the broader community. The training of DKP staff in public consultation methods allowed for the involvement of the whole community in the planning and decision-making processes. Promotional materials incorporated the ideas and artwork of school children, integrating them into the process and fostering a sense of responsibility. The DKP is interested in translating the community outreach approach to its other programs in an effort to build similar community spirit.

## Lessons Learned

### (a) Building municipal capacity through an iterative and locally owned initiative

The main objective of the pilot-project approach was to build the capacity of DKP staff to introduce a community composting program into the department's normal services, while ensuring the potential benefits, costs and constraints were understood and taken into account before launching a full scale program. The project was undertaken by a small dedicated team of DKP, which took ownership of the project. This approach helped ensure transfer of capacities to DKP, while contributing to the sustainability of the composting program. The project ownership taken by DKP staff also allowed them to transfer capacities to other areas within DKP, exemplified by the development of the department's outreach activities to support paper recycling. It should also be noted that the initiative was part of the rethinking around waste management services needed in Banda Aceh. It provided local leaders with concrete information that helped them shape their policy in that field, in particular as they were preparing a waste management strategy.

**(b) Community participation in service planning and delivery**

Early meetings and ongoing communication with community and school leaders, as well as with other donor organizations working in the area, helped to promote coordinated efforts and avoid duplication of services or resources. Regular meetings between all involved stakeholders also meant that constant updates were provided with regard to evolving equipment, personnel and funding needs.

**(c) Positive engagement between DKP and schools to promote environmental awareness**

Regarding the involvement of schools in the project, DKP staff was very successful generating enthusiasm in SMP 12 and Bambun Naja, but they also discovered after a couple of months and at the beginning of a new school year, that mechanisms to maintain and renew the commitment of students needed to be put in place. Consequently, they decided to monitor more regularly the schools and invest more time in the training of teachers that would stay in place year after year. They also adapted their educational material to different age groups so that the information shared was evolving at the same time as the children were growing.

**(d) Anti-corruption measures**

Pertinent to CALGAP's anti-corruption cross-cutting theme, the team noted a need to ensure transparency in purchasing services or products from local vendors. Officials and administrators publicly committed to the planned expenditures through the project plan, and a detailed budget provided a clear intention for regional spending. As well, improved transparency in the planning stages and in the reporting of results was beneficial for addressing peace-building and anti-corruption goals.

**(e) Addressing gender equality issues**

Related to CALGAP's gender equality cross-cutting theme, it became clear during the pilot project phase that women were getting more involved than men. For some, this is a good example of a successful mainstreaming of gender equality considerations when in fact women were mostly getting involved in the project in their traditional role as housewives responsible for managing household waste. Men did not get involved as much because garbage is considered women's work. To counterbalance this bias, it is recommended to develop, at the beginning of the project, a "marketing" plan to increase men's participation and promote the importance of composting for the broader community and the environment. This can include new ideas for the recognition of the work accomplished by participants but also finding well-known men to promote composting in more "masculine" settings such as coffee stalls and soccer fields, which was planned and successfully implemented in the extension phase.

## Sustainability and Replicability

The project was assessed by community members after a few months. They identified its strengths and issues and discussed possible improvements as well as the extension of the program to the rest of Banda Aceh city. The idea of making it a regular service offered by DKP was then validated. DKP's commitment to the composting program increased over the course of the pilot project, illustrated by the appointment of four permanent staff and two short-term consultants to support composting initiatives. DKP also started unrolling the program through its own budget, purchasing a number of composters. In addition, composting was made an important component of their prepared environmental strategy. DKP also expressed the desire to apply the community outreach approach to build community spirit in the department's other programs.

DKP staff is responsible for the distribution of composting units to the 90 villages and schools within Banda Aceh. Each village is initially set to receive at least 10 to 20 composters, in order to facilitate the awareness-building and training process. DKP staff will monitor the progress and may provide up to 50 composting units to those villages that perform particularly well and express a desire for more units. The monitoring program can also assess the quality of the final compost being produced in each household and village, and allocate follow-up training to those areas where quality is poor.

The pilot project extension was a direct result of the success of the pilot program, as residents from other villages began contacting the DKP about receiving their own composters. Expansion into other villages occurred largely as a result of the outreach effort of female leaders, aided by a vigorous and diverse promotional and educational strategy. The communications campaign will sustain interest in the program and facilitate its expansion into even more villages.

CALGAP's focus on schools and students has boded well for the continuation and expansion of composting initiatives in Banda Aceh. SMP 12 and Bambun Naja's principals were very supportive of the program and acted as ambassadors, inviting other schools to sign on to the expanded composting project. As well, DKP staff met with the head of the Department for Education regarding the integration of composting into the public school curriculum. He suggested that a pilot composting curriculum be tested at three schools the following year. ■

## Canada Aceh Local Government Assistance Program (CALGAP)

# Enhancing Inter-Governmental Relations

**THE** Communication Forum of Local Governments and Legislatures of Aceh Province (KKA Forum) aims to enhance inter-governmental relations and cooperation between city/district and provincial offices, taking into consideration the framework of special autonomy.

With technical assistance from the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) through the Canada/Aceh Local Government Assistance Program (CALGAP) and funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), city and district administrations in Aceh took the initiative to establish KKA Forum in order to facilitate greater cooperation among them and with the provincial government.

Consultations were held with various stakeholders including Indonesia's four National Local Government Associations (LGAs). They were the Association of Indonesian District Governments (APKASI), the Association of Indonesian Municipalities (APEKSI), the Indonesian District Legislative Association (ADKASI) and the Indonesian Municipal Council Association (ADEKSI) in addition to the Home Ministry, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR), and the Aceh Legislation Bureau.

On March 8-9, 2008, districts and cities in Aceh and other important stakeholders gathered in Banda Aceh for the founding conference of KKA Forum.

In its statute, KKA Forum stated that it would support and accelerate the implementation of the Aceh Government Act (Law No. 11/2006) and strive to create

sustainability of peace in Aceh. KKA Forum also pledged to act as a medium for districts and cities in Aceh to carry out advocacy programs in the interest of the respective districts and cities, to the provincial and central governments. Internal cooperation among districts and cities was also stated as a focus of the forum, to empower its members. External cooperation by KKA Forum in facilitating cooperation with districts and cities outside the province was also adopted as a priority.

## Establishment of KKA Forum

The majority of newly elected district heads and mayors after the 2007 local elections in Aceh were not familiar with local government associations and the constructive and facilitative role such associations could play. They were skeptical about the benefits of creating a local government association.

The joint-secretariat of APEKSI and ADEKSI had originally recommended that KKA Forum be part of the National LGAs. However, the majority of newly elected district heads and mayors did not think the idea was the most advantageous approach to represent their interests. The consensus reached in the working conference in July 2007 was to establish an Aceh-based communication forum.

The political dynamics of Aceh, especially in the issue of forming two new provinces (one on the west coast and the other in the midlands), and membership combination (district heads and mayors, executive and legislative bodies) influenced the formation of the organization. To address the issue of balancing the representation in the leadership board, the participants of the founding conference agreed that the board should equally represent the geographic elements (north, east coast, west coast and center) as well as type of governments (city and district), and type of governance body (executive and legislative).

## Key Initiatives of KKA Forum

Since the founding of KKA Forum, several major initiatives have been undertaken. One of the priority initiatives of the forum during this period was the advocacy of effective transfer modalities for the Special Autonomy Fund and additional Shared Earning Fund (SEF) from the provincial government to districts and cities. The KKA Forum Secretariat implemented a range of activities related to SAF and SEF. Research was conducted in selected districts, representing the four regions of Aceh, to understand and compile the perspectives from diversified KKA Forum members. The findings and recommendations, endorsed by the KKA Forum's board of leadership, were presented to forum members through a series of regional meetings; and the recommendations were then submitted to the provincial government. The KKA Forum's coordinator, members of the board of leadership and the forum's executive secretary held meetings with the governor, vice

governor and other provincial government leaders such as the provincial secretary, heads of provincial agencies and representatives of the Aceh Legislation Bureau.

KKA Forum was established to speed up the development of Aceh as well as to harmonize cooperation among different levels of government in Aceh. KKA Forum was successful in this area by forming committees on local government financial issues, particularly in advancing the SAF and SEF advocacy theme. The local government finance committee comprises: district head (deputy district head), mayor (vice mayor) and speaker (deputy speaker) of 13 districts/cities. The initial purpose of the committee was to discuss the policy of SAF and SEF and to reflect on the views of KKA Forum members for the adoption of a common SAF and SEF policy. This committee was supported by a technical team made up of high-level local government officials from six districts/cities in Aceh. The main function of the technical committee was to assist the local government financial committee by providing technical information on the specific needs of districts and cities on the issue of local government finance.

The KKA Forum Secretariat also conducted outreach activities with its members in four regions in Aceh to identify members' needs and make known the role the forum could play to assist and serve its members. The KKA Forum Secretariat provided partners with tools and methodologies for identifying priority issues/needs of districts/cities and helped consolidate and prioritize issues/needs to better articulate them as points of advocacy for KKA Forum to the provincial government. Instead of sending districts or cities' requests individually to the province, KKA Forum was effective and efficient in "pooling" common district/city development challenges and needs and advocating these through KKA Forum to the provincial government.

Other initiatives conducted by KKA Forum in 2008 included the dissemination of information and capacity building. KKA Forum facilitated the exchange of information through various channels as well as the regular publication of a newsletter and bulletin. The newsletter became a vehicle for KKA Forum to inform its members of the organization's current, past and future activities. Members could also contribute ideas and suggestions through the newsletter.

The KKA Forum Secretariat engaged in a process to determine how to support its members on issues of government procurements. Following a series of initial consultations, the secretariat established a plan to cooperate with the Aceh Education and Training Agency and the LKPP office to provide training on government procurements for local government staff in the future.

## Achievements

- Relations between district and city administrations have been enhanced through several initiatives provided by KKA Forum. The opinions of KKA Forum's members are better articulated and conveyed to the provincial government through the

organization. A strong inter-governmental relationship has been established between districts/cities and the provincial government, as demonstrated through a series of technical meetings between the provincial government and KKA Forum. The provincial government sent agency heads to the meetings to discuss issues of importance with the KKA Forum Secretariat. Stronger communication among districts/cities to discuss their common needs and challenges also occurs more frequently and presentations, committee meetings and technical team meetings build the capacity of KKA Forum members.

- On the advocacy for SAF and SEF, KKA Forum succeeded in influencing the provincial government to ensure that the management of the implementation of SAF and SEF should be conducted at the district and city level starting from 2009 onwards. KKA Forum also had remarkable achievements in enhancing inter-governmental relations with the province by signing a memorandum of understanding for the implementation of the SAF and SEF.
- The secretariat also established an agreement to cooperate with National LGAs to share best practices on public service delivery within Aceh. Discussions are ongoing to determine the role the forum can play to provide orientation and training programs to newly elected legislative members after the 2009 election in Aceh.
- KKA Forum also planned exchanges with the Home Ministry on issues pertaining to the operation of local government associations, the collection of membership dues and local government authority over various responsibilities, et cetera.

## Success factors

KKA Forum is the only organization of districts/cities that exists at the provincial level. At the national level, there are four local government associations, which have variable forms of local representation. They are: APKASI, APEKSI, ADKASI and ADEKSI.

KKA Forum is a unique model of local government association for Indonesia. The members of KKA Forum consist of district and city governments of Aceh province as well as their respective legislative bodies. Board members of KKA Forum comprise 13 members. Mayors, vice mayors, regents, vice regents and speakers or deputy Speakers are represented. According to the forum's statute, regents, vice mayors and speakers can fill the positions of coordinator and deputy coordinators. KKA Forum is the first local government association in Indonesia that comprises members from districts and cities representing the executive branches and legislatures.

KKA Forum felt that bringing these two elements together as members of the same local government association was imperative because all local governments in Aceh face similar development challenges. It is thought that if the executive branches and legislatures of local governments in Aceh work together on common issues, it will help strengthen the frequently confrontational relationship between legislative and executive branches of districts and cities.

The destruction of infrastructure and the loss of local government personnel necessitated that recovery efforts in Aceh not only address the physical aspects of reconstruction but also the capacity building of civil servants to enhance systems in local governance. Now that former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) members have been elected leaders, and decentralization is taking place at the local level within the framework of special autonomy, it is clear that the need for more improvements and adjustments in government relations is necessary.

## Challenges

KKA Forum faced several challenges. While the members of leadership boards had experience and know-how on how to balance their functions and tasks in managing their regular local government affairs, setting up an appropriate organization for KKA Forum was still difficult. However, technical assistance provided by CALGAP on these issues was used to specifically strengthen board members' capacities in these areas.

Lack of adequate human resources to support and follow-up on the activities of KKA Forum with members was seen as a challenging factor. The function of policy analysis and formulation requires highly qualified and experienced personnel who may be difficult to recruit under the current financial conditions of the forum. KKA Forum must recruit top quality personnel to play an effective leadership role in the sector.

Making communication more effective between board members and KKA Forum local government members is also a work in progress. The forum continues to organize outreach activities to educate members and strives to appreciate needs so that the organization more accurately represents each regional base in Aceh.

In the long term, the financial sustainability of KKA Forum will depend on members paying their dues as well as the organization's ability to generate revenue from other sources such as training, grants, etc.

One of the external challenges of KKA Forum is reconciling the divide between GAM and GAM-related elected officials and elected executive and legislative officials with perceived "nationalist" inclinations. The April 2009 elections for city and regency legislatures will likely intensify these tensions, at least during the campaign period.

## Actual and potential benefits of the forum

### Enhanced and efficient communication

KKA Forum constitutes a unique channel for dialogue between cities and districts and the provincial government. Instead of communicating individually with each district and city, the province can now directly communicate with KKA Forum to discuss development needs common to all districts and cities in Aceh.

### United cities and districts can play a role to advocate effective policy and programs

Based on their experience and implementation realities, districts and cities can provide valuable input to help develop effective policy, enhancing the synergy among the efforts of both district/city and provincial governments.

### Potential for replication

There is potential for the KKA Forum model to be replicated in other Indonesian provinces. As stated in Law No. 32/2004 on autonomy and Government Regulation No 38/2007 on the authority of districts/cities, districts and cities are permitted to develop local government associations in every province. Aceh should be considered a special case in which the post-conflict and post-tsunami environment provided districts/cities with a unique opportunity to organize themselves in an innovative, new organization in order to better respond to the needs of the citizens of Aceh. ■

## Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

# Bringing Services Closer to the Community through Single Window Service at Sub-district Level

**I**N line with Indonesia's national decentralization program sub-district administrations have requested additional powers and a shift of authority from the district administration. Consequently some authority and responsibility for public service delivery has been shifted to the sub-district level, making services more accessible to the community. The implementation of Single Window Services (SWS) in sub-districts in Aceh – assisted by LOGICA – has improved the quality of public service to the community; standard based processes are easier, quicker and more transparent. This case study looks at how this came about.

## Background

The sub-district level of government in Indonesia delivers many public services to communities, and as in most sub-districts in Indonesia, sub-district public services in Aceh are generally of a poor standard. Indicators suggest employees do not keep to standard work hours, are arrogant and do not apply standard prices for standard procedures. The lack of regulatory support for the sub-district by district and provincial administrations is also a contributing factor to poor public service conditions in sub-district offices.

The problems are generally worse in Aceh than other areas of Indonesia due to the long conflict between the national government and the Free Aceh Movement (*GAM*). This lack of quality public service was then exacerbated drastically by the 2004 tsunami, which

caused the loss of many public service officials' lives, as well as destroying government office buildings and other infrastructure.

Communities across the province had long complained about poor public services, and after the tsunami, many additional community needs emerged related to the sub-district offices, such as applications for probate concerning estates of deceased individuals in order to withdraw money from banks, and applications for identity cards or letters proving a person's hardship status. Sub-district administrations have generally not been able to provide these services efficiently. The villagers often present their concerns at the sub-district offices, but go home in disappointment. The most common reasons for this are the absence of the office head (lack of delegation of authority), as well as uncertainty about fees.

The poor quality of sub-district public service results in the public perceiving the sub-district offices as ineffective and is widespread distrust of government.

## Significant Events

To improve conditions, LOGICA worked with sub-district office administrations in several districts in Aceh in order to improve sub-district service delivery. Four sub-districts in Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat districts were selected for a pilot project. First, it was necessary to ascertain the community's perception towards sub-district public services. This was done through a community survey, with many weaknesses identified. These weaknesses were mainly related to service operations, such as uncertain procedures, unavailability of a service fee schedule, slow service delivery times, and discrimination. The survey results were then followed up in the form of a service contract between sub-district offices and communities. The main point is that the sub-districts were willing to improve their public services to suit their own abilities and to meet the community's needs.

The sub-district offices then formulated public service visions in order to most effectively implement the service contract. Much had to be done, beginning with formulating Standard Operating Procedures (SOP); distributing job descriptions to the sub-district employees; and providing staff training concerning service ethics, as well as promoting the use of public service databases to accelerate service delivery. These efforts ultimately resulted in the idea of creating a single window for public services in the sub-district offices. Fundamentally, the Single Window Service (SWS) system would change the nature of the administration's service from its previous reliance upon the on the head of the sub-district office for the approval of many standard services. The new system would utilize a single desk where all services were provided transparently and efficiently.

Single Window Service (SWS) results in clients who come to the office being welcomed by the on-duty officer and asked to sign the guest book. They provided access to information about all of the services on offer, inclusive of requirements, standard costs

and timeframes for service delivery. Clients are then led to the service post to submit the required documents, after which they can pass the time in the waiting room reading a newspaper or watching TV. Delivery time is now clearly stated, and the officer in the document submission division will call the customer's name and state the fee to be paid for the service requested. In addition, people no longer have to worry about whether the fee they pay will go to the local finance office or disappear because of poor or corrupt procedures.

Meanwhile, to accelerate service performance, standard computer generated forms are utilized by sub-district officers who no longer have to manually type letters or forms. The officers need only fill out the data on a computer and print it out directly, while also archiving documents electronically. The implementation of this SWS system has resulted in fast and efficient service delivery, reducing service delivery time for all services offered by several days to within just one hour. Standard operating procedures and fee schedules are also prominently displayed in the sub-district offices. Communities are also requested to write down any complaints regarding services and place them in a complaints box, the contents of which are then addressed by sub-district office staff.

The testimonials given by the community prove that the people are satisfied with the improved services offered through SWS in sub-district offices. The implementation of the SWS in Aceh system has aided sub-district offices in building public trust and confidence. The district government has replicated the pilot SWS model at other sub-district offices, expanding the program from the four piloted sub-districts to forty Sub-districts, and directly allocating part of the 2008 district budget for the implementation of SWS in sub-district offices.

Until now, the implementation of the SWS in the District of Aceh Besar has shown good results. The provincial government of Aceh has given awards to three sub-district heads for best practice in running SWS. This service system is also currently being discussed by the Home Affairs Department as a potential model for integrated public services for all sub-district offices in Indonesia.

## Challenges

- 1. Reward and punishment.** Until now, the district government in Aceh Besar treats almost all sub-district offices in the same way, whether they are high performing or not. In the long term, this will potentially affect the motivation of the staffs at sub-district offices that perform well, but who may not be commensurately remunerated for demonstrated improved public service. Some form of award and punishment system for high and low performance of sub-district offices is recommended to ensure the sustained success of the system.
- 2. Monitoring and evaluation.** Sub-district offices are the real face of the government in the eyes of the community. To curb the tendency of district governments to

assume that all public service needs have been met due to the implementation of SWS, ongoing attention to evolving community concerns is required through ongoing monitoring and evaluation, with a sustained emphasis on the potential for improvement in the quality of public service delivery.

3. **Recruitment of sub-district office staff.** The common image among public servants that sub-district office work and services are less important than those of the district government needs reforming. This can be done by improving the mechanisms for staff recruitment, including that of sub-district office heads, ensuring that they meet established terms of reference and have the relevant technical qualifications.
4. **Delegation of authority to sub-district offices.** District government staffs are generally reluctant to delegate their authority to sub-district offices. However, if they allow smaller scale matters to be handled by sub-district offices in relation to a number of public services, it can free them to focus on macro and strategic issues affecting their district.

## Lessons Learned

1. **Gradual change.** Public service improvements at the sub-district level involve a lengthy process and much time. Effective and long-lasting change must be undertaken slowly with an inclusive approach involving staff at both sub-district and district offices. Change also requires ongoing consultation with the public to ensure responsiveness to community and staff concerns, and good will, which are the foundation for all reform.
2. **Support from upper levels.** Public service improvement initiatives cannot be well executed without support from higher levels of government. The motivation of sub-district offices should be supported by district governments in the form of regulatory policy, budgetary support, and expression of appreciation.
3. **Raised expectations.** Since people have experienced better services from sub-district offices, they also expect to receive better services through similar SWSs in the district government offices. This expectation needs to be lived up to through ongoing support to district and provincial administrations, streamlining public service delivery between offices, and promoting the use of – and dialogue between – successful initiatives at other levels of government. ■

## Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

# Computer-Based Reform for Reliable, Quality Services at Sub-district Offices

**RELIABLE** computer-based information management systems boosted the performance of sub-district offices (SDOs) in delivering services to citizens. The progress is evident: the longest waiting time now is an hour thanks to modern data storage and retrieval systems, whereas it used to take up to three days to receive identity cards, licenses, and letters of approval from SDOs. The system has also reduced costs considerably and complaints have significantly diminished.

## Background

Sub-district government office administration during the conflict and following the tsunami was generally poor, with haphazard information storage and unreliable data retrieval. It was characterized by disorganized filing systems, procedural uncertainties, and duplication. This caused widespread public dissatisfaction and created excessively long processing times. In addition there was a lack of transparency regarding the amount of fees set for public services. The drawn-out administrative process and unreasonable costs undermined public trust and created disincentives for business registration and economic investments. Citizens, NGOs and private companies complained about the quality of services from underperforming SDOs.

To tackle these inefficiencies, LOGICA assisted 50 SDOs with database improvement programs between 2005 and 2008. Building reliable SDO database management systems played a pivotal role in improving public service delivery and fostering regional business development and investment.

## What has Happened and Why was It Significant?

Computer-based information systems were not previously the norm for SDOs in Aceh. LOGICA's computer-based reform program for SDOs aimed to: (1) improve public service efficiency by simplifying processes and improving public access, reducing waiting times from three days to one hour; (2) build a task force of government officials to provide technical assistance to SDOs; (3) equip SDO officials with computer and database management skills in order to deliver these improvements.

In 2005, LOGICA commenced the program with a thorough assessment of the administrative processes at a number of SDOs, including human resources, office equipment, and standard templates. Intensive discussions were held with both public servants and citizens through a variety of internal and public workshops regarding needs and priorities. The resulting information was used to design a new SDO computer-based database system.

Upon completion, LOGICA facilitators organized meetings and workshops to introduce the new database system to SDO officials. The workshops emphasized the application of the computer-based system. LOGICA provided training on technical operating procedures, assigning skilled facilitators to accustom SDO officials to the new system and assist them in resolving problems.

SDO staff was able to deliver services much faster and reduce costs using the computerized database system. Staff could use templates for forms rather than typing letters one by one as was previously the norm. The new system also provided more efficient and systematic filing, and its digital nature saved valuable office space previously taken up by physical files. Citizens had to pay fewer photocopy fees, and the transportation costs for clients declined as it was no longer necessary to go to the SDO for multiple days. Client waiting times decreased significantly whilst client satisfaction rose. The database proved vital in providing better public service at SDOs.

As of December 2008, four SDOs in five Districts (Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Pidie and Bireuen) have participated in the database reform effort, to much public support. The basic database system is customized through internal SDO and public consultations to each SDO's particular requirements.

LOGICA's database model has gathered widespread publicity within Aceh Province and beyond, with other provinces such as Central Kalimantan expressing their interest in replicating the system.

## Challenges

- **Computer illiteracy.** Most SDO officials were initially computer illiterate, and continued to face problems after the initial training. Faced with relatively small technical problems, staff often reverted to doing things manually.
- **Power failure.** During power outages, the staff had to work manually. Many were reluctant to re-input the data once to power came back up, resulting in data accuracy and validity concerns.
- **Reluctant support from district government offices.** District government offices were not always supportive of the digitized database system, often sending out their own reporting formats which were incompatible with the SDO system templates. SDO staff was influenced by the authority of the district administration to abandon the system templates and follow the district government formats, creating inefficiency.

## Lessons Learned

- **Give staff the opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities.** Government officials often work without having any chance to display their real capabilities due to their inefficient working environments. The database reform program provided them with an opportunity to demonstrate what they could do to improve the quality of public services on offer. Both SDO staff and their colleagues in the technical assistance task force were appreciative that they could be innovative, effective and efficient in the workplace. Workplace satisfaction and newfound pride in the work done also led to improved quality of service and increased client satisfaction.
- **Improvements to laborious office processes stemming from the new database system meant that SDO staff could spend more time on other activities.** More efficient and shorter processing times meant that SDO staff could devote more time to other activities such as updating information in the database, community visits to explain the government's vision and mission on issues such as land ownership and funds allocation, coordinating with village government officials, and gathering client/community feedback on the efficacy of service delivery.
- **Technical assistance and monitoring was crucial.** Technical assistance and support played a crucial role in the implementation and sustainability of the new database systems at the SDOs. Going forwards, technical assistance is needed for ongoing refinement and improvement of the database, as well as for everyday support.
- These reforms helped support the One Stop Service initiative for efficient business licensing, which in turn has assisted regional economic development. ■

## United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC) for Aceh and Nias

### Empowering Local administrations through Technical and Coordination Capacity for Sustainable Recovery and Development: Municipality/District Recovery Forum's Experiences

**ONE** of the core challenges facing the populace of province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) after the earthquake and tsunami was how to establish a democratic framework of good governance within the residue of the martial law paradigm that had developed previously due to the prolonged armed conflict in the province. This remains an ongoing and difficult undertaking, and much more time will be required to perfect good governance systems, particularly at district and municipal levels in both Aceh and Nias.

One of the key institutions set into place to facilitate the process is the

Municipality/District Recovery Forum (Kota/Kabupaten Recovery Forum: KRF)<sup>1</sup>, an independent body established and developed under the United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC). This institution has made a concerted effort to design and implement a series of activities and to set out clear targets for facilitating the process of developing better governance at the municipal and district levels. Several achievements have been made in this direction thus far, including improvement of prioritization and strategic planning at municipal and district levels; improved institutional capacity; increased levels of information and understanding on good management; and more effective coordination.

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<sup>1</sup> Kota/Kabupaten Recovery Forum means Municipality/District Recovery Forum. Administratively Aceh has 5 municipalities (Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, Langsa, Subulussalam and Sabang). There are 20 districts/districts altogether in Aceh and Nias.

## Background

Aceh's governance underwent a remarkable transformation after the signing of a Peace Treaty and effective completion of provincial and district administration elections. This resulted in the effective commencement of the ongoing democratization process. The newly elected regents and mayors then faced the huge challenge of resolving post-conflict and post-disaster issues in their respective districts and cities.

This process was then shaken by the challenges emerging from the enormous loss of life and property caused an earthquake in Nias, a region long known for its poverty.

The local administrations felt an immediate need for more efficient and effective establishment of good governance mechanisms within the context of recovery and sustainability in Aceh and Nias. At the insistence of the region's regents and mayors, the Municipality/District Recovery Forum (Kota/Kabupaten Recovery Forum: KRF) was launched to facilitate the democratization process.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forum commenced at a very critical time when a central avenue toward good governance was needed by the new, first-time democratically elected local leaders to render greater cooperation and collaboration among all stakeholders to "build back better".

Given the complex nature of the recovery process after the earthquake and tsunami within the context of the region's previous long-term conflict and under-development, it was vital that building back be done together with the Acehnese and Nias communities and with a vigor that envisaged their long-term sustainable development.

The main objectives of the Municipality/District Recovery Forum (KRF) were the empowering of local administrations and stakeholders, through the building of their technical and coordination capacities toward sustainable recovery, and the development of all municipalities and districts. Within this context, the institution began designing ways to promote collective, coordinated, and transparent planning to ensure that all policies, planning and budgeting relating to international aid provision and evolving recovery plans were closely aligned to local populations and stakeholders under the direction of democratically-elected regents and mayors.

## Establishing Field Support

In early 2007, the Field offices of the United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC) in Banda Aceh, Meulaboh, Lhokseumawe and Nias, which have been working closely with local administrations and the BRR regional and district offices, as well as with international and local partners, were directed to support and facilitate the establishment of the Municipality/District Recovery Forum (KRF) and to provide technical support for all of its efforts and operations toward realizing its goals of goal governance and greater democratization.

In mid 2008, additional Field offices were established in Subulussalam and Takengon to expand the coverage of the Municipality/District Recovery Forum to all of the local stakeholders. A new team of 50 Municipality/District Recovery Forum facilitation officers and facilitation associates was deployed to the Municipality/District Recovery Forum secretariats in each of the districts for facilitation, coordination, and planning support.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forum facilitation teams were inducted in April 2008, during a seven-day workshop at which there was much discussion of expectations and intended outcomes. During this workshop, the Municipality/District Recovery Forum facilitation teams received training on coordination, team-building and leadership skills. In particular, the participants received input on improving their facilitation skills, initiative-taking abilities, and work functions.

In addition to the technical aspects of operating the Municipality/District Recovery Forum, the rigorous and highly structured induction ensured that the Municipality/District Recovery Forum facilitation teams are able to provide thorough support relating to diverse issues, district priorities, and immediate recovery needs in the forums under the leadership of regent/mayors.

## Launching Municipality/District Recovery Forum

In February 2007, the first District Recovery Forum was launched in East Aceh District on a pilot basis, followed by the launch of the first Municipality Recovery Forum (KRF) in the city of Banda Aceh in November 2007. By now all of the Municipality/District Recovery Forum offices have been launched, totaling Municipality Recovery Forum offices and 20 District Recovery Forum offices throughout the province of Aceh and in Nias. The Municipality/District Recovery Forum is included in the legal framework of the municipal and district administrations through decrees signed by a mayor or a regent.

## Municipality/District Recovery Forum Meetings

Post-launch, in each municipality/district, an inaugural Municipality/District Recovery Forum meeting was held to set out the priority sectors of the respective municipalities/districts. This meeting, represented by all stakeholders from a wide range of backgrounds, both individuals and groups, including ex-combatants, representatives of all governmental departments and of domestic and international organizations, as well as associations grouping women and youths, prioritized the sectors based on the needs of the given municipality or district.

In total 120 priorities have been identified across 25 municipalities/districts after holding inaugural meetings and a number of consecutive meetings. These priorities include Basic Services and Infrastructure, Livelihood and Economic Development, the Environment, Agriculture, Plantations and Forestry, Health and Education, Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, Tourism, Religion and Cultural Heritage, Trade, Asset Management, Child Protection and Good Governance. A few of the Municipality/District Recovery Forum

offices also prioritized Disaster Preparedness, Gender Mainstreaming and Reintegration as cross-sectoral issues. Of the priorities stipulated, Basic Services and Infrastructure, Economic Development, Education and Good Governance were considered the most important.

Municipality/District Recovery Forums were active in holding the Aceh Recovery Framework (ARF) consultations that were completed by the end of June 2008. These consultations have been crucial in ensuring that provincial strategies reflect priority needs at the district level. The Municipality/District Recovery Forums have also been significant in exploring the capacity building needs of stakeholders and answering those needs by building partnerships with domestic and international partners, private companies, BRR and local administrations.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forums have been very successful in mediating local differences, by holding constructive discussions and bringing local solutions. In some districts, the Municipality/District Recovery Forums (KRFs) have been vital in actively responding to local disasters and providing local leadership in handling emergency needs.

### **Output 1: *District Recovery Priorities and Strategies***

In order to formulate priorities and strategies for recovery district, district and subdistrict levels, the Municipality/District Recovery Forums develop recovery strategies through a holistic, multi-sectoral approach that identifies sector-specific challenges, priorities and responses at the same time as ensuring the cross-cutting linkages necessary to ensure coherent and sustainable recovery interventions.

Under the leadership of mayors/regents, most of the Municipality/District Recovery Forum offices have prepared draft municipality/district recovery strategies for at least three sectors in each municipality/district. Then, these strategies were discussed, validated, and refined with involved Municipality/District Recovery Forum stakeholders based on feedback received during sectoral meetings.

To support the program, the Municipality/District Recovery Forum Secretariat – supported by both international and local expertise – proactively worked on formulating draft municipality/district recovery strategies. Once the strategies were formulated, the Municipality/District Recovery Forum determined the appropriate priorities for municipalities and districts, which were then approved by the Municipality/District Recovery Forum stakeholders. Once validated, these strategies were then adopted as a vision on municipality and district levels for translation into the 2008-2012 transitional plan, which will be updated annually with the active participation of Municipality/District Recovery Forums stakeholders. Furthermore, Municipality/District Recovery Forums are involved in formulating municipality/district data profiles, which will be referred to by the municipality/district administrators, planners and partners for the planning, benchmarking and monitoring of recovery activities within municipalities/districts.

### **Output 2: Capacity Building**

The Municipality/District Recovery Forum has also established a Cyber Resource Center (CRC) at the offices of mayors and regents in 25 districts in order to improve and develop the capacities of and provide ready access knowledge and information for civil servants and Municipality/District Recovery Forum stakeholders alike. These Cyber Resource Centers (CRCs) are meant to enable government staffers and Municipality/District Recovery Forum stakeholders to stay connected to a wider network of recovery expertise through Solution Exchange.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forum Cyber Resources Centers have been hosting various training programs in the field of Microfinance, Basic Computer Operations, Accounting & Book Keeping, Gender Sensitization, IMS, Database Management, Accountability Reporting and GIS that have resulted in considerable improvement in the skills of stakeholders. These training programs have been held in partnership with private-sector companies, domestic and international partners, BRR and local administrations.

To ensure sustainability, in the Cyber Resources Centers will also host

E-governance initiatives as a means to ensure effective connectivity across governmental offices, to improve information and service delivery, and to encourage citizen participation in the decision-making process in order to make government more accountable, transparent and effective.

### **Output 3: Information and Knowledge Management**

The Municipality/District Recovery Forums have also initiated activity mapping in their respective municipalities/districts to develop a database for updating information on the activities of their partners. This activity mapping is expected to be helpful in synchronizing the recovery strategies formulated by Municipality/District Recovery Forums stakeholders with the various project activities of their various partners.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forum also assisted BRR with its Housing Audit and Analysis Project NAD-Nias (HAAP). HAAP aimed to address gaps in previous reporting mechanisms, to account for qualitative assessments of projects, and to maintain a current and accurate database of housing progress. This partnership and a municipality/district level field audit and check helped BRR to ensure efficient use of resources, reduce overlap, and address many of the problems of the housing sector.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forums in all districts have also been documenting best practices that can be utilized in future recovery and decentralization processes. Municipality/District Recovery Forum stakeholders have also opened lines of communication by applying Solution Exchange in order to facilitate the overcoming of local challenges.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forum has also regularly contributed updates from the various municipalities and districts to the Aceh Recovery Newsletter in support of

this publication and to ensure its own sustainability. The individual Municipality/District Recovery Forums also regularly publish flyers and other information sheets on the organization's activities, progress and developments for stakeholders.

#### **Output 4: Effective Coordination**

Successful mediation to resolve local differences in districts/municipalities is covered here with specific examples from some of the Municipality/District Recovery Forum offices. Conflicts and disputes were generally resolved by presenting the problems and applying social capital to reach effective solutions.

The Aceh Jaya Municipality/District Recovery Forum effectively mediated a dispute by bringing together local contractors, local officials and legislators to discuss the contentious issues. The result was a consensus to monitor the construction of the community infrastructure to ensure it was carried out properly and in a timely manner.

Likewise, the Aceh Tenggara Municipality/District Recovery Forum has led productive discussions on concerns ranging from flooding to unfair pricing of farm input. In both cases, discussions facilitated by the Municipality/District Recovery Forum were helpful in pinpointing the reasons for the problems and ways to resolve them to the satisfaction of all stakeholders.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forums encourage participatory decision making on project implementation. The Aceh Singkil Municipality/District Recovery Forum, through its coordination in the infrastructure sector, hopes to facilitate the building of a new road connecting Aceh Singkil to Aceh Tenggara. The regent has commented that these efforts are contributing to efficiency in the local bureaucracy.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forums also have been effective in solving local problems by holding discussions with local administrative bodies. In Bireuen, when stakeholders complained about abandoned fishponds, the secretariat did field inspections and discovered that 44.2 hectares of fishponds affected by the tsunami had not received any kind of assistance. As a result, the Bireuen Fishery Department promised to include fishponds in the rehabilitation budget.

Along similar lines, the Aceh Barat Daya Municipality/District Recovery Forum took the initiative to analyze the urgent needs of the fishery sector, which led to the disbursement of Rp. 3 billion by the deputy governor for the support of recovery in the fishery and maritime affairs sectors.

And in connection with BRR's exit strategy at the end of its mandated period of operation (April 2005-April 2009), the Municipality/District Recovery Forums in all districts and municipalities took the lead with local administrations and BRR to work with domestic and international partners in transferring assets.

## Experiences and the Road Ahead

The Municipality/District Recovery Forums in all districts and municipalities took the lead with local administrations and BRR to work with domestic and international partners in transferring assets in connection with BRR's exit strategy.

In connection with this, the Municipality/District Recovery Forum has laid the groundwork for acceptance and ownership by local administrations toward ensuring that all policies and activities are derived from and uphold the aspirations of the people. The Municipality/District Recovery Forums has established and expanded on innovative mechanism that contribute further to development efforts of the region, such as E-governance, a capacity building program conducted through the Cyber Resource Centers to sharpen the skills of all stakeholders, including government officials. Enhanced capacity and computer literacy increases the support available for E-governance and Solution-Exchange.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forums also ascertains whether the annual budgets prepared by local administrations can be pre-validated through stakeholder discussions with a result that local priorities are on the top of the list in all government planning. This also ensures long term development of municipalities and districts based on the people's aspirations and immediate needs. The operations of the Municipality/District Recovery Forums are funded from the budgets of the respective local administrations, ensuring its local ownership from the outset.

It is envisaged that donors, as well as development and aid agencies will find the Municipality/District Recovery Forum a "one-stop-shop" for their future projects due to the reliable and information it makes available on immediate and long-term needs and priorities rooted in public consensus. The Municipality/District Recovery Forum is also geared to support business development efforts by providing a consultative road map for investors about the potential and challenges existing on the local level. It is expected that improved transparency and accountability will encourage more investments from outside the province, leading to a stronger economy and further development.

The Municipality/District Recovery Forum proves that decentralization and informed decision making by local leadership is an imperative for successful recovery and development. As a result of engagement with the Municipality/District Recovery Forums, the decision-making by government bodies and stakeholders has transformed into "highly-informed and participatory" decision-making. ■

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16	GTZ	Bilateral	59,169,511	544,360		
17	IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)	Palang Merah	52,436,727	482,418		
18	CARE International	NGO	50,856,819	467,883		
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TOSHIBA

# Funding, Operations and Monitoring

THE management of the recovery has emerged not simply as an administrative need, but also as a critical success factor. Considering the scale of the devastation, the number of participating agencies and the funding available, it has been essential to introduce a range of mechanisms to manage the recovery program. Some of these mechanisms have been included here among the 8 case studies for this sector. In these case studies, 5 of which are included in the printed pages while 3 are on CD, a description of some of the procedures implemented by participating agencies is provided. The aim is to illustrate procedures peculiar to the situation in Aceh and Nias and to explore the viability of such mechanisms and their appropriateness for replication.

*The Center for Data and Information (Pusdatin) collects, manages, and dispenses data concerning the activities of NGOs and donors participating in the recovery process, Banda Aceh, July 25, 2007.  
Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi*

# Decentralized Safeguards: Screening, Review and Monitoring of Subprojects

**INTERNATIONAL** good practice requires development agencies and governments to ensure that projects avoid or minimize causing undue short-term harm to people and the environment. In relation to this, environmental and social safeguard policies and processes have been included in the core policies and procedures of international aid and finance institutions to guide planning and implementation of development projects.

In disaster rehabilitation work, however, where the immediate rehabilitation and restoration of key infrastructure, social services and livelihoods are needed, and where local institutions and agencies have been severely weakened, ensuring compliance to established safeguard standards and practice becomes a challenge.

The lessons from the Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project (ETESP) experience can be used as a reference for future disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction work in terms of how to effectively address social and environmental concerns in post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction.

## Background

The ETESP Grant Agreement requires that an Initial Environmental Examination or IEE be conducted for all subprojects financed under ETESP, except those that are solely capacity-building and fiduciary/governance related activities, and submitted for review and approval by both the government's Regional Environmental Impact Management Agency (BAPEDALDA) and the ADB. Monitoring and reporting on the implementation of environmental mitigation measures described in the IEE is also required.

Likewise, the Grant Agreement requires the screening of all subprojects in terms of implications related to land acquisition, involuntary resettlement and indigenous people. Land Acquisition and Resettlement Plans that comply with ADB policies are to be prepared and implemented for a subproject that involves land acquisition or involuntary resettlement. Indigenous People Specific Action is needed for subprojects with an impact on indigenous people. Resettlement monitoring and reporting is also required.

ADB policy requires that environmental assessment prepared for ADB-financed projects/subprojects with limited impacts (Category B) are reviewed by the environmental specialists in regional department. Likewise, resettlement plans for Category B subprojects are to be reviewed by the resettlement specialists in the same department. Those with significant impacts are to be reviewed and cleared by ADB's Chief Compliance Officer (CCO).

Therefore, the challenge in ETESP was how to facilitate subproject review, approval and implementation in order to respond more quickly to the immediate needs of the communities, while ensuring compliance with ADB's safeguard policies and procedures and the long-term environmental and social sustainability of subproject interventions.

## Development and Implementation

The approach taken by ADB was to:

1. Work toward a more decentralized review of safeguards and the monitoring process, and
2. Provide expertise in the field to - (a) advise and train Preparation and Implementation Consultants (PIUs) and local government on the safeguard requirements and standards for ETESP, (b) assist Extended Mission for Sumatra (EMS) and the ADB-Southeast Asia Regional Department (SERD) in the safeguard review of subprojects, (c) oversee the safeguard monitoring of subprojects, and (d) link with related government agencies (i.e. BPN, BAPEDALDA).

EMS developed a harmonized system for reviewing subprojects that – (a) introduced a common approach and nomenclature for all ETESP sectors; (b) reduced the appraisal period for each intervention under the ETESP; (c) allowed for early detection of interventions that could be implemented and interventions that were not feasible for implementation; and (d) identified approvals to be given at EMS level and ADB-HQ level.

The system is a two-staged review process – the Subproject Appraisal Report (SPAR), and the Subproject Preparation Report (SPPR) stage. At the SPAR-review stage, subprojects were screened in terms of potential environmental and social safeguards issues and assigned safeguards categories. Based on the SPAR review, EMS issued a no-objection letter for the inclusion of the subproject to ETESP. This triggered the commencement of more detailed/intensive subproject preparation. Subprojects which were determined as potentially involving land acquisition, land consolidation or re-blocking, structure or asset losses, displacement of people from housing or loss of livelihoods were required to prepare the appropriate resettlement planning documents at the SPPR-review stage. Likewise, IEEs were required for all subprojects that involved civil work. Based on the SPPR-review (including the safeguards planning instruments), EMS issued a no-objection letter for the commencement of civil work.

Two Social Safeguards Advisers (one international and one national), reporting to the EMS Office in Banda Aceh, were mobilized in November 2005. Recruitment of two environment Safeguard Advisers followed. In consultation with the SERD Safeguard Specialists, the EMS advisers undertook subproject screening, reviewed Safeguard assessment and planning documents (LARAP, CAP, IEE), advised/mentored sector consultants/implementing units/local administrations on environmental/social safeguard issues and policies, conducted field visits and set up safeguard monitoring of subprojects.

To facilitate IEE review, EMS worked with BAPEDALDA to conduct joint environmental reviews of ETESP subprojects. Beginning in November 2006, EMS also engaged an Environmental Assessment Officer in NAD and in Nias in the review and monitoring of ETESP subprojects. As of August 2008, a total of 246 ETESP subprojects had undergone environmental assessment. EMS and BAPELDADA both conducted field monitoring of the implementation of environmental mitigation and enhancement measures in these subprojects.

In terms of social safeguards, 80 subprojects were deemed to have a minor land acquisition/involuntary resettlement impact and one subproject a significant impact. Resettlement plans for these subprojects, including supporting documentation, have been reviewed and cleared by ADB. In July 2007 EMS engaged the University of Syiah Kuala to conduct external resettlement monitoring (ERM). Gaps noted in the monitoring were discussed with BRR for appropriate action. After review, ERM reports were uploaded into the ADB website for public disclosure.

## Output/Outcome

The decentralized and two-staged safeguard screening and review allowed the immediate implementation of activities that do not have safeguards issues, and enabled PIUs to integrate safeguard planning and implementation in the detailed subproject planning activities. It also provided opportunities for mainstreaming environmental enhancement measures in subprojects.

For example, in the ETESP fisheries sector additional emphasis has been placed on rehabilitation of the coastal “green zone”, mangrove planting, promotion of environmentally sustainable aquaculture and capture fisheries methods, and improved management of fish landing sites and fuel depots. In the agriculture sector, work included ecologically sensitive rehabilitation of tsunami affected agriculture land and improvement of damaged livestock facilities; and in the housing sector considerable emphasis was placed on ensuring that houses are equipped with a sustainable sanitation system in compliance with national building codes and BRR Sustainable Sanitation Guidelines. As a result, most ETESP subprojects had moderate to significant environmental benefits and have mitigated potential negative impacts.

The early coordination of EMS with BAPEDALDA on the environmental review and monitoring of subprojects and provision of an adviser to BAPEDALDA also (a) enabled ETESP to comply with both the ADB and government of Indonesia (GOI) environmental requirements, (b) expedited BAPEDALDA review and approval, and (c) improved external environmental monitoring of ETESP subprojects.

The mobilization of safeguards advisers at EMS helped (a) augment the capacity gap among PIUs and consultant teams, (b) enhanced the identification of solutions of safeguards issues, (c) facilitated safeguard review and monitoring of subprojects by the ADB SERD, and (d) allowed phased-approval of civil works, while continuously engaging the government on pending safeguard issues and concerns.

## Challenges

The initial challenges faced by ETESP revolved around (a) the PIU, local governments and preparation consultant teams’ lack of familiarity with ADB environmental and social safeguards policies, requirements, and procedures, and (b) limited capacity of agencies with roles on environmental assessment and land acquisition and resettlement.

These were addressed in various degrees with the engagement of safeguards advisers at EMS, with guidance from ADB safeguard specialists in SERD. The regular interaction between the EMS safeguards advisers with PIUs, sector consultants, local governments and other agencies allowed for more hands-on coaching, clarification of issues, and compliance monitoring.

Despite the gains achieved, challenges remain that require close attention in terms of environmental and social safeguards. These include:

- Provision of sustainable building materials for civil work. The demand for building materials has led to the development of uncontrolled and illegal quarries and extensive extraction of river bed materials, and illegal logging.
- Environmental monitoring of subprojects: environmental monitoring has not kept up with the pace of subproject activities. And even where monitoring does occur, follow-up action is typically still limited.
- Reluctance to implement standards and entitlements in ETESP that differ with local practices concerning non-tenured affected persons and determination of compensation rates hinder the resolution of some land acquisition/resettlement issues. This becomes more challenging with the phasing out of BRR.
- Limited disclosure of ETESP entitlements of affected persons which casts doubt on the validity of land contributions made by some affected persons.

## Lessons Learned

The approach taken by ETESP on safeguards has improved the quality of subprojects financed under the grant and helped avoid/minimize adverse impacts on people and the environment. The ETESP experience demonstrated that due diligence can still be done even in post-disaster rehabilitation/reconstruction work.

From the experience, it was learned that environment and social safeguards in rehabilitation and reconstruction can be improved if:

- (a) an integrated safeguards framework is developed and agreed upon with government (EA, IAs and local administrations), donors and partner agencies as early as possible;
- (b) safeguards experts are engaged to work closely with implementation units, preparation consultants and partner agencies, as well as to conduct frequent field visits;
- (c) linkage with development partners with complementing activities or program is established.
- (d) a safeguards team is also mobilized in the EA to provide day-to-day guidance to the work units in the preparation and implementation of subprojects;
- (e) capacity of agencies involved in safeguards (BAPEDALDA, district government ) is assessed early and assistance is provided for improvement ;
- (f) official endorsement from district government of the land acquisition and resettlement guidelines and principles (especially those involving non-tenured APs, and valuation of assets) to be adapted for the project is secured before commencing actual land acquisition procedures; and
- (g) funds for land acquisition and resettlement are made available early in the process. ■

# Settlement Recovery Monitoring: A Final Review

**WHEN** the Indonesian Government set up the national post-tsunami reconstruction agency, BRR NAD-Nias, in April 2005, efficiency, transparency and accountability were outlined as key principles, together with and supported by effective monitoring and evaluation. As key events unfolded in the early months of 2005, it was unclear how rebuilding would take shape. By mid 2005, even though only the basic procedures had been established, an unexpectedly large number of implementing organizations rushed forward to build new houses.

In August 2005, UN-HABITAT took up a policy support role for the Housing and Settlements Department of BRR. The newly established BRR department required assistance in the setting up of its information management and compliance management systems. Some kind of assistance in monitoring and evaluation was therefore expected, even though the format and substance was initially not defined. BRR was already establishing the information management framework at large with the introduction of Project Concept Notes. These eventually developed into a respectable project tracking system, the RAN database. However, it would take until late 2006 before this RAN was producing truly reliable tracking data.

An early conceptual problem for monitoring was simply the question of what to monitor. Many policy makers were not very knowledgeable about housing and did not expect the overwhelming impact of the housing operation on the strategic environment of the reconstruction as a whole. The housing issues were often reduced to a limited

number of questions: the pledges of house units, the number of houses effectively started and the number of houses completed.

The reality was, of course, different. Many things had to come together and many parties had to work together – for instance village councils, sub-district officials, contractors, institutions dealing with land issues, utility companies, and local authorities, including in the education sector – on repairing infrastructure and irrigation and rebuilding schools. In a simplified manner, settlement recovery in Aceh could be represented as a process with two dimensions. One dimension was settlement recovery itself, for which a variety of tasks had to be completed: debris cleared, land mapped, village mapping done and infrastructure and amenities developed. The other dimension was housing recovery and required new houses or repairs to be started, implemented and completed. These activities were like a long pipeline of things to be done. Settlement recovery actions both preceded and followed upon the reconstruction of houses proper. So a housing monitoring program also had to include the extent to which the settlement rebuilding issues were coming together. The whole pipeline had to be tracked. Moreover, the assumption was that the more accomplished in the early phase of the pipeline activity, the more chances there would be to accomplish housing and settlement recovery in full.

Other principles of reconstruction as expressed in the Master Plan – community involvement, sustainability, a holistic approach, integration and prioritizing of vulnerable people – needed also to be monitored with respect to the intertwining dimensions of settlement recovery and housing recovery. Community involvement is required both in relation to settlement issues and when rebuilding homes for people. Furthermore, it was clear that settlement recovery also encompassed issues beyond narrow shelter recovery programming: the restoration and strengthening of local governance, the need for overall planning and coordination (horizontal and vertical), the recovery of livelihoods and issues of environmental safeguards and remediation.

UN-HABITAT developed a monitoring program for housing recovery, which also contributed to the monitoring of settlement recovery in line with the expectations of the Master Plan. The monitoring program was established with a specific layout and implementing and reporting tools, such as monitoring scorecards.

## Establishing the Monitoring Program

By 2008, BRR had set up a number of monitoring systems. The RAN database had become the core tracking instrument, in effect accounting for all implementing organizations and Indonesian government programs. When in mid 2008 UNORC re-tallied all new housing with the assistance of its growing number of field offices, it basically confirmed BRR's data. A geographical information system was also set up within BRR, accounting for all the houses built both 'on-budget' and by implementing organizations.

Of course, in early 2005, the situation had been different. The Humanitarian information System had initially provided decent '3W' datasets (Who does What Where), superimposed on a good map set of Aceh. But the information only tracked emergency assistance. This coordination system more or less broke down by April 2005, with UNHCR, as emergency shelter lead, being replaced by the Indonesian Government and OCHA lacking a clear mandate.<sup>1</sup> The Government wanted to take over coordination, but this was delayed as a result of the Nias earthquake and the time needed to set up BRR.

The Shelter Working Group, set up during the emergency phase, had continued meeting in Banda Aceh and other key locations in April and beyond. But leadership in general was weak – including from UN-HABITAT. In collaboration with the Aceh Housing and Human Settlements Department, Kimpraswil, it was collecting an approximate list of pledges, by value and units. The pledges were continuously changing and thus deemed highly uncertain.

Luckily, by mid-2005, the coordination situation had significantly improved. BRR, the World Bank and UN-HABITAT had established a steering group for housing reconstruction. UN-HABITAT was firmly leading the Shelter Work Group as of September 2005. BRR was supporting comprehensive surveys, tracking housing pledges and housing starts in the field, together with an Acehnese organization 'Garansi' and the provincial authorities.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, the newly appointed UN Recovery Coordinator and the IFRC were still dealing with the problems of the tents and the need for transitional shelter.

However, the overall data environment was still deemed very unreliable. Even though the 'Garansi' survey, first implemented in September and then in November, had recorded an impressive number of housing pledges in specific villages and listed a significant number of housing starts, the overall perception was that these data could very well indicate weak promises and suggest a 'false start'. The trust in promises from NGOs was decreasing by late 2005. The implementation hurdles were considered too numerous – land security, availability of timber, very poor initial quality, volatile costs, etcetera – and the strategic environment uncertain. More than 200,000 units had been pledged, while only about 100,000 were required.

Within this void of reliable data, UN-HABITAT proposed to the Shelter Working Group to collectively engage in more detailed tracking. The presumption was that the nascent RAN database could not provide a dynamic picture of progress, as it was only requesting pledges and physical progress. As said earlier, ongoing preparatory steps such as land mapping and village planning were in themselves indications that the process of settlement and housing recovery had started in a community. Progress on these preparatory steps could tell in an implementing organization was overcoming the initial hurdles. If a minimum set of settlement recovery activities were on-going, such as land mapping and beneficiary selection, it was assumed that housing recovery as such could progress and succeed. The early progress made by a number of organizations, such as Oxfam, UN-HABITAT, UPLINK and a few others made this a reasonable assumption.

First, the member organizations in the Shelter Working Group were to collect the field information on progressing land mapping, village planning and beneficiary selection and to provide this information to an additional tracking module into the RAN database. This effort to integrate additional information within the RAN database was however quickly aborted. The IT teething problems of the RAN database, both with regard to hardware and software, were considerable. As a result, a stand-alone monitoring provision was pursued. The de-linking of the development of the monitoring initiative with that of the development of the RAN database had a second implication. It was no longer necessary that data collection would rely on self-reporting by implementing organizations. The latter has been the modality for the RAN database since its inception. Yet the initial teething problems of RAN and the lack of reporting discipline within overburdened organizations was feeding a vicious circle of under-reporting well into 2006. Tracking early performance and progress through self-reporting could therefore have been self-defeating.

To overcome this threat, UN-HABITAT invited the architecture department of the Banda Aceh state university Syiah Kuala ('Unsyiah') to do the monitoring. Even though the capacity of the department was limited, the choice had several critical advantages. The department could provide monitoring by Acehnese citizens and so fulfill the expectation for third-party monitoring and accountability, which was a strategic objective of the young BRR. Furthermore, the questionnaire was designed in close cooperation with the team of lecturers and students, providing an opportunity to absorb local knowledge and sensitivities in the monitoring program. Finally, the cooperation was an opportunity for local institutional cooperation. UN-HABITAT brought in experience from professional monitors with exposure to other countries and situations. By late 2006, the most experienced UNSYIAH monitors were absorbed as staff in UN-HABITAT, but the field monitoring continued to draw on students of the university.

The initial questionnaire was formulated in October 2005 and did a test run in November. The first published results were released in early February 2006. The program continued until mid 2008. The critical monitoring rounds were done in early 2006, mid 2006 and mid 2007. In addition, special monitoring rounds were done specifically for Red Cross housing program locations in Aceh Jaya and for all housing that had been provided or was being completed by UN-HABITAT. Table 1 provides the details about the timing and the locations.

Table 1 – UN-HABITAT – Unsyiah Monitoring Program – Timeline and Locations.

Monitoring	Month	Districts	Organizations	Villages
Round 1 (test)	Nov 05	Banda Aceh		16
Round 2	Jan - Mar 06	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh, Aceh Barat and Pidie	34	66
Round 3	May - Jul 06	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Nagan Raya, Pidie, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe and Aceh Utara	50	75
UN-HABITAT Housing	Oct - Nov 06	Nias and Nias Selatan		2
Aceh Jaya Housing (various Red Cross organizations)	Nov - Dec 06	Aceh Jaya	3	12
UN-HABITAT Housing	Dec 06 - Feb 07	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh and Pidie		17
UN-HABITAT Housing	Apr 07	Simeulue		3
Round 4	Aug - Sep 07	Aceh Besar, Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Pidie, Pidie Jaya, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe and Aceh Utara	43	73
UN-HABITAT Housing	Early 2008	Simeulue		3

## Monitoring of Compliance to Standards and Principles

The monitoring program started with the aim to assess the progress on the ground in the early months based on limited available information, such as meetings held, ongoing land mapping, and the progress in construction of a few incomplete house initiatives. From the start, the basic assumption was that settlement recovery in a more comprehensive manner needed to be envisaged, especially the preparatory steps of the formal signing of village agreements for housing implementation, the land mapping, the necessary village planning and the identification of beneficiaries. Additional data

could provide more information about the viability of settlement and housing recovery engagements: was any other assistance reaching the villages and neighborhoods, including social, health and education support; was there in kind of targeted assistance for vulnerable groups, were specific activities such as land mapping preceded and or concluded with signed-off documents and where crucial amenities such as drinking water provision being promised and/or provided?

In addition, the monitoring program needed to evaluate the extent to which the reconstruction process was comprehensively meeting the objectives of the Master Plan. Obvious and pragmatic questions were the starting points:

- Was settlement rebuilding responsive to the needs on the ground and could people take charge of the critical decisions what to prioritize and how to proceed?
- Were activities following due process, including land mapping and village planning?
- Was recovery sufficiently holistic, encompassing assistance on issues of livelihoods, health and education and was it inclusive to all people within their respective communities?
- Which infrastructure and amenities were required and were they being planned and provided?

Overall, the monitoring system was developed into a strategic tool set, flagging performance, quality, satisfaction and broad progress. At a strategic level, a critical question was whether monitoring should be done mostly in relation to 'performance-against-standards', querying 'compliance-against-standards'. For housing reconstruction, the question seemed easy, as the standard is usually a building code, which the quality of the constructions should comply with or exceed. Humanitarian assistance is also guided by standards, as expressed in the SPHERE.<sup>3</sup>

The reality of recovery after complex disasters can however not fully be reduced to compliance-against-standards, even though the latter is always critically important. It is well known that in complex social processes where no stakeholders are in full control, errors, opportunism and foul play seep in undetected and put the collective environment at risk, often unknowingly. Making the regulatory environment more complex usually does not lead to more rational responses by actors and rather increases the likelihood of either extreme risk avoidance or of a collapse of communication and collective evaluation. Typical remedies are prescribed under the label of 'fostering a compliance culture': making continuous risk assessments, fostering of an open environment that allows early signs of failure to be spotted and promoting communication without fear. These are cornerstones of modern accountability.

As a strategic tool set, the monitoring system sought to pursue these complementary objectives of compliance. The program measured construction quality against the building code, as an indication of compliance-against-the-standard. At the same time, it provided qualitative indicators on beneficiary satisfaction, the transparency of the process and it reported relative performance during implementation against other

implementing organizations, as a measure of early success or failure. These indicators were useful to guide policy makers and organizations in making critical decisions. By 2007, however, the emphasis shifted from reporting performance to reporting sustainable recovery. Construction quality, satisfaction and transparency with the shelter program only remained a subset of indicators. Additional categories were highlighted, including the progress and relative quality of the planning, infrastructure and amenity provision, environmental remediation and livelihoods recovery. This will be further explained in the next section about the design of the monitoring survey and reporting tools.

## The Design of the Monitoring Program

### The Sample Unit and Its Selection

The monitoring program randomly sampled hamlets or neighborhoods or parts of them where a specific humanitarian organization or a specific government program was providing new houses. A valid standard sample was a project location of a single organization where surveyors could get in touch with the beneficiaries of at least five houses of which the construction was progressing. The definition of the sample unit took into account that houses were mostly built in batches of more than five houses but that a small group of beneficiaries only would be around at the time of monitoring the unfinished houses.

The selected five houses were assumed to represent a representative sample of the on-going construction work facilitated by the implementing organization in a particular location. It was always beyond doubt that the challenges of implementation would cause the quality and the problems to vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, even for one and the same implementing organization. Therefore, it was attempted to select more samples for a particular organization commensurate for the scale of program. This was not always possible, however, for practical reasons. For instance, the survey rounds of the monitoring program targeted one particular district at a time, to which the Unsyiah teams then travelled. It occurred that a larger implementation program had not yet started up its projects in that particular district at the time of the survey, while it was proceeding with housing assistance in another district that was not targeted by the monitoring program at that point in time.

The selection of five houses allowed both to make a pragmatic appreciation of the construction quality of new houses being erected by a program in that village. Typically, a program would provide between 25 to 100 houses at a time. The selection of only five houses did in no way represent a 'building inspection' in order to release organizations of their 'contractor' liabilities. Rather, it simply provided an indication of probable quality being delivered by the implementing organization. In the same way, the beneficiaries of those five houses represented a focus group which could inform the monitors about various issues in relation to shelter and settlement recovery in their neighborhood and testify about issues of satisfaction and transparency.

With respect to the sampling of locations, a simple methodology was followed. Information from the Garansi surveys, the RAN database and data collection in the Shelter Workgroup was collated to make a long list of ongoing implementation activities. Districts were selected based on the availability of sufficient number of locations where housing construction was physically progressing, even if that was only in small numbers. In early 2006, accessibility was also an issue to be considered. Already after the publication of round 2, it became clear that the information and the selection process provided a reasonable overall picture. Most organizations agreed that the feedback was by and large agreeable, even though those who saw embarrassingly poor results reported acknowledged this reality only grudgingly. Organizations like Terre des Hommes Netherlands and Habitat for Humanity Indonesia investigated the information and initiated program corrections.

A more serious issue was of course that the monitoring program was skewed towards areas where reconstruction had effectively overcome the initial hurdles of land, potential resettlement and beneficiary selection and where building had started. As a result, areas of non-activity – for long in Aceh Jaya, along the Southwest coast and on Simeulue – were blind gaps in respect to the needs. Even ongoing minimal preparations in these areas, such as land mapping and beneficiary listing, were not tracked by the monitoring program as the program could only start efficiently surveying progress in those areas where a degree of housing building had taken off. Luckily, the experience of the student monitors built up through 2006 was such that a special monitoring mission on request of BRR could be undertaken to Aceh Jaya to look into the delay problems with regard to programs of the Canadian Red Cross and to map the settlement issues of the villages where so far only transitional shelters had been put up.

## The Questionnaire


In other to picture the progress and issues in relation to both shelter and settlement recovery a lengthy questionnaire was designed. For its design, the contribution of stakeholders was sought. The process started with workshop sessions with Unsyiah lecturers and students. When they tested the questionnaire, additional inputs were included from community members. 13 The active participation in the design of the questionnaire resulted in a feeling of ownership of the process among the monitors.

The result was a questionnaire consisting of 5 key sections: the scoping of the needs and shelter response in a village; the progress on the preparatory work of land mapping and village planning; the needs and responses in relation to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of neighborhood and village infrastructure and amenities, details about the housing program itself; and feedback on the quality of the construction work in progress. Additional forms provided information on the location, the five responding beneficiaries and the organization providing housing assistance.

The questionnaire was very long. About 250 questions needed to be answered by either the focus group of five beneficiaries, if in relation to the rebuilding of the immediate

# Principles of Participation, Sustainability, Risk Reduction and Poverty Reduction

The design of the monitoring program fundamentally acknowledged that settlement recovery would be a long process. The monitoring approach had to catch this stretched out process and had to pay attention to each aspect of the reconstruction process. As an example, UN-HABITAT's methodology of its own Aceh Nias Settlement Support Program (ANSSP) showed that the construction of shelter was only one phase in a long process.



UN-HABITAT has strongly endorsed a holistic settlements recovery approach. The notion 'settlement' refers to broader aspects of habitation, including movement, lifestyle and livelihood patterns. Monitoring settlements requires a focus on demographic composition of households, including identification of vulnerable groups. The program looks into the literacy and wealth of households, and into housing conditions and household's expectations. Migration and resettlement patterns are also of concern for settlement monitoring, including the differences between urban and rural settlement patterns. The monitoring concept takes into consideration the particularities of a post-disaster situation, including involuntary movements, displacement and drastic changes in life style and livelihood, and availability of physical infrastructure including healthcare and education. Fresh water supply and sanitation are of particular concern. In October 2005, 80% of the Tsunami affected people were living in temporary houses, barracks or tents with water supply from tanks. It is a great challenge to connect all of them to improved drinking water<sup>4</sup> and improved sanitation facilities<sup>5</sup> as they move to the newly constructed permanent houses.

UN-HABITAT's concern for sustainability permeates all levels of the reconstruction process. A sustainable settlement should offer a solid foundation for a prosperous life with equal opportunities for all.<sup>6</sup> A sustainable recovery process should build capacity towards disaster resilience. As part of that, houses must allow the full recovery from disaster in a sustainable way. Sustainability of shelter is about more than structural safety of the housing structures. Protection against the elements should be assured, over-crowding avoided, tenure should be secure and people and mobile assets safe. The structural integrity should include the risk of disasters, with a priority to protect people being hurt and killed by the impact of a severe disaster.

With its monitoring, UN-HABITAT aims to contribute to achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG), more precisely MDGs 1, 7, 10 and 11.7 Acting in the MDG-spirit, UN-HABITAT's Governing Council ratified in 2005 the Guideline for Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction<sup>8</sup>, considering guiding principles endorsed by experiences and recommendations<sup>9</sup> of practitioners. The Guideline states that disasters can provide opportunities for sustainable development if rehabilitation efforts are integrated into long term development strategies. Sustainability requires permanent links between the emergency relief and reconstruction on the one hand and the development of local government capacities on the other hand. It requires furthermore the development of productive economic activities, the development of broad-based and long-term reconstruction and shelter strategies, the protection of land and property rights and long-term solutions for land and property disputes. Moreover vulnerability reduction and disaster management, the securing of tenure, in line with Pinheiro Principles<sup>10</sup>, and the enforcement of equal rights for women are necessary. Last but not least the creation of strategic partnerships and alliances at all levels must be fostered.

The international community became aware of the necessity of a shift from disaster management practices towards an integrated disaster risk reduction approach within the framework of sustainable development.<sup>11</sup> An integrated disaster risk reduction effort should be a systematic creation and application of policies, strategies and practices which minimize vulnerabilities in a way that decreases losses and the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards. As required by the Hyogo Framework of Action on the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction in disaster and recovery responses, vulnerability reduction and disaster management should be integrated into existing national and local development and poverty reduction plans<sup>12</sup>. Furthermore, the idea of putting poverty alleviation at the centre of the recovery process acknowledges that the poor are the most vulnerable to major disasters, and also more exposed to small recurrent disasters like floods, landslides, the collapsing of badly maintained buildings etc. Before the Tsunami in Aceh, both poor and rich lived in risk locations. However, the average poor family in the city of Banda Aceh lives in an area which was already below sea level and sank even more after the earthquake and Tsunami. In the near future small disasters like periodically occurring floods will deteriorate house durability in settlements with an insufficient drainage system and the poor inhabitants of these areas will have few savings to maintain their houses.

For UN-HABITAT, the mapping of human settlements issues is a core mandate in the pursuit of the agency to support communities and institutions in improving housing environments and settlement management practices. Urban Sector Profiling, identifying Best Practices and allowing benchmarking through the establishment of standardized databases, as is the objective of the Global Urban Observatory initiative, are but a few ways of establishing such support. Specifically for disaster and recovery responses, Sustainable Relief and Reconstruction ('SRR') guidelines have been formulated, which is accompanied by an indicator tool set. The latter was used to reframe the reporting format of the Aceh monitoring framework, moving from performance benchmarking to a SRR picture of shelter and settlement recovery. Scorecards based on the latter reporting format are included in this publication.

neighborhood by the housing implementing organization providing assistance there, or by the village head for questions about the shelter and settlement recovery in the village as a whole. Another 70 questions were used to guide the student-monitors through a session of visible observation of the features and the quality of the construction of each of the five houses. In total, the questionnaire contained over 1,000 reply boxes to be considered. The vast majority of questions required a simple multiple choice response. Most questions listed the most likely responses and allowed that additional information could be added, such as for instance the name of the organization assisting the land mapping, providing drinking water, or education assistance, or livelihoods support. Responses in relation to the construction of the houses were structured around the

standards set out in the Building Code. One of the answers would correspond with the standard set in the code, while others would be either above-standard or below-standard.

In addition, the student monitors were asked to draw up out the floor plan and elevations of the new houses and to make a sketch of the hamlet layout, so that the targeted houses could be identified. No GPS identification or satellite maps were used.

A typical field monitoring team consisted of one teacher and three to four students. Throughout the program, experienced monitors were retained and new students added to the team. The training of the monitors coincided with the field testing of the questionnaire. <sup>14</sup> A typical work division developed. Two members of the team would typically do the focus group discussion, while another would interview the village leader. An engineering student by preference would do the visual observation of the construction. Architecture students would do the sketching. On a typical day, one team could examine two samples, either two different housing implementation programs ongoing in the same village or two programs ongoing in adjacent villages. In the late afternoon, the team would sit together and check the responses of the long questionnaires. A peculiar afternoon job was to overcome the problem if a focus group discussion with the five beneficiaries all together had not been possible. This happened regularly for a variety of reasons, such as in the case that the available responding men and women were not willing to sit in one focus group together. Then the monitors would resort to filling out five questionnaires with each respondent separately. Later in the day, they would then collate one final response for the 'cluster', based on the most prevalent answer for each question.

Upon return to Banda Aceh, the answers were finally transferred to a database. In addition, the teams provided a complete photo archive of the surveyed houses and their surroundings. After multiple rounds of quality checks, a so-called cleaned database, which had checked and re-checked on typo-errors and data inconsistencies, was released.

## The Indicators

The initial data stream produced as a result of the 2<sup>nd</sup> monitoring round was already comprehensive, but it was obvious that the evaluation was tedious, for several reasons. The broad scope of the questionnaire was of course an obvious challenge. But also the different levels of progress made comparisons difficult. As a result, a number of indicators were developed, which allowed expressing the intermediate outcomes in the sampled location as a set of three numerical scores: construction quality, satisfaction and transparency.

### The Construction Quality score.

As said, the construction quality was measured against the official Building Code. The scoring methodology was done in a number of steps:

- During the survey, the monitor was not allowed to consider the scoring. Being a student, he or she was only asked to do visual observation, ticking boxes which indicated whether a construction item was below standard, compliant to or exceeding it.
- After tabulation, the results were subjected to an algorithm that automatically calculated the score. The evaluator had only to specify the type of construction (full brick, half brick/half timber, or 'other') and the earthquake zone in which the sample was located. (Reconstruction in Aceh and Nias was spread out over three different earthquake zones, with differing construction standards set out for each.)
- The algorithm was based on attributed scores to each of the questions, ranging from 1 to 4; the score 3 was 'in compliance', 4 stood for exceeding the standard while 2 for being sub-standard and 1 or less being outright dangerously sub-standard. The questions were grouped into a number of issues, to calculate a first aggregated score, in relation to the quality of the foundation, the structure, the choice of materials (either structural or for finishing) and the application of bracings and anchoring, two vital attributes to make structures more earthquake safe. At the end a final score was being derived from the sub-scores, with 'downgrades' being applied if one of the sub-scores was particularly bad.

The scoring was a controversial application, simply because most organizations opted to build a concrete-and-brick structure but very few organizations managed to build in compliance with the Building Code. The standard itself was demanding and the know-how among construction workers in Aceh was very limited. Either the design of the construction had to significantly exceed the building code, so as to assure that a limited number implementation errors did not matter or supervision had to be extremely tight. Neither was possible in 2006 for most organizations. It was by some achieved in 2007 and beyond, but only after allowing the average budgets to increase twofold.

The monitoring program therefore applied a pragmatic stand: knowing that the Building Code was typically overdesigned to some degree (the required steel sizes were typically one size larger than what engineering calculations would dictate); the scoring had to indicate to which extent the surveyed structures were approaching the expectations of the Building Code. If that was the case, then the expectation to reduce the risk to large-scale loss of life and wholesale destruction in case of a new heavy earthquake could be met. It would still put structures at risk in the epicenter of a heavy earthquake, but would reduce the overall risks as matter of public policy. This was an important consideration, as most construction was taking place in low density areas.

The approach, however, failed for urban Banda Aceh, where construction standards should have been higher in order to offer more protection. However, on the whole, implementation programs were often less successful here. A simple change to the scoring could have given a better indication, by making the thresholds for 'broadly acceptable quality' more sensitive to population density. But at a broader level, it also

give caution to the inapplicability of the experiences gained in Aceh and Nias as well as in most recent post-disaster settings with regard to more complex post-disaster responses required in large urban areas.

### The Satisfaction score

As mentioned throughout this publication, an important issue of the Aceh Nias reconstruction has been the community oriented approach and community participation. Common construction monitoring systems usually revolve around hard facts like cost, quality and delivery in time. For shelter and settlement recovery, an indication of community involvement was, however, important.

The questionnaire had both questions looking for factual information and querying subjective feedback from beneficiaries. Community participation could be queried

The construction quality indicator put an average score between 0 and 4 to every cluster of 5 houses which was sampled. The first table shows the meaning adhered to each score.

A distinction had to be made between timber and brick houses. The Building Code specified that timber had to have a certain class and strength, but was not necessarily the best timber. This had implications to the expected lifetime of the construction. Simply put: a brick construction in accordance with the Building Code would easily survive more than 20 years, while a timber construction in compliance would probably not exceed 10 to 15 years. The monitoring scoring therefore put the score of '3' only to timber constructions with the best wood, which would have a comparable lifetime with the brick constructions.

Scoring Matrix for Construction Quality		
BUILDING TYPE		
score	brick, concrete, metal	half-brick, soft-infill, timber
4	<i>BETTER THAN BUILDING CODE</i>	<i>BUILDING CODE, AND VERY DURABLE</i>
better than required		
3	<i>BUILDING CODE TRESHOLD</i>	<i>BUILDING CODE , AND MORE DURABLE</i>
>2.5	broadly acceptable	
<2.5	many acceptable; may require inspection for retrofitting	
2	<i>BELOW BUILDING CODE</i>	<i>BUILDING CODE TRESHOLD</i>
poor; to be replaced or retrofitted		
1	<i>CRITICALLY BELOW BUILDING CODE</i>	<i>BELOW BUILDING CODE</i>
dangerous; to be replaced immediately		
0	<i>INACCEPTABLE</i>	<i>CRITICALLY BELOW BUILDING CODE</i>

The table shows the list of indicators on which the scoring was based. Critical issues were those with which every construction had to comply. Conditions issues could lead to different requirements of the critical issues. For instance, not all soil types would justify a strip foundation. Or not all types of timber would qualify as structural timber.

## Scoring parameters

Categories	Indicators	
	Critical Issues	Conditional Criteria
Foundation	foundation material, foundation base width, material of the foundation strip and plinth tie beam, dimension of the foundation strip, concrete composition, diameter of structural reinforcement, stirrup distance	soil type, type of foundation, class of structural timber, type of reinforcement, distance between two columns, earthquake zone
Structure	plinth tie beam material and dimensions, type and materials of the columns, tie beam material, wall in-fill material, diameters of the structural reinforcement, diameter of non-structural reinforcement, stirrup distance, concrete composition, water source and quality for concrete	type of house, type of foundation, class of structural timber, type of reinforcement, sand quality, utilization of continuous lintel beams over doors or windows, earthquake zone
Material Choice	cement type, type of aggregates, class of structural timber, class of non-structural timber, diameter of structural reinforcement, diameter of non-structural reinforcement, water source and quality for concrete, wall material, floor material, roof structure material	main door material, bathroom door material, window material, sand, quality, type of reinforcement, earthquake zone
Bracing/ Anchoring	application of anchors tying walls and columns to the roof structure, type of bracings including wind bracing, anchoring of door and windows to the wall frames	earthquake zone
Finishing Quality	floor material, cement composition for finishing plaster work, cement type	

directly and indirectly. Easy questions were about the frequency of community meetings and the participation rate of women. Indirect indications could be derived from questions asking for factual information: when monitors asked the focus group whether the land maps had been concluded and signed off, the answer 'I don't know' would point to a lack of community involvement, especially if this answer was returned in response to many questions.

Yet the most difficult point to gauge the quality of community involvement was the discontinuity and complexity of the interactions of communities with housing implementing organizations. People were often intensively involved in the initial communications on land mapping and beneficiary selection. Thereafter, organizations often went back to prepare for design and engineering, budgeting and contracting. It was a well known and often lamented issue that many communities were not contacted for months in a row thereafter, especially in 2005 and the first half of 2006. Communities became quite disappointed as a result. Moreover, the likelihood that organizations, because of internal bureaucratic, funding or competency problems, did not follow up

with actual housing construction, reduced its commitments or returned with additional queries was substantial.

As a result, many communities were dealing with more than one organization at a time, be it for shelter only and of course also in relation to other needs. Pinpointing community involvement and satisfaction in relation to a single housing program was therefore not easy and a single indicator would be at most indicative. A simple and pragmatic selection was made, resulting in nine questions on which replies were valued as 1, 0 or -1. A cumulative score between 3 and 9 was labeled green / satisfied. A score below -3 was considered red / dissatisfied. In-between was yellow.

The following questions were used:

- Is the new house (likely to be) comfortable?
- Did the housing organizations a good job, overall speaking?
- Would you recommend that the organization implement its program in other villages?
- Has the organization built good infrastructure and facilities?
- Is the organization (or any organization) providing a place of worship or promising to do so?
- Is the organization (or any organization) providing a school or promising to do so?
- Has the organization kept the community informed?
- Has the organization kept it promises in this village?
- Has the organization followed the wishes of communities?

These simple questions query a couple of issues: first, the first three questions query the general appreciation of the program, in the sense whether people like the house and commend the work of the organization; the next three questions ask whether it providing more than shelter assistance; and the last three questions query the overall responsiveness of the organization versus the community. Feedback throughout the monitoring program has validated the choice of these questions. Obtaining a good house was important for people, irrespective of the way it had been provided. But indirectly, it was also judged important to see that amenities and infrastructure were provided and the housing organization was seen as the provider of the last resort. If settlement recovery failed but houses were built, the housing implementing organization was blamed for it, often with further recriminations made such as its lack of willingness to follow the wishes of the community.

In short, the satisfaction score required organizations to deliver good houses, but also to take up the initiative for assisting in a holistic and sustainable recovery of the settlement as a whole. The low levels of satisfaction did therefore not only show the lack of competency of many organizations, but also the problematic formulation of their shelter-only programs and thus the problematic sectoral response policy upheld by both BRR, the major humanitarian organizations and many donors.

## The Quality – Satisfaction Matrix

The development of two indices allowed a performance benchmarking matrix to be put together. This became the Quality – Satisfaction Matrix. The matrix simply listed all sample results, providing a scorecard showing organizations which did well on both scores in a certain location, or those which scored poorly on either or both indices. The performance matrix was useful as it gave quick feedback, without making allusions that there was a causal relationship between satisfaction and quality. Early quick statistical analysis had indicated that it was futile to look for simple cause and effect relationships on many issues in the shelter and settlement recovery process. This had been supported by subsequent analysis which maintained that it was not possible to identify simple explanations or easy fixes.

The first complete matrix was made on the basis of round 2 results. It was presented with a strategic purpose in mind: green was chosen for programs producing shelter which broadly in line with the building standard – even if not fully compliant. The very few organizations which were fully compliant to or exceeding the Building Code were coded blue. Those which scored close to the 2 got a yellow status. One organization received a red label. The guiding criterion for the color coding was thus construction quality. The relative position of the organization, however, with a quarter of all organizations ending up in the box 'lower quality and lower satisfaction' was, however, an indication of weak performance.

Moreover, many of the larger programs had more than one sample in the matrix and scored at times well but in other locations often poor. The matrix therefore 'named and shamed' organizations that did poorly by and large. But it also brought out a statement that there were 'no saints nor sinners' in the Aceh and Nias reconstruction. Organizations could have a decent program, but still get into problems in certain districts or locations or with certain communities.

## The Transparency or Accountability Score

When in February 2005, rumors came up that two programs of international organizations were being investigated by their headquarters because of malfeasance and corruption problems, the monitoring team analyzed the 2<sup>nd</sup> round database, which had just been compiled, and distilled an Accountability Index. It was a timely input for policy: the monitored programs of those agencies showed very poor results on the questions in relation to the transparency of the process. As a result, randomly selected beneficiaries had come to the same conclusion as auditors in headquarters. However, the problems of these two organizations were not the tip of the iceberg, but simply symptomatic of two failing programs. The transparency score was calculated mainly based on two questions: did beneficiaries think that the process of obtaining new houses, including the selection of beneficiaries, was done openly and honestly and were labor and materials being bought in fairness and without corruption? Eighty percent of the score was linked to the replies on these questions, while the rest was based on a couple of secondary

calibrating questions querying the general satisfaction of beneficiaries with the housing organization. A score from 8 to 10 was classified as green / transparent. Below 5 was red, pointing to considerable or even grave problems. Between 5 and 8 indicated the possibility of problems (orange).

An area of concern has always been that the accountability problems were not caused by or related to the implementation program and its implementing organization. For instance, various forms of malfeasance (bending rules, collusion, etc.) could have been caused within communities or by community leaders. As a result, the index showed as likely the robustness of the process in which the organization was involved. The tightly organized contractor-led programs of several Red Cross organizations, which as of 2007 started to deliver houses of high cost and quality by qualified contractors and with strict oversight, were generally judged by beneficiaries as transparent and accountable. However, well organized community-driven programs reached the same results, although under duress, much earlier and at a much lower cost in early 2006.

### Limitations of the Program

A number of concerns have already been listed in the above discussion: the balance sought between monitoring compliance-against-standards and the fostering of a compliance and performance culture, the use of student monitors, the selection of samples based on progress and the easy interpretation that problems were caused by under-performing housing implementing organization. Another area of concern has been to present the questioning of respondents with a multiple-choice list as a 'focus group discussion'. Moreover, it happened that the selected five households were not representative for the community. Straight forward problems such as beneficiaries overstating their needs and frustrations were of course also common.

Another area of concern has been that the institutionalizing of information feedback has proven difficult over the past years. There were several valid reasons. Like so much post-tsunami work, the approach fostered an exclusive micro-view. The provision of encompassing flood protection, water resource management, the delivery of urban services and other matters are indeed often not organized at a settlement level, but by the administrations of sub-districts and districts. Another reason for the lack of institutionalization was that Syiah Kuala University has not succeeded in setting up a settlements based research program, mainly due to the result of the lack of a spatial planning and urban management department/faculty.

Of course, once it became clear that the housing reconstruction program as a whole was succeeding, the monitoring program in its present format, stressing performance and early warning, started to lose its strategic value. BRR required asset audit initiatives, listing all work done rather than evaluating on-going dynamics. This limitation also meant that with this publication, the program could exit.

## Reporting Tools

### Reporting Quality, Satisfaction and Transparency Issues

For the reporting of the monitoring results, UN-HABITAT used various outlets: the Shelter Work Group, the distribution of a CDroms , briefing sessions with authorities, a website, a newsletter, policy documents, national and international seminars and workshops.

The dissemination would typically start with a debriefing and discussion session with the Unsyiah monitors after the completion of the database. Next, the results were presented and discussed in the Shelter Work Group. CDroms were distributed to all interested organizations. In the months up to September 2006, 40 CDroms were distributed through government presentations, 9 were given to donors and close to 60 were collected by humanitarian organizations. All recipients had to sign a declaration that they could not approach individual respondents-beneficiaries in case of poor results.

A critical application was the UN-HABITAT electronic newsletter for Aceh and Nias shelter reconstruction. The newsletter was sent to 800 email addresses, including to the United Nations Special Envoy for the Tsunami Reconstruction. The newsletter provided a short review on critical issues, in relation to quality, accountability or land issues. In addition, policy briefings for Aceh and Nias were widely published, especially in the critical months of the first half of 2006.

The website [www.unhabitat-indonesia.org](http://www.unhabitat-indonesia.org) provides a full archive of all the reporting tools.

### Beyond Quality, Satisfaction and Accountability: The SRR scorecards

As earlier indicated, the need arose to report beyond the immediate issues of performance and to use the monitoring system in order to indicate the outcomes rather than the outputs of all activities. This has proven to be still a work in progress. A scorecard was developed bringing together various categories of information in relation to shelter and settlement recovery, including the categories of (1) critical infrastructure and amenities, (2) critical land use, planning and rights issues, (3) environmental remediation, and (4) livelihoods restoration.

The set of scorecards brought together thematically cover the following:

- Realizations of large programs in 2006 and 2007 respectively;
- Realizations of small INGO programs, in 2006 and 2007 respectively;
- Realizations of community driven programs, in 2006 and 2007 respectively;
- Contractor-built realizations;
- Realizations of programs of the Indonesian Government (BRR), as well as of Indonesian NGOs (2006-2007) and of Indonesian philanthropic initiatives funded by Indonesian companies;

- Red Cross Society programs;
- UN-HABITAT realizations; and
- Results of the government reconstruction program in Central Java (Klaten district) and Yogyakarta (Bantul district).

These scorecards allow a realistic but also sobering review of the achievements of the post-Tsunami assistance in Aceh and Nias. They should enable future evaluation work. Monitoring and evaluation should indeed continue in Aceh and Nias. For the amount of humanitarian funds invested in the settlement recovery, repeated evaluation and learning over time is no luxury. Monitoring and evaluation also provide a chance to look back when providing future assistance for development and further peace building. Indeed, rebuilding Aceh is still ongoing, especially in terms of rebuilding the infrastructure and the economy. The sustainability of the rebuilt settlements is not yet really certain. ■

## (Endnotes)

1. This writing is derived from sections of an earlier report: "Post-Tsunami Settlement Recovery Monitoring in Aceh by UN-HABITAT and Syiah Kuala University", by Francesca Campagnoli, Bruno Dercon, Tito Syahjanuar and Daniel Timme, Preliminary Report presented at the TRIAMS 2 Conference, Bangkok, and March 22, 2007. On the status of UNHCR
2. The surveys, conducted in September and November 2005, were published as the 'Garansi Surveys'. The initiative had teething problems and was, probably prematurely, aborted. BRR decided to invest more into the RAN tracking system, while the National Statistics Bureau, BPS, would do more comprehensive census-like data gathering. However, data gathering bridging the gap between the broad statistical data collection of BPS and the narrow 'production data' supplied by implementing organizations remained needed. In 2006, the Housing and Settlements Department of BRR did additional data gathering by itself, such as the listing of all beneficiaries. It took almost 2 years, till late 2007, until these stand-alone data gathering produced verified results.
3. "SPHERE Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response", the Sphere Project, 2004
4. WHO Water, Sanitation and Health Program Communication, March, 25th 2003: definitions: "Improved" water supply technologies: household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected dug well, protected spring, rainwater collection. "Not improved": unprotected well, unprotected spring, vendor-provided water, bottled water tanker truck provided water.
5. WHO/UNICEF Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council: Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment Report, Geneva, New York, 2000, pp.77-78: definitions: "Improved" sanitation technologies: connection to a public sewer, connection to septic system, pour-flush latrine, simple pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine. "Not improved": service or bucket latrines (where excreta are manually removed), public latrines, latrines with an open pit. The excreta disposal system is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if hygienically separates human excreta from human contact.
6. Governing Council of the United Nations Human Settlements Program, HSP/GC/20/5, 1st November 2004

7. The Millennium Development Goals are 18 internationally agreed targets in 8 development areas. They are to be achieved by 2015 with the exception of target 11, which shall be achieved by 2020. Goal 1: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Goal 7, target 10 and 11 are shelter specific, 10: Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. MDG are part of the Millennium Declaration, UN-GA 2000, for more information see: [www.unhabitat.org](http://www.unhabitat.org)
8. UN-Habitat Governing Council 20th session, Post-conflict, natural and human-made disasters assessment and reconstruction, April 2005 (HSP/GC/20/5)
9. World Urban Forum 2, Barcelona, September 2004
10. "The Pinheiro Principles: United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons", edited by COHRE on the basis of the final report of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 2005.
11. ISDR, Living with Risk, A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, Geneva July 2002
12. MDG 1 also relates to shelter in disaster situation. Disasters reduce directly livelihood sustainability, because of damage to housing, service infrastructure, savings, productive assets and human losses. Disasters have also an indirect impact on livelihood sustainability because they force vulnerable households to sell productive assets, and thus they increase inequality by pushing many into long-term poverty. In Aceh, Indonesia, the 2004 Tsunami is estimated to have increased the proportion of people living below the poverty line from 30% to 50% (DfID, 2006)
13. As a result, there are some additional questions in the questionnaire used in round 3 to survey 97 cases compared to the questionnaire used to survey 74 clusters in round 2. Round 3 complete database of 171 clusters circulated in late September 2006 is based on the wider questionnaire; therefore clusters surveyed in round 2 happen to have the newly introduced questions blank.
14. Training series: two day on the field led by Robin Willison in October 2005; one evening seminar led by Elisabeth Hausler at UN-Habitat's ANSSP in May 2006

## Multi Donor Fund (MDF)

# Ensuring Quality in Reconstruction Activities

**THE** Multi Donor Fund has proven to be a strong framework for realizing the goals of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in the context of the recovery. It also serves as a platform for broader policy dialogue with all stakeholders involved in the reconstruction process<sup>1</sup>. The Multi Donor Fund portfolio draws on five of the Partnership Commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. These include ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability<sup>2</sup>.

The overall goal of the Multi Donor Fund is to efficiently and effectively contribute to the reconstruction of a better Aceh and Nias following the earthquakes and tsunami. In this context, a “better” Aceh and Nias means not only improving infra-structure in accordance with the Government’s Master Plan, but also adhering to social concerns, such as reducing poverty, improving livelihoods, and increasing equity.

This overall goal will be accomplished by<sup>3</sup>:

- Pooling donor resources to support a mutually-agreed portfolio of projects and programs;
- Working through and within the Government’s Master Plan for recovery;

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1 Review of Post-Crisis Multidonor Trust Funds, Final Report prepared by the Scanteam, February 2007; First Year of Rebuilding Together: Results, Challenges and Opportunities: Lessons Learned Outcomes Report, May 2006.

2 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonization, Alignment, Results, and Mutual Accountability, February-March 2005.

3 Recovery Assistance Policy; MDFTANS, 2005

- Promoting bottom-up and demand-driven development of initiatives that are eligible for financing;
- Partnering with Government and non-government agencies;
- Serving as a forum for donor coordination;
- Supporting a policy dialogue between the international community, civil society and the Government on progress in the recovery process;
- Having funds flow through the Government budget wherever effective, and outside of the budget if the Steering Committee deems this more effective;
- Pursuing gender-sensitive activities;
- Seeking opportunities to support the peace process (conflict sensitivity); and
- Avoiding worsening regional disparities.

In attaining the goal of the MDF as set out in the Recovery Assistance Policy (MDFTANS, 2005), the expected results for Aceh and Nias are characterized as being:

- Communities/community infrastructure regenerated
- Larger infrastructure repaired
- Livelihoods restarted and Poverty reduced
- Governance rebuilt
- Environment sustained

The MDF places great importance on ensuring the quality of the implementation of the portfolio across all projects. This is achieved through a multi-pronged approach, encompassing the formulation and use of the MDF Results Framework, the use of a Management information System (MIS) tracking the implementation status of all projects and participating in and facilitating various visits and missions to the field that promote and ensure a first-hand experience of the conditions and workings of the projects in the MDF portfolio.

The MDF's approval process ensures that its portfolio is aligned with the priorities for the reconstruction. The Multi Donor Fund receives project proposals endorsed by BRR for funding. The Steering Committee reviews and endorses proposals assisted by a Technical Review Committee, whose members include representatives of the Government, donors, the World Bank and UN as observers. The World Bank and several other agencies serve as Partner Agencies<sup>4</sup>, responsible for appraisal and supervision of projects, including making grants to governmental and non-governmental implementing entities. Most of the MDF's funds (75%) are channeled through the government budget, and implemented by national agencies.

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4 Approved Partner Agencies of the Multi Donor Fund are the UNDP, World Food Program and World Bank.

## The MDF Results Framework

In order for the MDF to determine whether its goal and expected results are met, a comprehensive Logical Results Framework was developed. Determining appropriate macro-indicators, baseline values, and deliverable outputs and outcomes in order to ensure the efficient and effective tracking of results created a challenge due to the complex and diverse nature of projects that make up the MDF portfolio. The complexity of formulating a suitable Logical Results Framework to encompass the expected results in this diverse portfolio was compounded by the use of both on-budget and off-budget funding mechanisms in the portfolio, as well as different Partner Agencies fulfilling project supervision and monitoring activities. These Partner Agencies, as set out in the overarching agreements between the Trustee of the MDF and Partner Agencies are required to report to the MDF according to their own internal reporting requirements, and not in a customized manner specific to the MDF. This posed a significant challenge to the preparation of the framework for tracking results, and continues to present complexities in monitoring and reporting.

However, this Framework has managed to encompass clear qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the expected results and also uses a standardized format for easy stakeholder review, reference, monitoring and evaluation. It puts the policy into a broader context that

- focuses on verifiable results (both immediate deliverables, and longer term effects and impacts)
- highlights assumptions and risks
- in view of the need to periodically modify the policy, permits a rapid review and examination of it

The recovery of communities and regenerating of community infrastructure are tracked through various results focusing on the restoration of land ownership, housing and community infrastructure that contribute to improved living conditions. These include the number of land titles registered, the number of households resettled in reconstructed or rehabilitated homes, and also qualitative results such as the satisfaction level of the beneficiaries relating to the planning processes and the end products (e.g. houses).

In the monitoring of the recovery of large infrastructure, the quality of the rehabilitation, reconstruction and maintenance of key primary and secondary infrastructure are measured through both qualitative and quantitative indicators. The completion of designs and infrastructure components are measured, as well as the satisfaction rate of users.

In measuring the improved quality of governance and public services, the percentages of sub-projects (in value and in number) that are managed by local governments, as well as proportion of projects administered by the local governments that apply appropriate practices during project design and implementation are considered. Qualitative results indicators include the satisfaction level of beneficiaries with services provided.

The monitoring of the sustainability of the environment in the reconstruction process is measured against the implementation of environmental safeguards by the projects, as well as the increased access to effective waste management systems by communities and the clearance of tsunami waste.

In tracking the effectiveness and efficiency of the recovery process, the Results Framework measures the enhanced capacities of the BRR in strategic planning, policy development, implementation and quality monitoring, and the monitoring of complaints.

The logical framework has periodically been revisited and updated to ensure correspondence with the Multi-Donor Fund's dynamic portfolio. With the reconstruction efforts now shifting focus toward longer term economic recovery and enabling provincial governments to better use their own resources, the logical framework will again be reassessed to better reflect these important developments.

Projects in the MDF portfolio have individual results frameworks or equivalent tracking systems based on the Partner Agency models and requirements. This framework is a requirement for submission at Project Appraisal Document stage.

## MDF Reporting and Managing Feedback

As part of the monitoring activities of the MDF to ensure quality in the portfolio, the MDF Secretariat provides regular reports to the Steering Committee and the public on the status and progress of the projects and portfolio. The MDF Secretariat also uses various internal reports to facilitate the tracking of the portfolio.

Quarterly Financial Reports are prepared which provide updated figures of disbursements, project spending and pledges received from donors. The rate at which funds are disbursed to the projects is an important indicator of project progress.

Semi-annual progress reports are also prepared and submitted to the Steering Committee. These reports provide updates on all project results. Furthermore, the progress of the portfolio as a whole is presented, highlighting the results, challenges and expected outlook of the portfolio. In this way, the quality and progress of the MDF portfolio is regularly updated to MDF donors and other stakeholders.

Annual Reports are prepared to keep the public updated on achievements across the portfolio. In this way the MDF demonstrates its accountability to the beneficiaries and communities at large.

The internal Implementation Status Reports (MIS) of the MDF allows the Secretariat to be able to efficiently monitor the progress of all projects. This is an indispensable tracking tool that is regularly updated and which covers all projects in the portfolio.

Progress reports are submitted by the projects at regular intervals, enabling the MDF to track and report on project implementation – achievements, challenges and outlook. As

noted, these reports are based on the relevant Partner Agency reporting standards. In the case of the World Bank, this includes Aide Memoires and Implementation Status Reports, while the UNDP provides quarterly progress reports. Donors and the MDF Secretariat frequently join World Bank supervision missions as a way to gain first-hand exposure to project implementation progress and results.

Managing feedback contributes to the quality of the portfolio. Queries are handled directly by the MDF Secretariat or are forwarded to the respective projects for response. All projects in the Multi Donor Fund portfolio are required to set up an Anti Corruption Action Plan (ACAP) in their project management. One of the activities supporting the ACAP is the complaints handling unit (CHU). Complaints submitted typically involve general questions, misuse of funds, the approaches to and methods in settling cases, and implementation compliance issues.

## Evaluations and Field Missions

The MDF supports various missions to project implementing sites as well as portfolio evaluations as part of its dedication to ensuring quality in its portfolio. These include field visits to the various projects as part of Supervision Missions for World Bank implemented projects, European Commission Results Oriented Monitoring (EC ROM) Missions, and the commissioning of independent evaluations.

World Bank as Partner Agency requires that Supervision missions are held every six months. These missions evaluate the performance of the projects, identifying problem areas and making recommendations for the way forward. Representatives from the MDF Secretariat attend these missions as observers. The UNDP has regular field missions which inspect all UNDP projects. Results, areas of concern and recommendations appearing in resulting reports from these missions are incorporated into the MDF reports prepared by the Secretariat to the Steering Committee. Particular areas requiring attention are brought to the attention of the stakeholders.

EC ROM missions are frequently held, and these evaluate the projects along the OECD Development Assistance Criteria (DAC). The DAC criteria offer a set of comprehensive and complementary measures against which to assess development initiatives. The criteria are: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance.

The MDF has recently conducted a Social Sustainability Review and an Environmental Sustainability Review. These two reviews also feed into the Mid Term Review of the MDF Portfolio which is currently underway. These reviews underscore the MDF's commitment to quality in the portfolio.

The objectives of the Environmental Sustainability Review were to determine the quality of MDF projects in terms of incorporation and application of good practice in project implementation, and the results achieved to date. The review assessed the

application of practices that support environmental sustainability within the MDF, and evaluated appropriateness and application of practices within projects, and the overall compliance of projects and the portfolio with good practice. Intended and unintended positive and negative impacts and benefits relative to environmental sustainability were identified and, where appropriate, recommendations to improve the performance of projects and the portfolio as a whole were provided. Additionally, existing indicators were reviewed and recommendation provided for the Monitoring and Evaluation of the portfolio. Cross-cutting issues in the portfolio and the reconstruction context were also examined. Lessons learned were identified and challenges of mainstreaming cross-cutting themes in a reconstruction context were examined. Recommendations were provided which will feed into the Mid Term Review and its findings and recommendations.

The objectives of the Social Sustainability Review are to assess the inclusion and application of practices that contribute to enhanced social sustainability through MDF projects and the quality of Implementation and to verify results in the fields, analyzing the beneficiaries' perspective on the creation of social sustainability through MDF activities and the benefits/ intermediate results thereof. Based on this analysis recommendations are to be provided for the improvement of ongoing projects, where appropriate, and regarding the mainstreaming of social sustainability in the MDF portfolio during its remaining period of implementation.

The Mid-Term Review is currently underway and is assessing the performance of the MDF in two areas. Firstly, it is assessing the progress of the portfolio towards achieving the goals of the MDF, and the status of the portfolio in terms of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact, including the effects of the pooling of recovery funds. The second part of the assessment concentrates on the operational performance in terms of relevance and effectiveness of the MDF governance and management mechanisms, and also the level of compliance with rules and regulations of the Partner Agencies.

By framing the MTR at these two levels, the review would not only provide recommendations for enhancing the quality of the portfolio of projects, but can also feed into the wider international discussion of Multi Donor Trust Funds as post-crisis reconstruction tools and contribute to World Bank adequacy of operational procedures for effective MDTF management.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> A major stock-taking was conducted during 2006/07 and resulted in the "Review for Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds", February 2007. Scanteam. See specifically Annex E: "The Indonesia Multi-Donor Fund" for an in-depth analysis of the MDF.

## Conclusion

The MDF places great emphasis on ensuring the quality of its reconstruction activities.

Managing a large trust fund requires greater effort in ensuring quality of projects. A single project trust-fund would only require a results framework that focuses on one specific area. In the case of the MDF determining appropriate macro indicators, baseline values and deliverable outputs and outcomes for tracking of results can be challenging due to the complex and diverse nature of projects that make up the MDF portfolio. Thus, to enhance the efforts other approaches are also adopted: project reports, supervision missions, donor-funded missions, independent reviews (social, environment and portfolio level), and managing feedback from beneficiaries, etc.

Lessons learned from the Multi Donor Fund's experiences will be used not only to enhance the operations for the MDF's own portfolio but also shared widely so that its forward looking recommendations can enhance the quality of future post-disaster reconstruction efforts in other contexts. ■

